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ABSTRACT		This	thesis	traces	the	influence	that	transnational	networks	had	on	the	early	advocacy	campaigns	of	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee,	from	its	founding	in	February	1979	through	the	Madrid	follow-up	Conference	on	Security	and	Cooperation	in	Europe,	which	began	in	November	1980.		An	investigation	of	the	organization’s	early	advocacy	strategies	reveals	how	contact	between	activists	in	the	United	States	and	the	Soviet	Union	helped	shape	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee’s	presentation	of	Soviet	human	rights	abuses	to	American	audiences.		U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	utilized	nongovernmental	contact	across	transnational	networks	to	advocate	for	greater	human	rights	protections	using	a	strategy	I	refer	to	as	“moral	linkage.”	This	strategy	reframed	the	Soviets’	failure	to	observe	such	rights	as	an	obstacle	to	greater	cultural,	educational	and	scientific	exchanges	between	states,	calling	upon	private	organizations	and	individuals	involved	in	such	exchanges	to	insist	that	future	cooperation	be	contingent	upon	the	recognition	of	these	rights.																														
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INTRODUCTION		On	1	August	1975,	thirty-five	heads	of	state	and	government	from	Europe	and	North	America	convened	in	Helsinki,	Finland	to	sign	the	Final	Act	of	the	Conference	on	Security	and	Cooperation	in	Europe	(CSCE)—a	nearly	three-year	long	multilateral	negotiation	that	sought	to	minimize	the	possibility	of	military	confrontations,	and	standardize	a	framework	for	greater	technological,	economic	and	cultural	cooperation	between	states.		The	purpose	of	this	conference	was	to	offer	a	more	complete	reevaluation	of	the	existing	international	order	than	that	which	had	prevailed	upon	the	European	continent	since	the	end	of	the	Second	World	War.		A	comprehensive	multilateral	agreement	in	the	areas	of	security,	as	well	as	technological	and	cultural	cooperation,	the	conference	was	meant	to	standardize	relations	between	participating	states	in	the	spirit	of	détente,	thus	helping	to	stabilize	the	Cold	War	balance	of	power	and	usher	in	a	more	robust	and	lasting	peace.			The	acceptance	of	the	Helsinki	Final	Act	fundamentally	changed	the	nature	of	interstate	relations	during	the	Cold	War	in	a	way	that	was	not	fully	understood	at	the	time	of	its	signing.		This	thesis	is	a	study	of	one	small	part	of	that	process	of	change.		Throughout,	I	will	demonstrate	ways	in	which	transnational	concern	for	human	rights	developed	among	nongovernmental	actors	in	the	context	of	Helsinki	activism.		My	research	will	focus	primarily	on	the	conduct	of	one	American	NGO	that	was	established	in	response	to	the	signing	to	the	Final	Act—the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee.		Through	an	investigation	of	documentation	relevant	to	the	early	advocacy	campaigns	of	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	from	its	founding	in	February	1979	through	the	start	of	the	Madrid	follow-up	conference	to	the	CSCE	in	November	1980,	this	thesis	will	provide	a	clearer	understanding	of	the	tactics	and	approaches	that	were	used	to	advance	Western	popular	support	for	humanitarian	reforms,	as	well	as	the	degree	to	which	these	campaigns	relied	upon	contacts	across	transnational	networks	in	order	to	be	effective.1																																																										1	There	is	some	discrepancy	among	sources	and	scholars	concerning	the	exact	founding	date	of	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee.		The	$400,000	Ford	Foundation	grant	that	was	to	fund	the	activities	of	the	organization	through	its	first	two	years	was	received	in	January	1979.		This,	according	to	Helsinki	Watch	Chairman	Robert	Bernstein,	marked	the	moment	that	“Helsinki	Watch	was	born.”		However,	the	organization	was	by	no	means	operational	at	this	time,	as	it	still	did	not	have	much	of	its	executive	committee	in	place,	nor	had	it	appointed	an	executive	director.		Other	scholars	have	placed	the	organization’s	founding	to	be	as	early	
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This	research	will	shed	new	light	on	the	nature	of,	and	extent	to	which,	interactions	between	American	private	citizens,	U.S.	government	officials,	and	Soviet	and	East	European	dissidents	helped	to	further	a	new	approach	to	human	rights	advocacy	in	the	aftermath	of	the	signing	of	the	Helsinki	Final	Act.		At	the	foundation	of	this	approach	was	the	language	of	the	Final	Act	itself,	which	provided	a	legitimizing	basis	for	private	citizens	to	call	upon	participating	governments	to	honor	their	commitments	to	respect	human	rights	and	fundamental	freedoms.		But	what	gave	these	calls	their	salience	was	the	direct	connection	that	could	be	drawn	between	the	provision	of	these	rights	and	the	fulfillment	of	other	cultural,	economic,	and	scientific	exchanges	that	were	encouraged	through	the	process	of	détente	and	the	Final	Act	specifically.		The	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	stressed	this	connection	in	the	course	of	their	human	rights	advocacy,	using	a	strategic	approach	that	I	will	refer	to	throughout	this	paper	as	“moral	linkage.”2		In	the	earliest	years	of	its	existence,	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	relied	heavily	upon	transnational	networks	to	gather	information	and	develop	strategies	in	an	attempt	to	recast	thinking	about	Soviet	human	rights	abuses	in	the	minds	of	the	American	people.		My	research	will	provide	new	details	concerning	the	process	by	which	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	set	about	this	task,	by	investigating	how	the	organization	put	into	practice	a	personalizing,	“case	study”	method	that	sought	to	maximize	public	empathy	and	support	for	victims	of	Soviet	human	rights	abuses	among	American	audiences.	While	such	appeals	to	empathy	were	not	themselves	altogether	new	in	the	conduct	of	“Western”	human	rights	
																																																																																																																																																																																		as	July	1978,	when	a	$25,000	planning	grant,	meant	to	finance	the	Helsinki	group’s	establishment,	was	issued	by	the	Ford	Foundation	to	Bernstein’s	earlier	human	rights	organization,	the	Fund	for	Free	Expression.		Throughout	this	work,	I	regard	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee’s	founding	to	have	taken	place	in	February	1979,	at	the	moment	in	which	the	group	officially	announced	its	formation	to	the	public,	and	began	acting	as	a	proponent	of	human	rights	and	the	Helsinki	Accords.		Robert	L.	Bernstein,	Speaking	Freely:	My	Life	in	
Publishing	and	Human	Rights	(New	York:	The	New	Press,	2016),	153;	Peter	Slezkine,	“From	Helsinki	to	Human	Rights	Watch:		How	an	American	Cold	War	Monitoring	Group	Became	an	International	Human	Rights	Institution,”	Humanity:	An	International	Journal	of	Human	Rights,	Humanitarianism,	and	Development	5,	no.	3	(2014):	345–70.	2	For	an	analysis	of	Helsinki	Watch’s	strategies	concerning	organizational	influence	and	effectiveness,	see	Claude	E.	Welch	Jr.,	“Amnesty	International	and	Human	Rights	Watch:	A	Comparison,”	in	Claude	E.	Welch	Jr.	ed.,	NGOs	and	Human	Rights:	Promise	and	Performance	(Philadelphia:	University	of	Pennsylvania	Press,	2001).		This	organizational	approach	to	human	rights	advocacy,	which	relied	upon	bringing	human	rights	abuses	to	the	attention	of	communities	that	would	have	been	unlikely	to	be	exposed	to	them	otherwise	is	also	present	in	the	NGO's	more	recent	advocacy	campaigns.		For	example,	see	Barbara	J.	Keys,	“Harnessing	Human	Rights	to	the	Olympic	Games:	Human	Rights	Watch	and	the	1993	‘Stop	Beijing’	Campaign,”	Journal	of	Contemporary	
History	53,	no.	2	(2018):	415–38.	
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NGOs	during	this	period,	I	will	show	how	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	used	the	public	attention	garnered	through	the	presentation	of	these	case	studies	to	better	pursue	their	strategy	of	“moral	linkage.”3		U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	reframed	the	Soviet’s	abridgement	of	human	rights	as	a	fundamental	obstacle	to	the	ongoing	efforts	to	develop	more	robust	cultural,	economic,	and	scientific	exchanges	between	societies,	and	ultimately,	greater	global	peace	and	security.		While	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	had	a	close	working	relationship	with	the	U.S.	government,	this	strategy	of	“moral	linkage”	was	not	conducted	as	a	lobbying	effort	on	the	part	of	the	organization	aimed	at	influencing	governmental	policy,	but	rather	was	targeted	toward	private	individuals	and	professional	organizations	that	had	had	some	role	to	play	in	this	process	of	cultural	exchange.		While	there	had	been	significant	collaboration	during	this	time	between	Helsinki	Watch	and	segments	of	the	U.S.	government,	those	lobbying	and	information-sharing	efforts	are	beyond	the	scope	of	this	study.		Instead,	this	thesis	will	focus	on	how	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	encouraged	new	ways	of	framing	human	rights	in	the	minds	of	the	American	people.	The	Committee	presented	specific	cases	of	Soviet	and	East	European	human	rights	abuse	to	American	audiences	as	a	failure	of	those	governments	to	abide	by	their	Helsinki	obligations,	rather	than	as	a	violation	of	some	moral	or	ethical	code.4		Infringement	upon	free	expression	by	the	Soviet	state	through	the	practice	of	literary	censorship	was	not	most	often	cast	by	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	as	a	violation	of	a	person’s	inalienable	right	to	speak	their	minds,	but	as	an	unnecessary	obstacle	to	the	free	flow	of	information	and	ideas	that	was	necessary	to	achieve	greater	cultural	cooperation,	and	an	undue	burden	for	writers,	publishers,	and	journalists	on	both	sides	of	the	Iron	Curtain	to	continue	to	participate	in	such	exchanges	in	good	faith.5		Similarly,	the	involuntary	institutionalization	of	Soviet	
																																																								3	For	more	on	the	ways	in	which	appeals	to	emotion	have	been	employed	in	the	pursuit	of	human	rights	protections,	see	Roland	Burke,	“Emotional	Diplomacy	and	Human	Rights	at	the	United	Nations,”	Human	
Rights	Quarterly	39,	no.	2	(2017):	273–95;	Mark	Philip	Bradley,	The	World	Reimagined:	Americans	and	Human	
Rights	in	the	Twentieth	Century	(New	York:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2016).	4	On	the	importance	of	interventions	by	political	entrepreneurs—both	inside	and	outside	of	government—to	this	reframing	process,	see	Paul	Gordon	Lauren,	The	Evolution	of	International	Human	Rights:	Visions	Seen	(Philadelphia:	University	of	Pennsylvania	Press,	2011).				5	For	more	on	the	Soviets’	use	of	censorship	against	political	nonconformists,	see	Marianna	T.	Choldin	and	Maurice	Friedberg,	eds.,	The	Red	Pencil:	Artists,	Scholars	and	Censors	in	the	USSR	(Boston:	Unwin	Hyman,	
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dissidents	in	psychiatric	hospitals,	and	the	use	of	psychiatry	for	political	purposes	was	not	only	presented	to	the	American	people	as	an	abject	exercise	in	inhumanity,	but	was	detailed	in	advocacy	efforts	targeted	specifically	toward	American	psychological	associations	and	mental	health	practitioners	who	had	ongoing	business	ties	to	the	Soviet	bloc.		Such	appeals	implored	these	groups	to	demand	the	rectification	of	such	practices	as	a	matter	of	professional	integrity,	and	as	a	prerequisite	to	any	future	collaboration.6	It	was	the	ability	of	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	to	materialize	concepts	of	human	rights—which,	prior	to	the	mid-to-late	1970s	remained	somewhat	relegated	to	the	realm	of	the	abstract	and	aspirational—that	facilitated	a	change	in	American	perceptions	of	what	human	rights	advocacy	implied.		Framing	violations	of	human	rights	as	specific	impediments	to	particular	processes	of	cross-cultural	exchange	encouraged	citizens	to	view	the	indemnification	of	these	injustices	as	a	series	of	concrete	deliverables	that	could	meaningfully	be	pursued	in	the	here	and	now.		Most	importantly,	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	helped	to	institutionalize	the	notion	that	pressure	for	corrective	action	could	be	effectively	applied,	not	only	by	the	U.S.	government	through	international	exchange	and	foreign	policy	pronouncements,	but	also	by	private	individuals	and	organizations	who	felt	compelled	by	their	own	sense	of	values	to	see	such	commitments	upheld,	and	who	were	in	a	position	to	exert	direct	leverage	through	other	areas	of	cross-cultural	cooperation.7			When	the	35-nation	multilateral	negotiations	that	became	the	Conference	on	Security	and	Cooperation	in	Europe	began	in	Helsinki	on	22	November	1972,	international	
																																																																																																																																																																																		1989);	Friederike	Kind-Kovács	and	Jessie	Labov,	eds.,	Samizdat,	Tamizdat,	and	Beyond:	Transnational	Media	
During	and	After	Socialism	(New	York:	Berghahn	Books,	2013).	6	There	are	myriad	accounts	within	the	existing	dissident	memoir	literature	detailing	the	Soviet	government’s	various	repressive	practices.		For	some	of	the	earliest	and	most	thoroughly	well-documented	records	of	repressive	state	action	taken	during	the	period	of	organized	political	dissent,	see	Leopold	Labedz	and	Max	Hayward,	eds.,	On	Trial:	The	Case	of	Sinyavsky	(Tertz)	and	Daniel	(Arzhak)	(London:	Collins	and	Harvill	Press,	1967);	Pavel	Litvinov,	ed.,	The	Trial	of	Four:	A	Collection	of	Materials	on	the	Case	of	Galanskov,	Ginzburg,	
Dobrovolsky	and	Lashkova,	1967-68,	trans.	Peter	Reddaway	(New	York:	The	Viking	Press,	1972).	For	a	detailed	record	of	repressive	action	taken	against	Soviet	members	of	Helsinki	Watch	organizations	specifically,	see	Paul	Goldberg,	The	Final	Act:	The	Dramatic,	Revealing	Story	of	the	Moscow	Helsinki	Watch	
Group	(New	York:	William	Morrow	and	Company,	Inc.,	1988);	Yuri	Orlov,	Dangerous	Thoughts:	Memoirs	of	a	
Russian	Life,	trans.	Thomas	P.	Whitney	(New	York:	William	Morrow	and	Company,	Inc.,	1991).	7	For	an	idea	of	the	wide	range	of	competing	meanings	that	the	invocation	of	human	rights	could	convey	during	this	period	of	prolific	nongovernmental	activism,	see	Roland	Burke,	“The	Rites	of	Human	Rights	at	the	United	Nations,”	Humanity:	An	International	Journal	of	Human	Rights,	Humanitarianism,	and	Development	9,	no.	1	(2018):	127–42.	
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human	rights	issues	garnered	little	attention	among	the	majority	of	American	citizens.8		By	the	conclusion	of	conference	almost	three	years	later	in	the	summer	of	1975,	the	American	attitude	toward	the	talks	or	their	result	had	changed	little.		The	predominant	opinion	of	U.S.	policymakers	and	the	vast	majority	of	the	American	public	was	that	the	Soviets	had	gotten	the	better	of	the	negotiations,	having	secured	commitments	from	the	West	respecting	the	inviolability	of	frontiers	and	the	territorial	integrity	of	participating	states,	while	simultaneously	agreeing	to	the	non-intervention	in	the	internal	affairs	of	others—Principles	III,	IV,	and	VI	of	the	Final	Act’s	Declaration	Guiding	Relations	between	Participating	States,	respectively.		In	return,	the	Western	participants	received	vague	promises	from	the	members	of	the	Warsaw	Pact	acknowledging	the	future	possibility	of	the	alteration	of	borders	through	peaceful	means	and	“in	accordance	with	international	law,”	as	well	as	a	commitment	to	demonstrate	greater	respect	for	the	“human	rights	and	fundamental	freedoms”	of	individual	citizens,	including	the	freedom	of	thought,	conscience,	religion	or	belief.9			In	the	weeks	leading	up	to	President	Ford’s	signing	of	the	Final	Act,	popular	dissatisfaction	with	the	conference’s	results	was	palpable.10			In	the	days	prior	the	summit	meeting,	the	New	York	Times	ran	an	article	declaring	that	“the	35-nation	Conference	on	Security	in	Cooperation	in	Europe	.	.	.	should	not	have	happened.		Never	have	so	many	struggled	for	so	long	over	so	little.”11		And	yet	less	than	three	decades	later,	when	recalling	the	events	of	the	late	Cold	War,	the	former	U.S.	Congressman	and	participant	in	the	1980	Madrid	follow	up	conference	to	the	CSCE,	Robert	Drinan	was	willing	to	assert	that	“support																																																									8	These	were	the	preparatory	agenda-setting	talks	that	presaged	the	formal	start	of	negotiations,	which	began	in	Geneva	on	18	September	1973.		Richard	Davy,	“Helsinki	Myths:	Setting	the	Record	Straight	on	the	Final	Act	of	the	CSCE,	1975,”	Cold	War	History	9,	no.	1	(2009)	2.	9	"Conference	on	Security	and	Cooperation	in	Europe	Final	Act,"	1	August	1975,	Organization	for	Security	and	
Cooperation	in	Europe,	accessed	13	November	2013,	https://www.osce.org/mc/39501?download=true.		For	a	summary	of	the	complex	and	multivalent	place	of	human	rights	within	the	context	of	the	East-West	Cold	War	rivalry,	see	Barbara	Keys	and	Roland	Burke,	“Human	Rights,”	in	Richard	H.	Immerman	and	Petra	Goedde,	eds.,	Oxford	Handbook	of	the	Cold	War	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2013).	10	For	examples,	see	Christopher	Wren,	“Road	to	Helsinki:	Moscow	Hung	On,	Sacrificed	Some,	Won	Most	of	Its	Goals,”	New	York	Times,	21	July	1975;	Chalmers	M.	Roberts,	“The	Helsinki	Venture,”	The	Washington	Post,	1	August	1975;	“Beyond	Helsinki,”	Wall	Street	Journal,	11	August	1975;	Christopher	Wren,	“Brezhnev	Hints	Delay	on	Rights,”	New	York	Times,	16	August	1975;	Ibid.,	“Rights	in	Soviet—A	Fading	Hope,”	New	York	Times,	20	August	1975.		For	more	on	the	poor	public	perception	of	the	signing	of	the	Helsinki	Accords,	see	Sarah	Snyder,	“’Jerry,	Don’t	Go’:	Domestic	Opposition	to	the	1975	Helsinki	Final	Act,”	Journal	of	American	Studies,	44,	no.	1	(2010):	67-81.	11	“European	‘Security’.	.	.,”	New	York	Times,	21	July	1975.	
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for	human	rights	in	the	Helsinki	Accords	made	the	collapse	of	the	Communist	system	inevitable.”12		What	can	account	for	such	a	dramatic	incongruity	between	the	expectations	that	existed	concerning	the	significance	of	the	Helsinki	Accords	and	their	appraisal	afterward?		Why	were	nongovernmental	actors	able	to	invoke	the	articles	of	the	Final	Act	to	such	great	effect,	and	how	did	their	calls	for	human	rights	reforms	resonate	so	powerfully	through	the	framework	of	a	non-legally	binding	agreement?		Over	the	years,	scholars	have	singled	out	many	aspects	of	the	Final	Act	for	their	novelty	and	revolutionary	character,	in	an	attempt	to	explain	the	substantial	and	unanticipated	effect	that	the	agreements	ultimately	had.		For	some,	the	requirement	of	mutual	consensus	among	delegations	set	forth	during	the	negotiations’	preparatory	talks—as	opposed	to	a	less	onerous	threshold	requiring	only	a	simple	majority	of	support	to	secure	the	inclusion	of	any	provision	or	specific	use	of	language	within	the	conference’s	concluding	document—is	one	condition	that	has	often	been	cited	as	having	had	a	profound	impact	on	the	form	the	agreement	ultimately	took.13		This	provision	is	what	allowed	the	smaller	Western	European	states	to	collectively	negotiate	during	the	conference	as	a	unified	bloc,	ultimately	securing	within	the	final	agreement	terms	that	most	reflected	key	Western	values,	such	as	the	principle	guiding	relations	between	states	that	explicitly	called	upon	governments	to	show	“respect	for	human	rights	and	fundamental	freedoms”	of	their	own	citizens.		Never	before	this	had	the	conduct	of	a	state	government	toward	its	own	people	been	considered	as	a	legitimate	subject	of	examination	for	interstate	cooperation.14	
																																																								12	Robert	F.	Drinan,	The	Mobilization	of	Shame:	A	World	View	of	Human	Rights	(New	Haven:	Yale	University	Press,	2001),	74;	For	more	on	the	influence	of	international	organizations,	see	Akira	Iriye,	Global	Community:	
The	Role	of	International	Organizations	in	Making	the	Contemporary	World	(Berkeley:	University	of	California	Press,	2002).	13	On	the	rule	of	consensus	within	CSCE	negotiations,	see	Andrew	Moravcsik,	“Explaining	International	Human	Rights	Regimes:	Liberal	Theory	and	Western	Europe,”	European	Journal	of	International	Relations	1,	no.	2	(1995):	157–89;	Davy,	“Helsinki	Myths";	Daniel	Möckli,	"The	EC	Nine,	the	CSCE,	and	the	Changing	Pattern	of	European	Security,"	in	Andreas	Wenger,	Vojtech	Mastny,	and	Christian	Nuenlist	eds.,	Origins	of	the	
European	Security	System,	(London:	Routledge,2008);	William	Korey,	The	Promises	We	Keep:	Human	Rights,	
The	Helsinki	Process,	and	American	Foreign	Policy	(New	York:	St.	Martin’s	Press,	1993).	14	"Conference	on	Security	and	Cooperation	in	Europe	Final	Act."		The	significance	of	a	multilateral	agreement	that	made	a	state’s	treatment	of	its	own	citizens	a	matter	of	international	concern	is	another	novel	aspect	of	the	Final	Act	that	has	been	given	significant	attention	by	scholars.		See	Svetlana	Savranskaya,	“Unintended	Consequences:	Soviet	Interests,	Expectations	and	Reactions	to	the	Helsinki	Final	Act,”	in	Oliver	Bange	and	Gottfried	Niedhart	eds.,	Helsinki	1975	and	the	Transformation	of	Europe	(New	York:	Berghahn	Books,	2008).	
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	 Still	others	have	focused	on	more	procedural	elements	of	the	Final	Act	when	seeking	to	explain	its	transformative	effect	upon	the	existing	international	environment.		For	instance,	in	one	of	the	ten	principles	guiding	relations	between	states	that	composed	the	first	section,	or	“Basket,”	of	the	agreement,	negotiators	concluded	that	all	principles	set	forth	in	these	declarations	would	be	of	“primary	significance,”	and	“equally	and	unreservedly	applied”	with	respect	to	one	another.15		This	meant	that	no	guiding	principle	could	supersede	or	contradict	the	fulfillment	of	any	other,	ultimately	precluding	the	language	recognizing	the	inviolability	of	frontiers,	non-interference	in	internal	affairs,	or	sovereign	equality	of	all	states	from	taking	precedence	over	a	participating	government’s	commitment	to	ensure	respect	for	human	rights	of	all	its	citizens.16		Another	area	of	scholarly	focus	emphasizes	the	agreement’s	so-called	“Fourth	Basket,”	which	laid	out	procedures	for	the	follow	up	mechanism	of	the	CSCE,	calling	for	periodic	review	meetings	to	be	conducted	in	a	way	that	could	monitor	and	assess	the	status	of	implementation.		These	follow	on	CSCE	review	conferences	served	as	the	basis	for	which	a	host	of	national,	international	and	nongovernmental	institutions	and	organizations	set	about	monitoring	participating	states’	full	and	forthright	compliance	with	the	terms	of	the	Final	Act.		Over	time	this	system	of	official	and	unofficial	oversight	would	come	to	collectively	be	known	as	the	“Helsinki	process.”		While	some	scholars	restrict	their	use	of	this	term	to	refer	exclusively	to	the	follow	up	conferences	called	for	in	the	Final	Act,	others	use	it	more	holistically	when	describing	the	overall	system	of	governmental	and	nongovernmental	efforts	utilized	to	ensure	Helsinki	implementation.		My	use	of	the	term	will	conform	to	this	more	inclusive	interpretation.17		Yet	for	all	the	consequential	language	that	has	been	scrutinized	since	the	Final	Act	was	formally	accepted	into	the	international	lexicon,	one	aspect	of	the	agreement	that	has	received	considerably	less	attention	by	scholars	has	been	the	recognition	of	individual																																																									15	"Conference	on	Security	and	Cooperation	in	Europe	Final	Act.”		16	For	more	on	the	impact	that	this	clause	had	on	ensuing	international	negotiations,	see	Geoffrey	Edwards,	“Human	Rights	and	Basket	III	Issues:	Areas	of	Change	and	Continuity,”	Royal	Institute	of	International	Affairs	61,	no.	4	(1985):	631–42;	Christian	Philip	Peterson,	“Wielding	the	Human	Rights	Weapon:	The	United	States,	Soviet	Union,	and	Private	Citizens,	1975-1989”	(PhD	Dissertation,	Ohio	University,	2009).	17	For	more	on	the	importance	of	the	follow	up	mechanisms	of	the	CSCE	to	the	Helsinki	process,	see	Daniel	C.	Thomas,	The	Helsinki	Effect:	International	Norms,	Human	Rights,	and	the	Demise	of	Communism	(Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press,	2001);	Sarah	B.	Snyder,	Human	Rights	Activism	and	the	End	of	the	Cold	War:	A	
Transnational	History	of	the	Helsinki	Network	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2011).	
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citizens’	responsibility	to	“know	and	act	upon	[their]	rights	and	duties”	with	respect	to	the	Final	Act’s	humanitarian	provisions.18		This	was	a	key	concept	that	would	later	be	seen	by	private	citizens	as	an	explicit	endorsement	of	the	positive	role	that	individuals	had	to	play	in	ensuring	the	fulfillment	of	their	government’s	international	obligations.		Critically,	this	was	not	the	responsibility	of	a	citizen	to	his	or	her	own	government,	but	rather	that	of	an	
individual—without	distinction	as	to	nationality,	ideology,	or	belief—to	the	maintenance	of	a	new,	mutually-agreed	upon	international	order.		The	right	“to	know	and	to	act”	was	regularly	invoked	by	private	citizens’	Helsinki	monitoring	organizations	in	both	the	East	and	the	West	as	the	legitimizing	basis	for	which	these	groups	conducted	their	oversight	of	governments’	compliance	with	respect	to	the	Final	Act.19		Ultimately,	this	provision	contributed	to	the	growing	transnational	character	of	Helsinki-based	human	rights	activism	in	the	aftermath	of	the	Final	Act,	as	it	more	forcefully	asserted	the	place	of	the	individual	as	an	independent	interest	holder,	irrespective	of	national	boundaries	or	ideological	divisions.20		The	right	of	individuals	“to	know	and	to	act”	is	proclaimed	in	Principle	VII	of	the	Final	Act’s	ten-point	Basket	I	declaration,	which	enumerates	states’	commitment	to	respect	the	“human	rights	and	fundamental	freedoms”	of	their	citizens,	and	sanctifies	the	role	of	the	individual	in	working	toward	the	achievement	of	this	aim.		Yet	this	is	not	the	only	place	in	which	the	contributive	role	of	the	individual	is	expressly	asserted.		Again	in	Principle	IX,	which	sets	forth	the	terms	governing	cooperation	between	participating	states	in	areas	of	“economic,	scientific,	technological,	social,	cultural	and	humanitarian	fields,”	the	document	affirms	that	“governments,	institutions,	organizations	and	persons	have	a	relevant	and	positive	role	to	play”	in	contributing	toward	the	achievement	of	progress	within	these																																																									18	"Conference	on	Security	and	Cooperation	in	Europe	Final	Act.”		19	See	U.S.	Helsinki	Commission,	"The	Right	to	Know,	The	Right	to	Act:	Documents	of	Helsinki	Dissent	from	the	Soviet	Union	and	Eastern	Europe,"	Report	prepared	by	the	staff	of	the	Commission	on	Security	and	Cooperation	in	Europe,	May	1978,	accessed	15	April	2018,	https://www.csce.gov/international-impact/publications/right-know-right-act?sort_by=field_date_value&FuseAction=ContentRecords.ViewDetail	&ContentRecord_id=400&ContentType=G&ContentRecordType=G&Region_id=0&Issue_id=0&IsTextOnly=	True&page=60;	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee,	“U.S.	Citizens’	Group	Forms	‘Helsinki	Watch’	Committee,”	n.d.,	Houghton	Library	Modern	Books	and	Manuscripts	Collection,	Harvard	University	[hereafter	Andrei	Sakharov	Papers],	MS	Russ	79,	folder	S.VI.1.31.2.8.	20	For	more	on	intersectionalities	of	authority	and	obligation	between	the	individual,	the	state,	and	the	international	community,	see	Roland	Burke,	“The	Internationalism	of	Human	Rights,”	in	Glenda	Sluga	and	Patricia	Clavin	eds.,	Internationalisms:	A	Twentieth	Century	History	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2017).	
	 9	
different	areas.21		These	provisions	of	the	Final	Act,	which	acknowledge	the	individual	as	a	legitimate	arbiter	of	aspects	of	interstate	cooperation,	are	central	to	my	argument,	as	they	provide	the	conceptual	starting	point	for	nongovernmental	involvement	in	the	process	of	Helsinki	implementation,	and	serve	as	the	foundation	upon	which	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee’s	strategy	of	“moral	linkage”	was	based.22		The	new	international	normative	framework	introduced	by	these	and	other	innovative	provisions	of	the	Final	Act	was	a	key	area	of	research	for	many	of	the	earliest	scholarly	works	on	this	subject.		As	nongovernmental	“Helsinki	activists”—first	in	the	Soviet	Union,	and	then	elsewhere—started	to	stand	up	and	make	their	voices	heard,	invoking	the	text	of	the	Final	Act	when	demanding	greater	respect	for	human	rights	from	their	governments,	Western	observers	began	to	reexamine	their	own	views	on	the	power	and	possibilities	inherent	in	the	agreement.23		After	the	dissolution	of	the	Soviet	Union,	international	relations	scholars	and	political	theorists	were	the	first	to	look	back	upon	the	negotiations	of	the	CSCE	and	the	agreement	that	they	produced,	to	ask	what	role,	if	any,	these	developments	played	in	contributing	to	the	unexpected	outcome	of	the	Cold	War.24		The	earliest	studies	of	the	CSCE	and	the	Helsinki	process	stressed	the	revolutionary	language	and	structure	of	the	Final	Act	itself,	attributing	the	transformative	power	of	the	agreement	to	the	new	international	norms	that	it	established,	with	significantly	less	
																																																								21	"Conference	on	Security	and	Cooperation	in	Europe	Final	Act.”		22	For	an	early	and	insightful	analysis	of	the	influence	of	nongovernmental	actors	on	the	development	of	American	political	views	concerning	human	rights,	see	Kenneth	Cmiel,	“The	Emergence	of	Human	Rights	Politics	in	the	United	States,”	Journal	of	American	History	86,	no.	3	(1999):	1231–50.	23	See	Harold	S.	Russell,	“The	Helsinki	Declaration:	Brobdingnag	or	Lilliput?,”	American	Society	of	
International	Law	70,	no.	2	(1976):	242–72;	Lea	Sellers,	“Soviet	Dissidents	and	the	Western	World,”	The	
Fletcher	Forum	of	World	Affairs,	1	(1976):	83–102;	Richard	N.	Dean,	“Contacts	with	the	West:	The	Dissidents’	View	of	Western	Support	for	the	Human	Rights	Movement	in	the	Soviet	Union,”	Universal	Human	Rights	2,	no.	1	(1980):	47–65;	Edward	L.	Killham,	“The	Madrid	CSCE	Conference,”	World	Affairs	146,	no.	4	(1984):	340–57;	Edwards,	“Human	Rights	and	Basket	III	Issues:	Areas	of	Change	and	Continuity.”		24	See	Korey,	The	Promises	We	Keep;	Sandra	L.	Gubin,	“Between	Regimes	and	Realism—Transnational	Agenda	Setting:	Soviet	Compliance	with	CSCE	Human	Rights	Norms,”	Human	Rights	Quarterly	17,	no.	2	(1995):	278–302;	Moravcsik,	“Explaining	International	Human	Rights	Regimes;"	Rachel	Brett,	“Human	Rights	and	the	OSCE,”	Human	Rights	Quarterly	18,	no.	3	(1996):	668–93;	Gregory	Flynn	and	Henry	Farrell,	“Piecing	Together	the	Democratic	Peace:	The	CSCE,	Norms,	and	the	‘Construction’	of	Security	in	Post–Cold	War	Europe,”	
International	Organization	53,	no.	3	(1999):	505–35;	Thomas	Risse,	Stephen	C.	Ropp,	and	Kathryn	Sikkink,	eds.,	The	Power	of	Human	Rights:	International	Norms	and	Domestic	Change	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1999);	Daniel	C.	Thomas,	“Human	Rights	Ideas,	the	Demise	of	Communism,	and	the	End	of	the	Cold	War,”	Journal	of	Cold	War	Studies	7,	no.	2	(2005):	110–41.	
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attention	paid	to	the	individuals	who	invoked	them.25		By	the	late	2000s,	with	the	declassification	of	many	previously	unreleased	documents	in	a	number	of	different	countries,	the	first	true	archival	histories	of	the	CSCE	and	the	Helsinki	process	began	to	be	written.		These	works	tended	to	focus	mostly	on	the	diplomatic	wrangling	that	produced	the	Helsinki	Accords,	the	various	roles	that	different	states	played	during	the	negotiations,	and	the	larger	geopolitical	implications	of	those	decisions.26			The	sheer	amount	of	official	records	generated	over	the	two	and	a	half	years	of	CSCE	negotiations,	in	which	nearly	three-dozen	different	governments	participated	has	ensured	that	no	shortage	of	archival	research	has	been	possible	for	historians	to	engage	in.		Because	of	this	preponderance	of	documentation,	diplomatic	and	political	histories	of	the	CSCE	and	the	Helsinki	process	continue	to	dominate	the	field,	even	to	this	day.27		Conversely,	my	research	will	depart	from	these	state-centric	approaches,	and	instead	focus	on	nongovernmental	involvement	in	the	Helsinki	process	at	the	tactical	and	strategic	level.		Specifically,	I	will	explore	how	one	NGO	in	particular	utilized	contact	across	transnational	networks	to	promote	a	heightened	sense	of	responsibility	among	American	audiences	for	demanding	greater	protections	of	human	rights	internationally.																																																									25	Most	notably,	William	Korey’s	book,	The	Promises	We	Keep:	Human	Rights,	the	Helsinki	Process,	and	
American	Foreign	Policy	used	the	framework	of	the	CSCE	follow	up	meetings	to	explore	the	shifting	foreign	policy	strategies	of	the	American	and	Soviet	governments	with	respect	to	human	rights	issues	between	the	years	of	1975	and	1991.		This	work	continues	to	serve	as	an	important	distillation	of	many	of	key	events	concerning	the	Helsinki	process	at	the	governmental	level.		In	2001,	political	scientist	Daniel	C.	Thomas	published	a	more	in-depth	examination	of	how	the	new	norms	set	forth	in	the	Helsinki	Accords	were	integrated	into	the	existing	international	landscape	and	impacted	geopolitical	events.		His	book,	The	Helsinki	
Effect:	International	Norms,	Human	Rights,	and	the	Demise	of	Communism,	stresses	the	unforeseen	nature	of	the	Final	Act’s	influence,	it’s	ability	to	unify	disparate	groups	with	distinctive	identities,	and	its	direct	contribution	to	the	ultimate	demise	of	the	Soviet	Union	and	the	end	of	the	Cold	War.	26	Edited	volumes	like	Oliver	Bange	and	Gottfried	Niedhart’s	Helsinki	1975	and	the	Transformation	of	Europe,	and	Andreas	Wenger,	Vojtech	Mastny,	and	Christian	Nuenlist’s	Origins	of	the	European	Security	System:	The	
Helsinki	Pocess	Revisted,	1965-75	offer	readers	sweeping	overviews	of	the	CSCE	from	the	perspectives	of	the	West,	East	and	neutral	an	non-aligned	states	throughout	various	stages	of	the	planning,	execution,	and	aftermath	of	the	Conference.		In	addition	to	these	works,	see	also	Rasmus	Mariager,	Karl	Molin,	and	Kjersti	Brathagen,	eds.,	Human	Rights	in	Europe	during	the	Cold	War	(London:	Routledge,	2014);	Petri	Hakkarainen,	
A	State	of	Peace	in	Europe:	West	Germany	and	the	CSCE,	1966-1975,	Studies	in	Contemporary	European	History	(New	York:	Berghahn	Books,	2011);	Angela	Romano,	From	Détente	in	Europe	to	European	Détente:	
How	the	West	Shaped	the	Helsinki	CSCE,	Euroclio	Studies	and	Documents	44	(Brussels:	P.I.E.	Peter	Lang,	2009);	Thomas	Fischer,	Neutral	Power	in	the	CSCE:	The	N+N	States	and	the	Making	of	the	Helsinki	Accords	
1975	(Baden-Baden:	Nomos	Publishers,	2009).	27	For	example,	see	Michael	Cotey	Morgan,	The	Final	Act:	The	Helsinki	Accords	and	the	Transformation	of	the	
Cold	War	(Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press,	2018);	Angela	Romano,	The	European	Community	and	
Eastern	Europe	in	the	Cold	War:	The	EC’s	Ostpolitik	and	the	Transformation	of	Intra-State	Relations	(London:	Routledge,	forthcoming).	
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While	other	studies	of	the	CSCE	and	the	impact	of	the	Helsinki	activism	have	engaged	directly	with	the	role	of	nongovernmental	actors	within	the	Helsinki	process,	the	tendency	has	been	to	treat	nongovernmental	involvement	as	an	important,	but	largely	contingent	force	in	the	emergence	of	a	new	international	normative	framework	surrounding	human	rights.28		For	many	of	these	scholars,	the	benchmark	of	effectiveness	for	these	organizations	has	been	their	ability	to	inform	and	influence	state	governments,	whose	subsequent	action	was	the	real	locus	of	reform.29		In	Margaret	Keck	and	Kathryn	Sikkink’s	landmark	Activists	Beyond	Borders:	Advocacy	Networks	in	International	Politics	(1998),	the	authors	describe	what	they	refer	to	as	the	“boomerang	effect,”	in	which	nongovernmental	actors	blocked	from	effective	engagement	with	their	own	government	seek	redress	through	contact	with	ideologically	aligned	forces	across	transnational	advocacy	networks,	which	possess	the	opportunities	to	apply	pressure	on	the	offending	government	from	abroad.		While	the	authors	acknowledge	that	pressure	on	these	repressive	governments	can	originate	from	outside	private	actors	directly,	the	vast	majority	of	influence	identified	by	this	study	is	ultimately	administered	through	various	political	institutions,	where	states	serve	as	the	primary	agents	of	change.30			Keck	and	Sikkink’s	model	is	highly	applicable	to	the	post-Helsinki	international	environment,	and	as	such,	has	often	served	as	an	important	theoretical	framework	for	historians	investigating	the	emergence	of	transnational	advocacy	networks	during	this	period.31		Perhaps	most	significantly,	Sarah	Snyder’s	Human	Rights	Activism	and	the	End	of	
the	Cold	War	(2011),	relies	heavily	upon	the	theoretical	models	set	forth	in	Activists	Beyond	
Borders	when	explaining	how	transnational	human	rights	advocacy	developed	and																																																									28	For	example,	see	Snyder,	Human	Rights	Activism	and	the	End	of	the	Cold	War;	William	Korey,	NGOs	and	the	
Universal	Declaration	of	Human	Rights:	“A	Curious	Grapevine”	(New	York:	Palgrave,	1998);	Christian	Philip	Peterson,	Globalizing	Human	Rights:	Private	Citizens,	the	Soviet	Union,	and	the	West	(New	York:	Routledge,	2012);	James	Peck,	Ideal	Illusions:	How	the	U.S.	Government	Co-Opted	Human	Rights	(New	York:	Metropolitan	Books,	2011).	29	For	examples,	see	Korey,	The	Promises	We	Keep;	Peterson,	Globalizing	Human	Rights.	30	Margaret	E.	Keck	and	Kathryn	Sikkink,	Activists	beyond	Borders:	Advocacy	Networks	in	International	Politics	(Ithica:	Cornell	University	Press,	1998),	4;	13-25.	31	Some	relevant	scholarly	works	which	have	utilized	Keck	and	Sikkink’s	explanatory	model	in	their	own	analyses	and	which	are	relevant	to	my	research	include	Robert	Horvath,	“Breaking	the	Totalitarian	Ice:	The	Initiative	Group	for	the	Defense	of	Human	Rights	in	the	USSR,”	Human	Rights	Quarterly	36,	no.	1	(February	2014):	147–75;	Daniel	C.	Thomas,	“Boomerangs	and	Superpowers:	International	Norms,	Transnational	Networks,	and	US	Foreign	Policy,”	Cambridge	Review	of	International	Affairs	15,	no.	1	(2002):	25–44;	Sidney	Tarrow,	The	New	Transnational	Activism	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2005).	
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functioned	in	the	context	of	Helsinki	activism.	Snyder’s	approach	is	holistic,	weaving	a	convincing	narrative	concerning	the	process	of	transnational	human	rights	advocacy	from	the	signing	of	the	Helsinki	Final	Act	to	the	fall	of	the	Soviet	Union.		Throughout	her	work,	Snyder	frames	Western	nongovernmental	organizations	as	but	one	single	force	operating	within	a	larger	political	milieu	of	both	formal	and	informal	mechanisms	that	collectively	contributed	to	a	shift	in	international	attitudes	towards	Helsinki	and	questions	of	human	rights.		Although	she	explores	the	contribution	of	relevant	NGOs	in	some	detail,	Snyder’s	work	ultimately	remains	a	history	“from	above,”	as	the	involvement	of	these	nongovernmental	organizations	is	presented	largely	in	relation	to	the	political	and	diplomatic	pressure	that	was	applied	by	state	governments	and	policymakers	in	the	course	of	the	Helsinki	follow	up	conferences.32			In	contrast,	my	work	will	focus	on	the	ways	in	which	nongovernmental	organizations	like	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	promoted	support	for	the	protection	of	human	rights	among	private	groups	and	citizens.		This	approach	will	help	to	elucidate	the	power	and	limits	of	human	agency	within	the	Helsinki	process,	and	will	explore	the	extent	to	which	groups	like	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	took	seriously	the	provision	for	individuals	to	“know	and	act	upon”	their	rights	set	forth	in	the	Final	Act.		By	emphasizing	such	an	approach,	my	research	will	provide	a	more	granular	analysis	of	the	specific	conduct,	motivations	and	strategies	employed	by	individual	human	rights	activists,	which	will	help	to	shed	more	light	on	the	different	contexts	in	which	they	operated,	and	the	conditions	that	constrained	their	behavior.		For	a	concept	whose	meaning	is	so	heavily	contested,	so	selectively	interpreted,	and	so	fraught	with	ambiguity,	the	term	“human	rights”	nevertheless	resonated	meaningfully	at	key	moments	throughout	the	second	half	of	the	twentieth	century.		Evoking	powerful	associations	among	people	and	governments	in	almost	every	corner	the	world,	by	the	end	of	the	1970s,	this	universal	moral	currency	helped	pay	the	way	for	a	panoply	of	different	political,	cultural	and	ethical	causes—all	asserting	human	rights	as	the	legitimizing	justification	for	their	efforts.		The	term	became	a	rallying	cry	for	a	host	of	national	liberation	movements,	political	projects,	and	struggles	for	ethnic	self-determination.		Given																																																									32	See	Snyder,	Human	Rights	Activism	and	the	End	of	the	Cold	War,	particularly	chapters	4	and	5.	
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then	the	various	purposes	for	which	human	rights	have	been	invoked,	it	is	important	that	we	as	historians	be	mindful	of	the	distinct	constructions	and	contestations	of	these	claims	when	seeking	to	explain	their	utility	to	the	claimants,	or	their	significance	to	the	broader	public.		Most	of	all,	we	must	be	wary	of	how	the	successes	and	failures	of	these	earlier	projects	have	impacted	the	way	we	think	about	human	rights	today.33		In	his	book	The	Conservative	Human	Rights	Revolution:	European	Identity,	
Transnational	Politics,	and	the	Origins	of	the	European	Convention	(2017),	Marco	Duranti	demonstrates	how	international	human	rights	projects	can	be	utilized	to	further	a	domestic	political	agenda—even	at	the	transnational	level.		Elite	driven,	and	conservative	in	nature,	Duranti	shows	how	the	efforts	to	establish	the	European	Convention	on	Human	Rights	served	to	strengthen	the	place	of	embattled	politicians	in	both	France	and	Great	Britain	by	prioritizing	the	institutionalization	of	certain	rights	while	minimizing	the	inclusion	of	others.		In	The	Conservative	Human	Rights	Revolution,	Duranti	deconstructs	many	of	the	prevailing	characterizations	typically	ascribed	to	human	rights	projects	and	actors,	and	instead	offers	a	more	complex	and	nuanced	explanation	of	the	post-war	European	human	rights	project.		This	approach	has	been	helpful	to	bear	in	mind	when	considering	transnational	human	rights	advocacy	in	the	highly	politically	and	ideologically	charged	environment	of	the	1970s,	and	the	context	of	East-West	exchange.34		The	revisionist	scholarship	of	Samuel	Moyn,	beginning	with	The	Last	Utopia:	Human	
Rights	in	History	(2010),	forged	the	way	for	new	debates	on	the	origins,	character,	and	qualities	of	human	rights,	and	helping	scholars	to	reimagine	how	these	ideas	should	be	viewed	within	the	study	of	history.		Moyn	argues	that	the	explosion	of	human	rights	interest	in	the	1970s	was	highly	contingent	upon	the	failures	of	previous	ideologies	which	claimed	to	offer	utopian	visions	for	their	adherents’	future.35		For	Moyn,	there	are	moments	when	modern	notions	of	human	rights	can	and	should	be	considered	as	a	spontaneous	product	of	chance	events.		While	this	interpretation	has	its	detractors,	by	relinquishing	the	need	to	situate	the	study	of	human	rights	in	history	within	a	grand	narrative,	this	approach																																																									33	For	more	on	the	potential	for	selectivity	in	human	rights	advocacy,	see	Akira	Iriye,	Petra	Goedde,	and	William	I.	Hitchcock,	eds.,	The	Human	Rights	Revolution:	An	International	History	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2012).	34	Marco	Duranti,	The	Conservative	Human	Rights	Revolution:	European	Identity,	Transnational	Politics,	and	the	
Origins	of	the	European	Convention	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2017),	332–42.	35	Samuel	Moyn,	The	Last	Utopia:	Human	Rights	in	History	(Cambridge:	Harvard	University	Press,	2010),	5.	
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has	helped	scholars	to	avoid	the	teleological	tendency	to	try	and	contextualize	the	events	of	the	past	within	the	exalted	legacy	of	our	society’s	presently	held	belief	in	human	rights,	and	instead	more	critically	engage	with	these	values	and	their	historical	significance	prima	
facie,	by	considering	the	utilitarian	purpose	that	they	may	have	served	to	those	who	invoked	them.36			Revisiting	the	history	of	human	rights	in	its	American	political	context,	Barbara	Keys’	Reclaiming	American	Virtue:	The	Human	Rights	Revolution	of	the	1970s	(2014)	argues	that	the	renewed	American	interest	in	human	rights	in	the	mid–to–late	1970s	was,	at	its	foundation,	a	consequence	of	the	moral	and	cultural	uncertainty	produced	by	the	events	of	the	previous	decade—the	contentious	battle	for	civil	rights,	Nixon’s	Watergate	scandal,	and	above	all,	the	American	involvement	in	the	Vietnam	War.		Here,	a	link	to	the	Moynian	view	of	human	rights	is	clearly	distinguishable.		But	whereas	Moyn	sees	the	gravitation	toward	human	rights	at	this	time	and	the	existing	state	of	politics	in	the	United	States	as	forces	acting	against	one	another,	Keys’	analysis	navigates	the	political	landscape	of	the	American	body	politic,	stressing	the	unification	of	these	two	concepts.			Throughout	her	narrative,	Keys	threads	a	clear	link	between	the	redemptive	ideals	of	human	rights	projects,	and	the	pragmatic	political	purpose	that	they	served	for	those	who	invoked	them.		Reclaiming	American	Virtue	thus	presents	an	in-depth	look	into	how	U.S.	Congressional	leaders	from	both	parties	and	across	the	political	spectrum	utilized	the	language	of	human	rights	to	at	once	ameliorate	the	sense	of	dissatisfaction	and	anxiety	concerning	America’s	recent	conduct	in	world	affairs,	while	still	helping	to	serve	their	concrete	domestic	political	objectives.37		Keys’	work	has	served	to	provide	a	foundation	for	my	own	research.		While	Keys	addresses	the	involvement	of	nongovernmental	actors	within	the	development	of	events	under	investigation	throughout	the	course	of	her	book,	the	extent	of	the	transnational	influence	and	cooperation	that	these	organizations	relied	upon	in	the	course	of	their	collaboration	with	members	of	the	U.S.	government	is	one	area	in	which	closer	examination	is	possible.		My	study	will	seek	to	illuminate	such	processes	in	
																																																								36	Ibid,	7-8.	37	Barbara	J.	Keys,	Reclaiming	American	Virtue:	The	Human	Rights	Revolution	of	the	1970s	(Cambridge:	Harvard	University	Press,	2014),	particularly	chapters	6,	7	and	8.	
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greater	detail,	and	contribute	to	a	more	complete	picture	of	the	nature	of	human	rights	activism	in	the	1970s	and	80s.	In	his	study	of	rights	claims	among	Soviet	dissidents,	Benjamin	Nathans	suggests	the	need	to	seriously	consider	the	“polycentric	character	of	human	rights	history,”	and	properly	appreciate	the	nuance	inherent	in	each	particular	case.38		Daniel	Sargent	takes	a	similar	view	when	making	a	case	for	the	unique	set	of	circumstances	that	contributed	to	the	reemergence	of	human	rights	in	American	politics	during	the	1970s,	which	was	most	clearly	articulated	in	the	foreign	policy	formulations	of	the	Carter	administration.		Sargent	sees	human	rights	as	neither	strictly	the	consequence	of	unforeseeable	accidents,	nor	the	inevitable	inheritance	of	age-old	values	inherent	to	the	human	condition.		Instead,	he	argues	that	effective	human	rights	campaigns	take	hold	when	conditions	are	just	right—at	times	when	certain	“cracks”	appear	in	the	international	landscape	that	allow	deeply	held	moral,	ethical	and	philosophical	principles	to	bubble	up	to	produce	the	conditions	that	can	support	a	flourishing	human	rights	movement.39			These	interpretations	offer	many	compelling	prospects	for	the	future	scholarship	of	human	rights	history	because,	as	Sargent	himself	puts	it,	they	“acknowledges	both	the	specificity	in	place	and	time	of	particular	human	rights	eruptions	and	their	connectedness	to	deeper	wells	of	action	and	thought.”40	In	addition	to	helping	to	address	the	critical	impasse	that	has	long	existed	among	scholars	concerning	the	question	of	human	rights	origins,	this	approach	is	particularly	useful	for	my	purposes,	for	its	ability	to	reconcile	the	dualistic	nature	of	human	rights	claims—at	once	highly	relativistic	and	unique	to	the	social	and	cultural	conditions	from	which	they	emerge,	while	still	capable	of	invoking	deeply	held	beliefs,	possessing	of	the	kind	of	universalistic	appeal	that	can	resonate	globally	in	meaningful	ways.		The	thesis	is	structured	roughly	chronologically,	with	each	chapter	uncovering	more	of	the	national	and	transnational	factors	that	catalyzed	the	genesis	of	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	and	its	strategies.		In	Chapter	1,	I	examine	the	U.S.	government’s	attitudes	toward	private																																																									38		Benjamin	Nathans,	“The	Disenchantment	of	Socialism:	Soviet	Dissidents,	Human	Rights	and	the	New	Global	Morality,”	in	Jan	Eckel	and	Samuel	Moyn	eds.,	The	Breakthrough:	Human	Rights	in	the	1970s	(Philadelphia:	University	of	Pennsylvania	Press,	2014),	48.	39	Daniel	Sargent,	“Oasis	in	the	Desert?	America’s	Human	Rights	Rediscovery,”	in	Ibid.,	126.	40		Ibid.	
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citizen	involvement	in	the	promotion	of	international	human	rights	issues	in	the	years	leading	up	to	the	signing	of	the	Helsinki	Final	Act,	and	discuss	policymakers’	initial	expectations	concerning	a	U.S.-based	Helsinki	monitoring	organization.		The	purpose	of	this	chapter	is	twofold:	to	demonstrate	the	degree	to	which	U.S.	governmental	officials	helped	to	influence	the	creation	of	a	nongovernmental	Helsinki	monitoring	group	within	the	United	States,	and	to	illustrate	the	unanticipated	role	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	would	come	to	play	as	a	Western	nongovernmental	organization	advocating	for	Helsinki	compliance.		In	Chapter	2,	I	trace	the	development	of	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee’s	advocacy	campaigns	during	the	first	several	months	of	the	organization’s	existence.		I	discuss	both	the	challenges	and	opportunities	that	presented	themselves	during	this	time,	and	highlight	the	importance	of	transnational	contact	to	the	organization’s	early	effectiveness.		In	Chapter	3,	I	investigate	the	impact	of	these	transnational	contacts	upon	the	development	of	future	advocacy	campaigns,	as	well	as	larger	organization-defining	activism	strategies,	which	strove	to	reframe	the	costs	of	international	human	rights	abuses	in	the	minds	of	American	audiences.		Ultimately,	contact	with	activists	across	transnational	networks	combined	with	group	members’	domestic	personal	and	professional	influence	helped	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	further	new	approaches	for	the	defense	of	human	rights	by	stressing	their	importance	to	meaningful	and	forthright	cross-cultural	cooperation	in	other	fields.				
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CHAPTER	ONE:	
THE	RISE	OF	THE	U.S.	PRIVATE	SECTOR	IN	THE	HELSINKI	PROCESS		 The	signing	of	the	Helsinki	Final	Act	presented	new	approaches	to	existing	international	challenges—perhaps	none	more	significant	than	the	increased	involvement	of	nongovernmental	actors	in	the	process	of	interstate	cooperation.		The	novelty	of	an	international	agreement	that	expressly	called	upon	the	individual	to	“know	and	act	upon	his	rights,”	as	stipulated	in	the	Final	Act’s	Declaration	of	Principles	had	far-reaching	consequences	for	participating	states	in	both	the	East	and	the	West.1		This	chapter	will	discuss	the	evolving	attitudes	of	U.S.	government	officials	concerning	the	role	played	by	private	institutions,	organizations,	and	individuals	within	the	Helsinki	process	from	the	period	immediately	following	the	signing	of	the	Helsinki	Final	Act	in	August	1975,	to	the	proposed	creation	of	a	U.S.-based	Helsinki	monitoring	body	in	the	spring	of	1978.		This	analysis	will	highlight	the	influence	that	individuals	in	political	and	cultural	fields	had	upon	this	process,	focusing	specifically	on	the	perspectives	of	Congressional	leaders,	State	Department	officials,	private	citizens,	and	representatives	of	the	U.S.	delegation	participating	in	the	first	follow-up	conference	to	the	CSCE.		U.S.	governmental	support	for	private	citizen	participation	in	the	Helsinki	process	was	initially	most	encouraged	in	the	area	of	cultural	cooperation	between	states—increased	contact	between	publishers,	journalists,	academics	and	artists—as	well	as	through	the	promotion	of	a	more	robust	system	of	cross-cultural	information	exchange,	involving	the	increased	planning	and	organization	of	international	cultural	events.2	
																																																								1	"Conference	on	Security	and	Cooperation	in	Europe	Final	Act."		2	Available	U.S.	Congressional	Records	and	State	Department	communiqués	from	this	period	are	replete	with	documentary	evidence	that	supports	this	conclusion.		For	examples,	see	“Airgram	From	the	Embassy	in	the	Soviet	Union	to	the	Department	of	State,”	7	June	1977,	Foreign	Relations	of	the	United	States	[hereafter,	FRUS],	
1977-1980,	vol.	XXX,	Public	Diplomacy,	Foreign	Relations	of	the	United	States,	1977-1980,	Kristin	L.	Ahlberg	and	Adam	M.	Howard	eds.	(Washington	D.C.:	Government	Printing	Office,	2016),	Document	No.	60;	Commission	on	Security	and	Cooperation	in	Europe,	"Implementation	of	the	Final	Act	of	the	Conference	on	Security	and	Cooperation	in	Europe:	Findings	and	Recommendations	Two	Years	After	Helsinki,"	Report	Transmitted	to	the	House	Committee	on	International	Relations,	23	September	1977,	accessed	5	September	2018,	https://www.csce.gov/international-impact/publications/implementation-final-act-findings-and-recommendations-two-years.	
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American	policymakers’	support	for	such	programs	was	particularly	reflected	in	statements	made	by	the	U.S.	Congressional	Commission	on	Security	and	Cooperation	in	Europe,	in	their	recommendations	to	the	U.S.	delegation	participating	in	the	first	follow-up	conference,	held	in	Belgrade	in	1977.3		During	those	negotiations	at	Belgrade,	many	of	Washington's	Western	European	allies	favored	a	similar	approach	to	nongovernmental	involvement	in	the	Helsinki	process.		Yet	in	the	aftermath	of	Belgrade,	when	significant	and	organized	nongovernmental	support	for	the	Helsinki	Accords	did	begin	to	emerge	from	the	U.S.	private	sector,	the	participation	of	these	nongovernmental	organizations	differed	from	the	early	formulations	of	policymakers	in	some	distinct	ways.		In	terms	of	tactics,	these	groups	more	closely	resembled	their	Eastern	European	and	Soviet	counterparts	than	they	did	earlier	Western	nongovernmental	efforts	concerning	the	promotion	of	human	rights.	The	goal	of	this	chapter	will	be	firstly,	to	define	the	nature	of	the	differences	between	earlier	Western	nongovernmental	human	rights	advocacy	and	that	which	had	emerged	in	the	aftermath	of	the	signing	of	the	Helsinki	Final	Act,	and	secondly	to	offer	explanations	for	the	divergence	between	expectation	and	reality	in	regards	to	nongovernmental	participation	in	the	Helsinki	process.	I	begin	this	chapter	by	discussing	the	circumstances	that	led	New	Jersey	Congresswoman	Millicent	Fenwick	to	propose	the	creation	of	the	U.S.	Congressional	Commission	on	Security	and	Cooperation	in	Europe—an	innovative	intergovernmental	committee	composed	of	bicameral,	bipartisan	Congressional	membership,	as	well	as	appointed	representation	from	each	of	the	Departments	of	State,	Commerce	and	Defense.		I	then	investigate	the	process	by	which	that	Commission	came	to	understand	the	role	of	nongovernmental	actors	in	encouraging	greater	Helsinki	compliance.		This	analysis	of	the	Commission’s	early	relationship	with	various	nongovernmental	actors	will	illustrate	how,	in	the	immediate	aftermath	of	the	signing	of	the	Final	Act,	the	expectation	of	American	policymakers	with	regard	to	private	citizen	participation	in	the	promotion	of	human	rights	conformed	to	traditional	notions	of	nongovernmental	involvement	and	support	for	U.S.	policy	initiatives	that	had	existed	up	to	that	point.		Overwhelmingly,	this	meant	interaction																																																									3	See	“Report	of	the	Study	Mission	to	Europe	to	the	Commission	on	Security	and	Cooperation	in	Europe,”	3	December	1976,	Commission	on	Security	and	Cooperation	in	Europe,	accessed	30	May	2017,	https://www.csce.gov/international-impact/publications/report-study-mission-europe.	
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with	particular	special	interest	groups	whose	memberships	and	mandates	were	most	often	narrowly	defined	along	ethnic,	national	or	religious	lines.4			The	Commission’s	early	efforts	toward	engaging	with	members	of	the	U.S.	private	sector	will	demonstrate	the	somewhat	circumscribed	and	limited	role	that	was	initially	expected	of	nongovernmental	groups	within	the	context	of	the	Helsinki	process—an	approach	and	would	have	likely	contributed	to	a	general	fragmentation	and	compartmentalization	of	nongovernmental	human	rights	advocacy	by	“single-issue”	organizations,	possessing	little	reach	outside	their	own	particular	identity	communities	and	thus	exerting	a	negligible	impact	on	American	public	perceptions	of	the	Helsinki	Accords	en	masse.5		I	will	then	go	on	to	explore	the	conduct	of	the	U.S.	delegation	at	the	first	follow	up	conference	to	the	CSCE	held	in	Belgrade	from	October	1977	to	March	1978,	with	a	particular	focus	on	the	actions	of	Arthur	J.	Goldberg,	who	served	as	Ambassador-at-large																																																									4	For	specific	examples	of	the	ways	in	which	special	interest	groups	exerted	pressure	on	U.S.	policymakers	during	this	time,	see	Gal	Beckerman,	When	They	Come	for	Us,	We’ll	Be	Gone:	The	Epic	Struggle	to	Save	Soviet	
Jewry	(New	York:	Houghton	Mifflin	Harcourt,	2010),	particularly	chapters	7	and	8;	Joe	Renouard,	Human	
Rights	in	American	Foreign	Policy:	From	the	1960s	to	the	Soviet	Collapse	(Philadelphia:	University	of	Pennsylvania	Press,	2016),	particularly	chapter	2.		For	a	more	comprehensive	analysis	of	the	type	of	relationship	that	special	interest	groups	traditionally	had	with	the	process	of	U.S.	foreign	policymaking	generally,	see	Keys,	Reclaiming	American	Virtue.	5	One	notable	exception	to	the	limited	resonance	that	specific	human	rights	concerns	had	among	the	majority	of	the	American	people	is	the	matter	of	Jewish	emigration	from	the	Soviet	Union.		This	was	an	issue	that,	for	a	time,	enjoyed	mass	public	attention	in	the	United	States,	culminating	most	visibly	in	widespread	support	for	the	Jackson-Vanik	Amendment	to	the	Trade	Act	of	1974,	which	linked	the	Soviet	Union’s	eligibility	for	Most-Favored	Nation	trading	status	to	that	government’s	consent	domestically	for	Soviet	Jews	wishing	to	emigrate.		Sarah	Snyder	attributes	the	American	public’s	captivation	with	this	issue	to	be	a	consequence	of	the	country’s	unique	historical	experience	regarding	concern	for	the	protection	of	religious	freedom,	as	well	as	evidence	of	the	outsized	influence	that	particular	ethnic	groups	had	through	governmental	lobbying	during	this	time.	Samuel	Moyn	has	suggested	elsewhere	that	such	a	degree	of	popular	support	for	this	particular	cause	can	be	understood	by	viewing	it	as	a	historical	legacy	of	the	Holocaust.		But	whatever	the	explanation,	it	is	important	to	remember	that,	despite	the	issue’s	genuine	resonance	among	a	wide	variety	of	citizens,	this	was	not	support	that	was	primarily	generated	by	nongovernmental	actors	themselves,	but	was	rather	a	campaign	publicized	and	pursued	by	Congressional	policymakers,	which	undeniably	served	distinct	partisan	goals	of	conservative	Democrats	within	the	context	of	American	domestic	politics.		For	that	reason,	while	this	was	a	human	rights	issue	that	took	hold	among	large	swathes	of	the	U.S.	population	at	this	time,	the	initiative	that	brought	this	issue	so	sharply	into	focus	should	be	distinguished	from	the	kind	of	widespread	grassroots	nongovernmental	human	rights	advocacy	that	was	common	in	the	latter	part	of	the	decade	and	that	is	the	focus	of	this	study.		Sarah	B.	Snyder,	From	Selma	to	Moscow:	How	Human	Rights	Activists	Transformed	U.S.	
Foreign	Policy	(New	York:	Columbia	University	Press,	2018),	25;	Samuel	Moyn,	The	Last	Utopia:	Human	Rights	
in	History	(Cambridge:	Harvard	University	Press,	2010),	83.		For	more	information	on	the	details	surrounding	the	proposal	and	passage	of	the	Jackson-Vanik	Amendment	and	its	important	place	in	the	history	of	human	rights	during	the	1970s,	see;	Keys,	Reclaiming	American	Virtue;	Jeff	Bloodworth,	“Senator	Henry	Jackson,	the	Solzhenitsyn	Affair,	and	American	Liberalism,”	The	Pacific	Northwest	Quarterly	97,	no.	2	(2006):	69–77;	Daniel	Sargent,	A	Superpower	Transformed:	The	Remaking	of	American	Foreign	Relations	in	the	1970s	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2015)	particularly	chapter	7;	Snyder,	Human	Rights	Activism	and	the	End	of	the	Cold	
War,	particularly	chapter	2.	
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for	the	U.S.	delegation.		Goldberg’s	promotion	of	human	rights	on	the	international	stage	over	the	course	of	his	impressive	career	as	a	public	servant	is	presented	briefly,	before	moving	on	to	discuss	his	takeaways	from	the	Belgrade	Conference.6		Goldberg	returned	from	Belgrade	disappointed	by	the	American	media’s	rather	negative	presentation	of	the	Belgrade	Conference	and	the	persisting	unpopularity	of	the	Helsinki	Accords	in	the	minds	of	the	majority	of	U.S.	citizens.7		To	combat	these	developments,	the	former	Ambassador	took	steps	to	establish	a	nongovernmental	group	that	could	assist	in	the	public	promotion	of	the	Helsinki	Accords,	thus	providing	U.S.	policymakers	with	the	mandate	necessary	to	more	forcefully	pursue	Western	interests	pertaining	to	the	Helsinki	Accords	in	the	course	of	their	interstate	relations.		This	chapter	will	conclude	with	a	description	of	the	steps	taken	by	Goldberg	to	realize	this	plan,	and	by	introducing	the	reader	to	the	man	whose	organization	was	chosen	for	this	purpose—Robert	L.	Bernstein.		Understanding	Bernstein’s	background	helps	to	illustrate	the	kind	of	unique	advantages	that	many	members	of	what	would	become	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	enjoyed,	by	virtue	of	their	social	and	professional	positions	of	prominence.		These	advantages	would	prove	to	be	indispensible	to	the	development	of	tactics	and	strategies	that	the	group	would	use	to	pursue	their	promotion	of	human	rights	in	the	Soviet	bloc.		The	details	of	such	strategies	will	be	discussed	further	in	the	following	chapter.			
THE	HELSINKI	PROCESS	IN	ACTION		Less	than	a	week	after	the	Helsinki	Final	Act	was	signed,	a	nineteen-member	Congressional	delegation	travelled	to	Romania,	Yugoslavia	and	the	Soviet	Union	as	part	of	an	East-West	Interparliamentary	exchange	in	the	spirit	of	the	Final	Act.		Among	the	U.S.	representatives	on	the	trip	was	first-term	Republican	Congresswoman	from	New	Jersey,	Millicent	Fenwick.		Born	to	an	aristocratic	family,	Fenwick	enjoyed	a	privileged,	somewhat	sheltered	upbringing	largely	unconcerned	with	politics.		It	was	not	until	the	rise	of	Adolf	Hitler	that	Fenwick	realized	the	tremendous	influence	that	politics	could	have	over	a																																																									6	For	Goldberg’s	complete	testimony,	see	“Statement	of	Hon.	Arthur	J.	Goldberg,"	21	March	1978,	reproduced	in	The	Belgrade	Followup	Meeting	to	the	Conference	on	Security	and	Cooperation	In	Europe:	A	Report	and	
Appraisal,	17	May	1978,	Commission	on	Security	and	Cooperation	in	Europe,	(Washington	D.C.:	Government	Printing	Office,	1978),	Appendix	F.		7	For	examples,	see	Ibid.;	Arthur	J.	Goldberg,	Letter	to	the	Editor,	The	Economist,	4	February	1978.	
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society.		Germany’s	experience	with	fascism,	and	the	Nazi	party’s	inhumanity	toward	its	own	citizens	instilled	in	Fenwick	the	belief	that	a	government’s	most	important	responsibility	lay	in	its	obligation	to	ensure	justice	for	its	citizens.		As	an	adult	living	in	her	home	state	of	New	Jersey,	Fenwick	became	involved	in	local	and	state	politics.		Guided	by	this	principle,	she	fought	vociferously	for	social	issues	such	as	civil	rights	and	prison	reform.8		During	her	trip	to	the	USSR,	it	was	this	self-described	“obsession”	with	justice	that	led	Fenwick	to	press	Soviet	officials	about	their	government’s	treatment	of	political	dissidents,	as	well	as	the	degree	to	which	the	state	was	taking	steps	to	begin	to	fulfill	its	commitments	to	the	recently	signed	Helsinki	Accords.	This	concern	for	the	rights	of	oppressed	Soviet	citizens	also	compelled	Fenwick	to	seek	out	in-person	meetings	with	members	of	the	Soviet	dissident	community.		Word	of	the	Congresswoman’s	sympathies	spread	quickly,	and	as	a	result,	political	dissidents	and	refuseniks—members	of	the	Soviet	Jewish	community	who	had	been	denied	by	their	government	permission	to	emigrate—travelled	to	Moscow	from	as	far	away	as	Odessa	to	seek	an	audience	with	Fenwick.9	After	returning	to	the	United	States,	Fenwick	would	often	recount	in	speeches	and	interviews	the	heart-rending	experience	of	meeting	with	these	dissidents,	and	coming	face	to	face	with	the	casualties	of	Soviet	repression:	“You	read	about	an	automobile	accident	and	you’re	shocked.		But	you	come	upon	that	accident	and	see	the	blood	on	the	victims	and	hear	their	cries—how	different	it	is.		Well	that’s	what	it	was	like	to	go	to	Russia	and	hear	the	cries	of	all	these	desperate	people.”10		Elsewhere,	Fenwick	described	the	concern	she	felt	for	these	Soviet	citizens,	and	the	moral	imperative	that	she	believed	existed	for	those	in	the	West	to	lend	them	some	assistance:	“it’s	like	being	on	a	transatlantic	steamer	in	the	middle	of	a	terrible	storm,	and	seeing	people	go	by	in	rafts,	and	we	are	trying	to	pick	them	
																																																								8	Interview	with	Millicent	Fenwick,	17	December	1985,	The	Foreign	Affiars	Oral	History	Collection	of	the	
Association	of	Diplomatic	Studies	and	Training,	Library	of	Congress,	accessed	23	July	2018,	https://cdn.loc.gov/service/mss/mfdip/2004/2004fen01/2004fen01.pdf;	Snyder,	Human	Rights	Activism	
and	the	End	of	the	Cold	War,	40-41;	Amy	Schapiro,	Millicent	Fenwick:	Her	Way	(New	Brunswick:	Rutgers	University	Press,	2003),	168.	9	Interview	with	Millicent	Fenwick,	17	December	1985;	Goldberg,	The	Final	Act,	62;	Schapiro,	Millicent	
Fenwick:	Her	Way,	169-170.	10	Quoted	in	Peggy	Lamson,	In	the	Vanguard:	Six	American	Women	in	Public	Life	(Boston:	Houghton	Mifflin	Company,	1979),	26–27.	
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up,	but	can’t.		But	at	least	we	have	our	searchlights	on	them.”11	Fenwick	felt	moved	by	what	she	considered	to	be	America’s	responsibility	as	a	fellow	signatory	of	the	Helsinki	Final	Act	to	ensure	all	states’	compliance	with	the	terms	of	an	agreement	that	so	many	in	the	East	had	come	to	pin	their	hopes	upon.		On	5	September	1975,	the	New	Jersey	Congresswoman	introduced	legislation	onto	the	floor	of	the	House	proposing	the	establishment	of	a	Congressional	body	whose	responsibility	would	be	to	monitor	states’	fulfillment	of	the	Helsinki	Final	Act.		After	nine	months	of	wrangling	through	the	legislature,	the	bill	to	establish	a	Commission	on	Security	and	Cooperation	in	Europe	was	signed	into	law	by	President	Ford	on	3	June	1976.12			Although	few	at	the	time	realized,	by	the	spring	and	summer	of	1976,	subtle	changes	to	the	existing	international	order	which	began	with	the	signing	of	the	Helsinki	Final	Act	were	beginning	to	take	effect,	as	the	searchlight	of	world	public	opinion	affixed	itself	ever	more	brightly	upon	a	small	group	of	individuals	far	behind	the	Iron	Curtain,	who	remained	committed	to	the	idea	that	individual	rights	were	not	matters	to	be	resolved	solely	in	relations	between	a	state	and	its	citizens,	but	rather	concerned	the	peace	and	stability	of	the	entire	world.13			In	time,	this	concern	would	expand	beyond	the	bounds	of	governmental	authority	and	obligation,	and	take	shape	as	a	social	movement	of	transnational	proportions.	The	1976	law	that	gave	birth	to	the	Helsinki	Commission,	as	it	came	to	be	known,	authorized	and	directed	the	Congressional	body	to	“monitor	the	acts	of	the	signatories	which	reflect	compliance	with	or	violation	of	the	articles	of	the	Final	Act	of	the	Conference	on	Security	and	Cooperation	in	Europe,	with	particular	regard	to	the	provisions	relating	to	Cooperation	in	Humanitarian	Fields.”		In	addition,	this	law	further	authorized	the	Commission	to	“encourage	the	development	of	programs	and	activities	of	the	United	States	Government	and	private	organizations	with	a	view	toward	.	.	.	[achieving]	a	greater	interchange	of	people	and	ideas	between	East	and	West.”14		In	practice,	the	Commission	made	no	secret	about	their	intention	to	emphasize	the	humanitarian	articles	of	the	Final																																																									11	Quoted	in	Goldberg,	The	Final	Act,	61.	12	Ibid.,	62-63;	Schapiro,	Millicent	Fenwick:	Her	Way,	175.	13	For	a	more	in-depth	evaluation	of	the	precise	nature	of	the	Soviets’	rights	discourse	during	this	time,	see	Benjamin	Nathans,	“Soviet	Rights-Talk	in	the	Post-Stalin	Era,”	in	Stefan-Ludwig	Hoffmann	ed.,	Human	Rights	
in	the	Twentieth	Century	(New	York:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2010).	14	“To	Establish	a	Commission	on	Security	and	Cooperation	in	Europe,”	Pub.	L.	No.	94-304,	90	Stat.	661.			
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Act,	which	in	part	reflected	a	perceived	responsibility	felt	by	some	in	Congress	to	serve	as	a	check	on	some	of	the	more	questionable	foreign	policy	priorities	of	the	Kissinger	State	Department.		This	commitment	to	do	more	to	guarantee	humanitarian	protections	for	disadvantaged	or	oppressed	groups	in	other	countries	also	demonstrated	the	rising	influence	among	congressional	constituencies	of	émigré	organizations	and	special	interest	groups	in	the	United	States	during	this	time.15		In	an	onslaught	of	Congressional	activity,	in	the	period	between	January	and	June	1977	alone,	the	Helsinki	Commission	called	56	witnesses	to	testify	over	the	course	of	14	different	Committee	hearings,	and	administered	more	than	1,100	surveys	to	recent	Soviet	emigrants,	journalists,	and	U.S.	companies	involved	in	East-West	trade.16		Further	guided	by	the	law’s	dual	mandate,	the	Commission	arranged	as	part	of	its	first	overseas	trip	a	small	Study	Mission	whose	goal	would	be	to	investigate	the	current	status	of	implementation	of	the	humanitarian	provisions	of	the	Final	Act	elsewhere	throughout	Europe.		With	the	first	review	conference	of	the	CSCE	quickly	approaching,	Commission	members	undertook	this	trip	so	that	they	might	better	understand	what	actions	other	signatory	states	were	taking	in	order	to	more	fully	comply	with	the	humanitarian	articles	set	forth	in	the	Helsinki	Accords,	and	to	assist	the	U.S.	delegation	participating	in	the	review	in	determining	negotiating	strategies	which	might	best	ensure	unified	Western	interests	in	the	upcoming	negotiations	at	Belgrade.17			The	Mission	met	with	government	officials	and	parliamentarians	from	18	different	European	states	(all	from	the	West	with	the	exception	of	Yugoslavia,	the	site	of	the	upcoming	review	meeting),	as	well	as	a	number	of	private	organizations	and	individuals.		These	private	citizens’	organizations	represented	émigré	communities,	Eastern	European																																																									15	Madeleine	K.	Albright	and	Alfred	Friendly	Jr.,	“Helsinki	and	Human	Rights,”	in	Edmund	S.	Muskie,	Kenneth	Rush,	and	Kenneth	W.	Thompson	eds.,		The	President,	the	Congress,	and	Foreign	Policy:	A	Joint	Policy	Project	of	
the	Association	of	Former	Members	of	Congress	and	the	Atlantic	Council	of	the	United	States	(Lanham:	University	Press	of	America,	1986)	294		See	also	Barbara	J.	Keys,	“Congress,	Kissinger,	and	the	Origins	of	Human	Rights	Diplomacy,”	Diplomatic	History	34,	no.	5	(2010).	16	Ibid.;	"Implementation	of	the	Final	Act	of	the	Conference	on	Security	and	Cooperation	in	Europe:	Findings	and	Recommendations	Two	Years	After	Helsinki."		17	The	Study	Mission	consisted	of	five	members	of	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Commission,	including	its	Chair,	Rep.	Dante	Fascell	(D-FL),	Co-Chair	Sen.	Claiborne	Pell	(D-RI),	Rep.	John	Bingham	(D-NY),	Rep.	Paul	Simon	(D-IL),	and	the	Congresswoman	responsible	for	proposing	the	creation	of	the	Commission,	Rep.	Millicent	Fenwick	(R-NJ).		For	a	more	detailed	analysis	of	the	Commission’s	work,	see	Snyder,	Human	Rights	Activism	and	the	
End	of	the	Cold	War,	particularly	chapter	2.	
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exiles,	journalists,	and	businessmen	who	could	offer	insights	into	the	current	state	of	East-West	cooperation.		The	Mission	found	that,	among	the	European	governmental	representatives	with	whom	they	met,	there	was	virtual	unanimity	in	the	belief	that	the	Helsinki	Final	Act	had	yielded	more	concrete	positive	results	than	anyone	had	anticipated	at	the	time	of	its	summit-level	signing	in	August	1975.		This	unanticipated	efficacy	existed	in	spite	of	what	the	Mission	found	to	be	a	profound	sense	of	skepticism	in	the	Helsinki	process	on	the	part	of	Western	European	and	American	publics,	who—despite	the	optimism	of	many	of	their	elected	officials—largely	maintained	the	belief	that	the	agreements	had	little	value	to	the	Western	powers,	and	had	only	served	to	authorize	the	Soviets’	territorial	ambitions	in	Eastern	Europe.18			The	Helsinki	Commission’s	final	report	summarizing	the	Study	Mission’s	findings	described	the	Western	European	states’	“high	degree	of	official	interest	in	the	CSCE	aftermath,”	and	policymakers’	“unanimously	positive	assessment	of	[the	Final	Act’s]	long-term	potential.”		And	yet	despite	this,	the	Study	Mission	was	particularly	struck	by	the	noticeable	lack	of	public	promotion	being	done	to	improve	popular	perception	and	generate	demand	for	more	complete	implementation	on	the	part	of	all	the	signatories.		The	Commission	report	remarked	that	“the	same	officials	who	are	today	most	sanguine	about	CSCE	prospects	are	those	who	failed	15	months	ago	to	communicate	their	hopes	for	the	accords	to	the	broader	public,”	and	warned	that	“a	continuation	of	government	silence	over	CSCE	in	the	months	leading	to	[the	Belgrade	follow-up	conference]	could	lead	an	already	disenchanted	public	once	again	to	reject	the	opportunities	and	advantages	inherent	in	long-term	Western	commitment	to	implement	the	Helsinki	accords.”19	Even	those	Foreign	Ministry	representatives	who	most	favored	a	restrained	Western	approach	at	Belgrade	for	fear	of	provoking	the	Soviets	could	not	deny	that	their	bargaining	positions	at	the	conference	would	be	substantially	weakened	without	some	degree	of	vocal	public	concern	and	support	of	their	efforts.		Overall,	this	failure	by	Western	governments	to	sufficiently	promote	the	value	of	the	Helsinki	agreements	to	their	people	resulted	in	what	the	Study	Mission	had	described	as	“uninformed	disinterest”	among	these																																																									18	“Report	of	the	Study	Mission	to	Europe,”	3	December	1976.	For	more	on	the	Western	reaction	to	the	signing	of	the	Helsinki	Accords,	see	footnote	11.		19	Ibid.	
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countries’	populations.		This	negligence,	the	report’s	authors	concluded,	deprived	Western	negotiators	of	“what	may	turn	out	to	be	the	most	effective	Helsinki-implementer	at	all:	informed	public	opinion.”20		
DOMESTIC	IMPLICATIONS	FOR	NONGOVERNMENTAL	INVOLVEMENT	IN	THE	
HELSINKI	PROCESS		Although	the	Study	Mission’s	report	focused	on	European	states’	promotion	of	the	Helsinki	Accords	in	their	own	countries,	the	implications	for	American	society	were	clear,	since	public	interest	in	the	Helsinki	Accords	fared	no	better	in	the	United	States	at	this	time	than	it	did	in	Europe.		This	lack	of	public	promotion	for	Helsinki	Accords	in	the	U.S.	was	further	compounded	by	the	fact	that,	compared	to	many	of	the	European	capitals,	there	seemed	to	exist	little	interest	in	the	potential	of	the	Helsinki	process	even	at	the	official	level,	with	almost	no	demonstrable	effort	made	by	the	United	States	to	take	the	lead	in	developing	a	unified	Western	strategy	for	the	CSCE	follow-up	meetings.		“Except	in	the	workings	of	the	NATO	political	commission,”	the	Study	Mission’s	report	found,	“the	American	voice	is	little	heard	in	European	councils	and	consultation	on	the	meaning	and	future	of	the	Helsinki	pact.		While	Western	European	officials	themselves	demonstrate	an	awareness	of	the	real	and	potential	utility	of	the	CSCE	undertakings	in	patterning	and	improving	the	East-West	dialogue,	they	report	little	evidence	of	such	interest	or	optimism	from	Washington.”21		In	recommending	action	that	could	reverse	such	a	trend,	the	Study	Mission’s	report	suggested	ways	in	which	participating	states	could	enlist	help	from	particular	areas	of	civil	society,	whose	professional	experiences	could	provide	key	insights	into	the	challenges	facing	a	more	forthright	multilateral	exchange	among	Helsinki	signatories	abroad,	and	whose	public	stature,	they	believed,	could	better	help	mobilize	public	opinion	back	home:			If	medical	associations,	editorial	boards	of	publishing	houses,	scholarly	societies,	journalists’	groups,	travel	agencies	and	universities	were	more	aware	of	the	specific	Basket	II	and	III	opportunities	for	contact	and	exchange	with	the	East,	it	is	possible	that	they	would	take	a	more	active	and	effective	role	in	opening	many	more	doors																																																									20	Ibid.	21	Ibid.	
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than	a	limited	number	of	diplomats	can	ever	hope	to	do.		Perhaps	such	private	initiatives,	similar	to	those	the	Commission	has	been	mandated	by	law	to	encourage,	will	only	be	rebuffed.		But	without	attempting	them,	we	cannot	know.22				In	its	report,	the	Study	Mission	also	described	the	extent	of	its	contacts	with	various	intergovernmental	organizations,	policy	think	tanks,	individuals,	and	special	interest	groups,	including	the	European	Cooperation	Research	Group,	the	Organization	for	Economic	Cooperation	and	Development,	the	Aspen	Institute	in	Berlin,	Keston	College,	and	the	World	Council	of	Churches.		Loosely	defined	in	the	report	as	a	community	of	“private	Helsinki	watchers,”	these	were	individuals	and	groups	that	had	some	stake	in	seeing	participating	state	governments	abide	by	their	Helsinki	commitments—recent	Soviet	exiles,	refugee	organizations,	businessmen	active	in	East-West	trade,	journalists,	and	researchers.		What	had	impressed	members	of	the	Study	Mission	most	in	their	meetings	with	these	organizations	had	been	the	value	and	quality	of	data	that	these	groups	had	assembled	on	states’	compliance	with	the	Helsinki	Act.		Because	of	this,	the	Congressional	delegation	expressed	their	strong	desire	to	see	contact	between	the	Helsinki	Commission	and	these	types	of	organizations	continue	after	the	conclusion	of	the	Study	Mission.		They	believed	that	their	input	was	likely	to	“be	helpful	to	the	overall	Western	consultative	process,	before	and	after	Belgrade.”		The	report	recommended	that	U.S.	legislators	“maintain	close	liaison	with	the	most	active	of	these	special	interest	organizations	so	that	their	particular	expertise	and	points	of	view	on	Helsinki	issues	[could]	be	made	a	helpful	ingredient	in	the	continuing	official	and	public	review	of	the	utility	of	the	Final	Act.”23	Interestingly,	the	report	described	these	institutions	and	their	work	as	existing	“outside	the	immediate	CSCE	framework,”	suggesting	the	degree	to	which	Commission	members	still	considered	the	Helsinki	process	at	this	point	in	time	from	the	paradigmatic	viewpoint	of	traditional	international	relations,	where	the	pressure	upon	a	state	to	abide	by	its	international	covenants	overwhelmingly	originated	from	the	power	and	authority	of	its	fellow	state	governments.		In	truth,	it	would	be	some	time	before	the	Commission	would	fully	come	to	understand	the	place	of	the	individual	citizen	with	respect	to	the	Helsinki																																																									22	These	conclusions	demonstrate	an	early	conception	by	policymakers	of	the	value	of	non-state	actors	and	their	involvement	in	the	Helsinki	process.		These	positive	attitudes	would	later	prove	to	be	crucial	in	fostering	governmental	support	for	private	citizens’	Helsinki	advocacy	groups	by	the	late	1970s.	Ibid.	23	Ibid.	
	 27	
Agreement—not	just	insofar	as	how	the	protection	of	the	individual	served	as	a	constituent	element	of	participating	states’	responsibility	to	the	Final	Act,	but	also	the	role	that	individual	private	citizens	had	and	should	be	invited	to	play	in	contributing	to	the	overall	strength	and	success	of	the	agreement.		Crucially	though,	this	Study	Mission’s	report	serves	as	early	evidence	of	the	fact	that	governmental	organizations	like	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Commission	were	gradually	becoming	sensitized	to	seeing	the	Final	Act	of	the	CSCE	as	a	mechanism	by	which	previously	marginalized	interest	holders	were	able	to	more	effectively	insert	themselves	into	the	Helsinki	arbitration	process.		Based	on	its	findings,	the	Study	Mission	concluded	its	report	with	a	list	of	fifteen	specific	recommendations	for	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Commission	and	the	rest	of	the	U.S.	government	in	preparation	for	the	Belgrade	meeting,	with	the	aim	of	strengthening	the	overall	impact	of	the	CSCE	process.		Of	the	fifteen,	five	of	these	recommendations	dealt	specifically	with	increasing	cooperation	between	the	U.S.	government	and	private	individuals	or	organizations.		This	fact	demonstrates	that	members	of	the	Commission	recognized	as	early	as	1976	the	valuable	role	that	public	opinion	could	potentially	play	in	the	CSCE	review	process.24		Engaging	individual	citizens	from	the	private	sector	both	at	home	and	abroad	would	help	to	expand	the	mechanisms	for	implementation	and	monitoring	in	ways	that	far	surpassed	the	capabilities	of	governments	acting	without	such	support.		Most	importantly,	robust	public	pressure	would	provide	Western	governments	with	the	authority	to	be	more	resolute	in	their	dealings	with	countries	like	the	Soviet	Union	on	the	provisions	protecting	greater	individual	freedoms,	which	they	most	wanted	to	see	implemented	through	the	Helsinki	framework.		And	yet,	while	it	is	clear	that	the	value	of	nongovernmental	involvement	was	evident	to	many	of	these	officials	even	from	the	early	stages	of	the	Helsinki	process,	the	specific	approach	that	policymakers	sought	to	take	at	this	time	seemed	to	miss	the	mark	when	it	came	to	mobilizing	public	opinion	en	masse.	
																																																								24	Ibid.		In	addition	to	this	report,	there	are	a	multitude	of	different	documents	housed	within	the	Commission	on	Security	and	Cooperation	in	Europe	archives	that	demonstrate	the	Commission’s	efforts	to	engage	with	private	citizens	and	help	improve	public	opinion	toward	the	Helsinki	process.		Transcripts	of	Commission	hearings	are	particularly	demonstrative	of	this.		As	an	example,	see	Commission	on	Security	and	Cooperation	in	Europe,	"Hearings	before	the	Commission	on	Security	and	Cooperation	in	Europe	on	Implementation	of	the	Helsinki	Accords,"	vol.	III,	Information	Flow,	and	Cultural	and	Educational	Exchanges,	17	May	1977,	accessed	6	August	2018,	https://www.csce.gov/international-impact/events/implementation-helsinki-accords-vol-iii-information-flow-and-cultural.			
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Although	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Commission	actively	encouraged	the	American	government’s	closer	association	and	involvement	with	nongovernmental	organizations	advocating	for	states’	faithful	adherence	to	the	terms	of	the	Helsinki	Final	Act,	they	most	often	did	so	at	this	time	through	their	collaboration	with	specific	special	interest	groups	whose	defense	of	the	Final	Act	was	generally	circumscribed	by	the	limited	objectives	defined	by	that	group’s	particular	interests.		This	approach	to	nongovernmental	involvement	reflected	a	certain	doctrinal	way	of	thinking	in	Washington,	which	had	long	historical	precedence	in	the	government’s	past	involvement	with	NGOs	promoting	U.S.	policymaking	with	respect	to	human	rights	issues.		From	the	support	provided	by	Jewish-American	organizations	for	the	establishment	of	the	United	Nations	Commission	on	Human	Rights	and	the	adoption	of	the	Universal	Declaration	of	Human	Rights	in	the	aftermath	of	the	Holocaust,	to	the	solidarity	of	African-American	groups	in	support	of	the	campaign	to	end	apartheid	in	South	Africa,	it	was	understood	in	Washington	that	these	special	interest	groups	could	be	relied	upon	to	generate	substantial	support	within	their	respective	communities	for	both	politicians	and	policies	that	aligned	with	their	interests.25	In	the	twelve	months	between	the	establishment	of	the	Helsinki	Commission	and	the	start	of	preparatory	agenda-setting	talks	at	Belgrade,	the	Commission	heard	testimony	from	such	groups	as	the	Polish-American	Congress,	the	American-Romanian	Committee	on	Family	Reunion,	the	Helsinki	Guarantees	for	Ukraine	Committee,	the	Union	of	Councils	for	Soviet	Jews,	the	Czechoslovak	National	Council	of	America,	and	the	U.S.-USSR	Trade	Council.		These	were	just	a	small	number	of	the	special	interests	groups	with	whom	the	Commission	sought	to	engage.26		Similarly,	the	private	organizations	that	the	1976	Congressional	Study	Mission	to	Europe	met	with	included	representatives	from	the	Hebrew	Immigrant	Aid	Society,	the	Jewish	Agency	for	Israel,	the	World	Federation	of	Free																																																									25	For	more	on	NGO’s	promotion	of	specific	human	rights	issues	within	U.S.	policy	prior	to	the	1970s,	see	William	Korey,	NGOs	and	the	Universal	Declaration	of	Human	Rights:	“A	Curious	Grapevine”	(New	York:	Palgrave,	1998);	Welch	Jr.	ed.,	NGOs	and	Human	Rights:	Promise	and	Performance;	Jan	Eckel,	“The	International	League	for	the	Rights	of	Man,	Amnesty	International,	and	the	Changing	Fate	of	Human	Rights	Activism	from	the	1940s	through	the	1970s,”	Humanity:	An	International	Journal	of	Human	Rights,	
Humanitarianism,	and	Development	4,	no.	2	(2013):	183–214;	Zachary	Steven	Ramirez,	International	Human	
Rights	Activism	in	the	United	States	during	the	Cold	War,	(Ph.D.	Dissertation,	University	of	California,	Berkeley,	2013);	Bradley,	The	World	Reimagined.	26	Dante	Fascell,	“The	Helsinki	Accord:	A	Case	Study,”	The	Annals	of	the	American	Academy	of	Political	and	
Social	Science	442	(1979):	69–76.	
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Latvians,	the	World	Council	of	Churches,	the	Institute	of	Jewish	Affairs,	as	well	as	a	number	of	individuals	from	ethnic	and	national	émigré	communities.27		What	stands	out	about	the	interests	of	these	particular	nongovernmental	organizations	is	the	relatively	limited	resonance	that	those	groups’	appeals	were	likely	to	have	on	American	society	at	large.		That	is	not	to	say	that	these	groups’	efforts	were	in	any	way	insignificant,	or	that	the	American	people	were	not	sympathetic	to	their	cause,	only	that	special	interest	groups	tended	to,	by	definition,	focus	their	efforts	on	achieving	specific	goals,	which	pertained	to	their	community’s	immediate	interests—a	particular	set	of	deliverables	with	an	often	limited	focus.		These	organizations	based	their	efforts	upon	a	desire	to	achieve	the	restoration	of	dignity	or	rights	for	a	particular	group,	rather	than	the	practical	defense	of	values	that	undergirded	Western	society	at	large.		Journalists	advocated	for	fewer	restrictions	on	journalism;	émigrés	advocated	for	freer	movement	of	people;	religious	organizations	advocated	for	greater	freedom	of	belief	and	freedom	from	religious	persecution.		Furthermore,	the	strategies	employed	by	these	groups	to	achieve	such	ends	overwhelmingly	tended	to	involve	lobbying	U.S.	policymakers,	and	rarely	sought	to	enlist	the	support	of	large	swaths	of	the	American	people.28		By	the	mid-to-late	1970s,	however,	nongovernmental	organizations	began	arriving	on	the	scene	in	pursuit	of	a	much	more	holistic	mandate,	striving	to	assume	a	place	within	American	society	as	legitimate	agents	of	general	reform	with	respect	to	international	human	rights	issues	more	broadly.		A	confluence	of	different	factors	contributed	to	this	shift	in	the	strategies	and	scope	of	many	of	these	organizations.		The	questionable	morality	and	conduct	of	the	Nixon	administration,	culminating	in	the	public	exposure	of	the	Watergate	scandal	and	Nixon’s	own	resignation,	as	well	as	the	American	military’s	ignominious	withdrawal	from	Vietnam	all	helped	to	produce	an	unprecedented	degree	of	support	for	Congressional	oversight	of	American	foreign	policy	at	this	time,	which	provided	
																																																								27	"Report	of	the	Study	Mission,"	3	December	1976.	28	For	more	on	the	conduct	and	political	impact	of	special	interest	groups	during	this	period,	and	their	place	within	the	process	of	U.S.	policymaking,	see	Keys,	Reclaiming	American	Virtue;	Korey,	NGOs	and	the	Universal	
Declaration;	Melvin	Small,	Democracy	and	Diplomacy:	The	Impact	of	Domestic	Politics	in	U.S.	Foreign	Policy,	
1789-1994	(Baltimore:	Johns	Hopkins	University	Press,	1995),	particularly	chapter	5;	David	Weissbrodt,	“The	Influence	of	Interest	Groups	on	the	Development	of	United	States	Human	Rights	Policies,”	in	Natalie	Kaufman	Hevener	ed.,	The	Dynamics	of	Human	Rights	in	United	States	Foreign	Policy	(New	Brunswick:	Transaction	Books,	1984).	
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opportunities	for	previously	underrepresented	actors	to	better	exert	their	influence	in	this	field.29		Of	course,	the	signing	of	the	Helsinki	Final	Act	itself	was	also	significant,	as	it	explicitly	called	upon	individual	citizens	to	“know	and	act	upon”	their	rights	in	the	context	of	the	multilateral	agreements	and	provided	an	international	framework	through	which	to	do	so.		Finally,	action	taken	by	individuals	in	positions	of	power	at	this	time	also	helped	to	facilitate	an	environment	in	which	concern	for	the	violation	of	certain	rights	could	be	more	clearly	addressed	and	widely	publicized	throughout	American	society.	Perhaps	the	most	prominent	individual	effort	that	helped	to	elevate	concern	for	human	rights	during	this	period	was	that	of	President	Jimmy	Carter’s.		His	decision	to	make	human	rights	an	American	foreign	policy	priority	and	a	centerpiece	of	his	administration	not	only	helped	to	mobilize	the	resources	of	the	American	government	to	more	effectively	address	such	issues,	but	also	substantially	raised	public	awareness	by	capturing	the	attention	of	the	American	people	and	the	media	concerning	human	rights	in	a	way	that	little	else	at	this	time	could.30		Other	leaders	on	issues	of	human	rights	in	Congress—individuals	such	as	Fenwick,	Clifford	Case	(who	co-sponsored	Fenwick’s	proposed	bill	for	the	creation	of	the	Helsinki	Commission),	and	Dante	Fascell	(the	Commission’s	first	chairman	and	a	tireless	supporter	of	human	rights)—also	did	much	to	bring	these	issues	to	the	forefront	of	political	discourse	in	the	mid-to-late	1970s.			But	perhaps	the	individual	who	had	the	most	lasting	impact	on	Americans’	commitment	to	the	Helsinki	process	and	the	role	that	nongovernmental	organizations	came	to	fulfill	within	it	was	the	man	who	President	Carter	chose	to	lead	the	U.S.	delegation	at	the	first	CSCE	follow-up	negotiations	in	Belgrade,	Arthur	J.	Goldberg.		As	a	former	Secretary	of	Labor	in	the	Kennedy	administration,	and	Supreme	Court	Justice	and																																																									29	See	Keys,	Reclaiming	American	Virtue,	particularly	chapter	8.	30	Of	course,	the	human	rights	policies	that	would	come	to	define	Carter’s	presidency	were	themselves	the	product	of	exhaustive	work	by	innumerable	policy	advisers	and	analysts	whose	outlooks	were	themselves	informed	by	a	multitude	of	different	social,	cultural	and	political	factors.		Yet,	the	exceptional	authority	of	the	presidency,	with	the	final	decision	to	pursue	or	abandon	any	particular	course	of	action	ultimately	resting	upon	the	will	of	a	single	individual	is	sufficient	in	this	instance	to	be	acknowledged.		For	more	on	the	complex	history	of	Carter’s	human	rights	policy	and	its	implications	for	U.S.–Soviet	relations,	see	David	C.	Engerman,	
Know	Your	Enemy:	The	Rise	and	Fall	of	America’s	Soviet	Experts	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2009);	T.M.	Nichols,	“Carter	and	the	Soviets:	The	Origins	of	the	U.S.	Return	to	a	Strategy	of	Confrontation,”	Diplomacy	&	
Statecraft	13,	no.	2	(2002):	21–42;	Christian	Philip	Peterson,	“The	Carter	Administration	and	the	Promotion	of	Human	Rights	in	the	Soviet	Union,	1977-1981,”	Diplomatic	History	38,	no.	3	(2014):	628–56;	Renouard,	
Human	Rights	in	American	Foreign	Policy;	Sargent,	A	Superpower	Transformed.	
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Ambassador	to	the	UN	under	President	Johnson,	Goldberg’s	credentials	were	of	the	highest	order,	and	his	appointment	to	lead	the		American	delegation	was	an	unambiguous	sign	of	the	new	administration’s	commitment	to	the	CSCE.31		His	conduct	both	at	the	Belgrade	meeting	and	back	home	in	Washington	proved	to	be	instrumental	in	changing	the	way	that	American	policymakers	viewed	the	CSCE,	and	ushered	in	a	new	way	of	thinking	about	nongovernmental	participation	in	the	Helsinki	process.				
ARTHUR	J.	GOLDBERG	AND	THE	ADVANCEMENT	OF	NONGOVERNMENTAL	
INFLUENCE	IN	THE	HELSINKI	PROCESS		Goldberg’s	record	of	support	for	the	defense	of	international	human	rights	had	significant	precedence	throughout	his	long	career	in	public	service.		As	a	staunch	opponent	of	America’s	escalating	involvement	in	Vietnam,	Goldberg	had	stepped	down	from	the	Supreme	Court	in	1965	to	accept	the	position	of	U.S.	Ambassador	to	the	UN,	with	the	expectation	that	he	could	use	the	office	to	help	broker	some	sort	of	peaceful	resolution	to	the	conflict.		According	to	biographer	David	L.	Stebenne,	Goldberg	agreed	to	accept	Johnson’s	nomination	only	after	he	was	given	assurances	by	the	president	that	the	White	House	also	favored	a	negotiated	end	to	the	fighting,	and	that,	as	UN	Ambassador,	it	would	be	one	of	Goldberg’s	primarily	responsibilities	to	work	toward	such	an	end.32			While	this	appears	to	be	precisely	the	impression	the	Johnson	had	hoped	to	cultivate,	the	nomination	of	Goldberg	seems	to	have	been	primarily	motivated	by	the	president’s	need	to	deflect	the	criticism	of	those	in	his	party	who	opposed	increased	American	involvement	in	Vietnam,	and	who	would	consider	the	selection	of	somebody	of	Goldberg’s	status	to	be	a	sincere	gesture	of	the	administration’s	willingness	to	pursue	a	peaceful	resolution.		The	White	House	also	used	Goldberg’s	appointment	to	help	manage	the	expectations	of	the	public,	as	his	nomination	to	the	UN	was	announced	just	prior	to	Johnson’s	decision	to	increase	the	American	military’s	presence	in	South	Vietnam	from																																																									31	For	more	on	the	exact	circumstances	that	led	to	Goldberg’s	appointment,	see	Korey,	The	Promises	We	Keep,	69–70;	Max	M.	Kampelman,	Entering	New	Worlds:	The	Memoirs	of	a	Private	Man	in	Public	Life	(New	York:	HarperCollins	Publishers,	1991),	219–23.	32	David	L.	Stebenne,	Arthur	J.	Goldberg:	New	Deal	Liberal	(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	1996),	347–48;	John	D.	Pomfret,	“Vital	Role	Cited:	Johnson	Persuasive	in	Getting	Ex-Labor	Aide	to	Accept	Position,”	New	York	
Times,	21	July	1965.		
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75,000	to	125,0000	troops.		The	strategy	paid	off,	as	the	reporting	of	these	events	in	the	American	press	stressed	their	connection.		In	light	of	Goldberg’s	appointment,	Johnson’s	escalation	of	the	war	effort	was	billed	as	an	act	of	reluctant	restraint	and	calculated	statecraft,	whose	goal	was	ultimately	to	achieve	a	peaceful	resolution.		In	actuality,	unbeknownst	to	the	public,	Johnson	had	approved	an	increase	of	up	to	200,000	troops	in	addition	to	a	major	increase	in	military	spending,	before	Goldberg	had	even	agreed	to	accept	the	position.33			The	ideological	differences	that	existed	between	Johnson	and	Goldberg	continued	throughout	the	latter’s	time	as	Ambassador.		Yet	Goldberg	was	not	to	be	deterred	from	pursuing	an	approach	at	the	UN	that	aligned	with	his	beliefs.	While	serving	as	Ambassador,	Goldberg	had	played	an	important	part	in	the	final	negotiations	of	the	International	Covenant	on	Civil	and	Political	Rights	(ICCPR)	and	the	International	Covenant	on	Economic,	Social,	and	Cultural	Rights	(ICESCR)—two	multilateral	treaties	adopted	by	the	General	Assembly	in	December	1966	that	called	upon	states	to	observe	and	protect	various	internationally	recognized	rights.		On	the	eve	of	the	two	Covenants’	adoption,	Goldberg	wrote	to	President	Johnson,	strongly	advocating	for	their	immediate	ratification,	arguing	that	such	a	move	would	provide	the	United	States	with	an	opportunity	of	“immense	value”	to	“set	and	uphold	[new]	international	standards”	built	around	the	defense	of	human	rights.		An	American	foreign	policy	approach	that	embraced	concern	for	human	rights,	Goldberg	said,	would	“represent	a	new,	liberal	departure	in	our	international	relations”	and	would	serve	as	a	“logical	component”	to	the	progress	made	domestically	through	the	recent	passage	of	civil	rights	legislation.		This	bold	new	direction,	Goldberg	believed,	would	“allow	[the	United	States]	to	answer	Soviet	criticism	in	a	psychologically	important	area	of	international	cooperation.”34			Goldberg	argued	that	the	current	US	approach	forfeited	much	of	what	he	described	as	the	“international	advantage”	that	could	be	gained	from	a	more	unambiguous	position																																																									33	John	P.	Burke	and	Fred	L.	Greenstein,	How	Presidents	Test	Reality:	Decisions	on	Vietnam,	1954	and	1965	(New	York:	Russell	Sage	Foundation,	1989),	215–31;	Fred	L.	Greenstein,	“Goldberg,	Hoping	to	End	Vietnam	War,	Was	In	on	Its	Escalation,”	New	York	Times,	4	February	1990.	34	“Letter	from	the	Representative	to	the	United	Nations	(Goldberg)	to	President	Johnson,"	4	May	1966,	FRUS,	
1964-1968,	vol.	XXXIII-	Organization	and	Management	of	Foreign	Policy;	United	Nations,	David	C.	Humphrey,	James	E.	Miller	and	Edward	C.	Keefer	eds.	(Washington	D.C.:	Government	Printing	Office,	2004),	Document	No.	381.	
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on	human	rights,	and	suggested	that	it	was	time	the	United	States	stepped	into	a	leadership	role	concerning	these	issues.35		His	conduct	as	Ambassador	to	the	UN	further	demonstrated	the	extent	of	his	belief	in	the	efficacy	of	such	a	strategy.		In	his	statements	to	the	General	Assembly,	he	frequently	voiced	support	for	a	more	unambiguous	American	position	concerning	human	rights	issues,	even	going	so	far	in	March	1968	as	to	publically	admonish	Soviet	representatives	for	their	government’s	persecution	of	dissident	authors.		Goldberg’s	indictment	of	the	Soviet	government	within	the	forum	of	the	UN	broke	decisively	with	the	prevailing	American	policy	with	respect	to	issues	of	human	rights	and	their	relations	with	the	Soviet	Union.		His	denunciation	was	one	of	the	earliest	occurrences	of	a	Western	government	using	an	international	platform	to	publically	challenge	the	Soviet	government	on	the	treatment	of	its	own	citizens—an	issue	which	had	long	been	regarded	within	the	realm	of	international	relations	as	strictly	an	internal	affair,	and	as	such,	the	purview	of	that	government	alone.36		These	bold	and	assertive	tactics	would	come	to	define	Goldberg’s	approach	to	human	rights	within	the	context	of	the	Belgrade	follow	up	meeting—an	approach	that	would	set	him	apart	from	European	allies	and	certain	colleagues	in	the	State	Department	for	his	willingness	to	directly	confront	the	Soviets	and	engage	with	them	on	matters	of	cultural	cooperation.	Goldberg	saw	the	aggressive	pursuit	of	human	rights	on	the	international	stage	as	a	means	by	which	to	further	other	U.S.	policy	aims,	and	better	situate	the	United	States	to	engage	with	its	geopolitical	rivals	on	vital	international	issues	from	a	position	of	strength.		But	these	documents	also	testify	to	the	important	contributive	role	that	Goldberg	felt	should	be	played	by	nongovernmental	organizations	and	the	public	when	executing	such	a	strategy.		In	Goldberg’s	1966	letter	to	the	president,	the	future	Ambassador-at-large	to	the	Belgrade	conference	suggested	to	Johnson	additional	steps	that	could	be	taken,	which	might	lend	assistance	to	the	administration	when	pushing	for	the	ratification	of	the	two	international	human	rights	covenants.		These	measures	involved	enlisting	the	help	of	private	organizations	to	rally	public	support	for	this	administrative	action.37	As	Goldberg	saw	it,	an	effective	American	approach	to	international	human	rights																																																									35	Ibid.	36	See	Drew	Middleton,	“U.S.	Scores	Trials	of	Soviet	Writers,”	New	York	Times,	7	March	1968;	"Excerpts	from	Unite	States	and	Soviet	Speeches	on	Human	Rights	at	the	U.N.,"	New	York	Times,	7	March	1968.	37	“Letter	from	Goldberg	to	Johnson,"	FRUS.	
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issues	required	consistent,	principled	policy	across	all	areas	of	government	backed	by	strong	popular	support.		Citing	the	recent	creation	of	the	Ad-Hoc	Committee	on	Human	Rights	and	Genocide	Treaties—an	advocacy	group	made	up	of	more	than	fifty	prominent	American	NGOs	whose	goal	was	to	lobby	Senatorial	support	for	President	Kennedy’s	proposed	conventions	on	genocide,	slavery,	forced	labor,	and	the	rights	of	women—Goldberg	stressed	to	Johnson	the	role	that	he	believed	could	similarly	be	played	by	U.S.-based	nongovernmental	organizations	in	this	instance.		Goldberg	emphasized	to	the	president	that	there	was	an	important	part	to	be	played	by	nongovernmental	actors	in	helping	to	“contribute	to	understanding	in	the	Senate	and	the	American	public	of	the	importance	of	US	ratification	of	human	rights	conventions.”38		Despite	these	efforts,	Goldberg’s	vision	for	a	more	unequivocal	U.S.	approach	towards	human	rights	would	not	be	realized	during	his	time	as	UN	Ambassador.		Among	other	considerations,	the	United	States’	intensifying	involvement	in	the	Vietnam	War	precluded	such	a	high-minded	position	on	international	human	rights	issues	at	this	time,	to	say	nothing	of	the	challenges	of	winning	widespread	domestic	support	for	American	foreign	policy	in	the	late	1960s.39		But	within	the	decade,	changes	to	the	international	and	domestic	political	landscape	alluded	to	earlier	presented	the	Ambassador	with	an	opportunity	to	revisit	these	ideas.		His	appointment	to	head	the	U.S.	delegation	at	the	first	CSCE	follow	up	conference	in	Belgrade	gave	Goldberg	the	chance	to	once	again	pursue	his	vision	for	a	more	outspoken	American	human	rights	policy	with	some	possibility	of	success.			
THE	BELGRADE	CSCE	AND	ITS	CONSEQUENCES		Under	Goldberg’s	leadership,	the	U.S.	delegation	at	the	Belgrade	conference	decisively	broke	with	accepted	notion	that	the	West	should	not	pressure	the	Soviets	too																																																									38	Ibid.;	Korey,	NGOs	and	the	Universal	Declaration,	212–20.	39	For	an	overview	of	some	of	the	challenges	that	Goldberg	faced	when	seeking	to	promote	certain	policy	recommendations	as	UN	Ambassador,	see	Robert	H.	Estabrook,	"Goldberg	Said	to	Delay	Quitting,"	Washington	
Post,	1	April	1968;	"Goldberg	Quits,"	Chicago	Tribune,	26	April	1968;	Max	Frankel,	"Chilly	Tone	Marked	Exchanges	between	Johnson	and	Goldberg,"	New	York	Times,	29	April	1968.		Goldberg's	personal	views—and	the	degree	to	which	they	diverge	from	official	U.S.	policy—are	further	articulated	in	an	eight-part	series	written	by	the	former	Ambassador	and	published	in	the	South	China	Morning	Post	from	7	to	17	September	1968.		
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directly	on	matters	of	human	rights	for	fear	of	jeopardizing	possible	progress	on	other	aspects	of	détente.		Instead,	using	tactics	similar	to	those	employed	by	Goldberg	at	the	UN	in	1968,	the	United	States	delegation	began	a	concerted	effort	to	publically	name	and	shame	Soviet	bloc	countries	for	their	failure	to	comply	with	the	humanitarian	provisions	of	the	Helsinki	agreements	up	to	this	point.		From	the	outset	of	the	Belgrade	negotiations,	the	U.S.	delegation	made	no	secret	of	their	intention	to	demand	greater	adherence	to	the	humanitarian	articles	contained	within	the	Final	Act.		Representatives	from	Washington	repeatedly	stressed	the	importance	of	the	Third	Basket	of	the	agreement	pertaining	to	cooperation	in	humanitarian	fields	and	Principle	VII	of	the	Declaration	of	Principles,	which	guaranteed	respect	for	human	rights	and	the	fundamental	freedoms	of	individual	citizens	within	the	participating	countries.40			Goldberg’s	conduct	as	head	of	the	U.S.	delegation	at	Belgrade	was	very	much	in	keeping	with	his	long-held	personal	belief	in	the	value	of	a	strong	U.S.	position	on	human	rights.		His	actions	at	the	CSCE	follow	up	meeting	significantly	helped	to	encourage	new	ways	of	thinking	among	the	American	people	concerning	the	utility	of	the	Helsinki	process	and	its	place	in	international	affairs.		But	while	his	behavior	at	Belgrade	may	have	set	an	important	precedent	for	future	multilateral	negotiations,	the	immediate	effects	of	this	strategy	were	largely	stymied	by	intransigent	allies	and	the	prioritization	by	many	at	the	meeting	of	questions	of	military	security	over	matters	of	cultural	cooperation.		When	the	conference	came	to	a	close	in	March	1978,	no	definitive	concluding	document	could	be	drafted	under	the	rules	of	consensus,	and	little	had	been	resolved,	except	for	a	commitment	by	the	signatory	states	to	meet	again	in	Madrid	in	1980.41	Immediately	following	the	conclusion	of	the	Belgrade	conference,	Goldberg	appeared	before	the	U.S.	Congressional	Helsinki	Commission	to	give	testimony	on	the	progress	of	Helsinki	implementation	in	the	almost	three-year	period	since	the	signing	of	Final	Act,	and	to	summarize	what	he	considered	to	be	the	achievements	of	the	recently																																																									40	Commission	on	Security	and	Cooperation	in	Europe,	“U.S.	Statements	at	the	Belgrade	CSCE	Meeting:	Review	of	Implementation	and	Consideration	of	New	Proposals,	6	October–22	December	1977,"	accessed	17	September	2018,	https://www.csce.gov/international-impact/publications/belgrade-csce-meeting-us-delegation-statements-oct-6-dec-22?sort_by=field_date_value&page=16.	41	For	more	on	the	development	and	execution	of	American	policy	at	the	Belgrade	conference,	see	Snyder,	
Human	Rights	Activism	and	the	End	of	the	Cold	War,	particularly	chapter	4;	Thomas,	The	Helsinki	Effect,	particularly	chapter	4;	Korey,	The	Promises	We	Keep,	particularly	chapters	4	and	5.	
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concluded	Belgrade	meeting.		In	his	testimony,	Goldberg	rebutted	the	popular	perception	that	Belgrade	had	accomplished	little,	and	decried	the	poor	coverage	in	the	American	press	concerning	the	achievements	of	the	conference.		According	to	the	Ambassador,	one	of	the	greatest	accomplishments	of	the	Belgrade	meeting	was	that	it	demonstrated	to	Western	observers	a	fact	that	he	had	long	believed:	that	the	CSCE	process	was	a	gradual	one.		“We’re	not	going	to	change	habits,	traditions—particularly	in	the	East—overnight,”	Goldberg	said.		Rather,	he	insisted	that	Americans	must	use	the	forum	of	the	CSCE	to	engage	the	Soviets	with	patience	and	determination,	and	systematically	build	upon	the	small	achievements	that	were	made	possible	through	the	Helsinki	framework	to,	as	he	put	it,	“let	a	little	sunlight	in,”	in	the	hopes	that	greater	openness	and	less	repression	would	begin	to	characterize	the	Soviet’s	behavior	in	time.42		When	seen	from	this	perspective,	Goldberg	explained	to	the	Commission,	the	Belgrade	conference	represented	an	undeniable	success,	since	the	actions	of	the	Western	delegations	confirmed	in	no	uncertain	terms	that	the	defense	of	human	rights	and	fundamental	freedoms	now	existed	as	an	appropriate	subject	of	international	concern	within	the	Helsinki	process.		“It	cannot	be	said	any	longer,	despite	objections	from	some	of	the	Eastern	bloc,	that	matters	such	as	this	are	not	the	legitimate	subject	of	international	inquiry,	investigation,	[and]	accounting.”		Furthermore,	Goldberg	believed	that	by	recognizing	individual	rights	in	this	way,	the	Helsinki	process	had	revealed	itself	as	a	resilient	international	framework	through	which	the	role	of	the	individual	in	contributing	to	global	peace	and	security	was	finally	recognized.		He	defended	the	American	delegation’s	decision	to	cite	specific	cases	of	human	rights	abuse	and	the	noncompliance	of	individual	states,	since,	as	he	saw	it,	the	Final	Act	concerned	not	only	governments,	but	people	as	well:	“The	Final	Act	not	only	is	an	act	which	relates	to	governments,”	Goldberg	said,	“it	relates	to	people,	[and]	the	role	of	the	individual	in	contributing	to	peace	and	security.		Governments	alone	cannot	make	peace.		Peace,	in	large	part,	is	a	matter	of	human	rights.”43		Goldberg	stressed	in	his	testimony	before	the	Helsinki	Commission	that	there	was	still	much	work	that	needed	to	be	done—not	least	of	all	among	private	individuals	residing	in	the	West.		In	reference	to	the	efforts	of	the	Moscow	Helsinki	Watch	Group	and	other																																																									42	“Statement	of	Hon.	Arthur	J.	Goldberg,"	21	March	1978.		43	Ibid.	
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Eastern	European	citizens	organizations	that	were	created	to	monitor	their	governments’	compliance	with	the	Final	Act,	Goldberg	puzzled	over	the	absence	of	a	similar	movement	within	the	United	States.		“It's	a	great	anomaly	to	me	that	while	in	the	Soviet	Union,	in	Czechoslovakia,	in	Poland	under	conditions	of	repression,	private	individuals	have	had	the	courage	to	organize	private	groups,	[and	yet]	in	our	country	individuals	have	not	organized	a	monitoring	group.”44			In	a	U.S.-based	Helsinki	monitoring	group,	Goldberg	saw	the	fulfillment	of	the	important	role	that	nongovernmental	agency	was	to	play	in	the	greater	human	rights	strategy	that	he	first	proposed	in	1966.		Conforming	to	his	previous	statements	on	the	utility	of	nongovernmental	organizations,	Goldberg	expressed	his	belief	that,	through	close	cooperation	with	the	Commission,	a	U.S.-based	Helsinki	monitoring	group	could	supplement	Congress’	efforts	to	bring	attention	to	states’	Helsinki	commitments	by	legitimizing	actions	taken	to	better	ensure	such	compliance	with	the	force	of	a	popular	movement.		Furthermore,	as	a	group	of	private	citizens	expressing	their	commitment	to	the	observation	of	humanitarian	provisions	of	the	Helsinki	Accords,	this	organization	would	be	able	to	act	in	ways	that	governmental	bodies	could	not,	since	they	would	not	be	subject	to	the	same	inevitable	accusations	of	disingenuous	motivation	or	partisan	political	opportunism.				
THE	ORIGINS	OF	A	U.S.	HELSINKI	GROUP		 Because	the	Helsinki	Final	Act	explicitly	called	upon	individual	citizens	to	“know	and	act	upon”	their	rights,	and	because	the	Carter	administration	was	determined	to	pursue	a	much	more	publically	facing	diplomatic	strategy	with	respect	to	the	CSCE	process,	the	U.S.	State	Department	had	arranged	several	meetings	prior	to	and	during	the	Belgrade	Conference	between	members	of	the	U.S.	delegation	and	representatives	from	a	variety	of	different	nongovernmental	organizations.		The	purpose	of	these	meetings	was	to	give	these	organizations	the	opportunity	to	express	their	concerns	and	hopes	for	the	upcoming	negotiations,	to	provide	the	delegation	with	access	to	information	that	these	groups	had	compiled	on	various	human	rights	issues,	and	to	stimulate	private	initiatives	in	support	of																																																									44	Ibid.		
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greater	Helsinki	implementation.	Documents	show	that	Arthur	Goldberg	had	personally	attended	several	such	meetings,	and	was	supportive	of	their	potential	to	contribute	meaningfully	to	the	delegation’s	work.45			Similar	to	those	private	citizens’	groups	that	were	invited	to	testify	before	the	Helsinki	Commission	prior	to	the	Belgrade	meeting,	or	the	listening	sessions	conducted	by	the	Study	Mission	to	Europe,	the	nongovernmental	organizations	that	had	participated	in	these	consultations	with	Goldberg	and	the	U.S.	delegation	were	overwhelmingly	comprised	of	various	special	interests	groups	representing	particular	ethnic,	national	or	religious	communities,	which	had	their	own	vested	interest	in	seeing	greater	Helsinki	implementation	in	Eastern	Europe	and	the	Soviet	Union.		One	such	meeting,	held	a	month	before	the	opening	of	the	Belgrade	Conference	in	October	1977,	was	attended	by	a	woman	in	her	mid-forties	named	Jeri	Laber—a	freelance	writer	and	staff	member	of	the	Association	of	American	Publishers	(AAP).		As	a	part-time	writer	and	mother	of	three,	Laber	had	led	an	otherwise	unassuming	life	before	taking	up	the	fight	for	human	rights	in	the	mid-1970s,	after	reading	an	article	which	appeared	in	the	New	Republic	detailing	the	inhumane	imprisonment	of	opponents	to	the	Greek	military	junta.		At	the	time	of	the	State	Department	consultations,	Laber	was	serving	as	the	representative	of	a	New	York-based	NGO	known	as	the	Fund	for	Free	Expression—an	advocacy	group	organized	by	American	publishers	and	writers,	which	sought	to	bring	greater	visibility	to	the	plight	of	authors	and	dissidents	in	the	East	whose	ability	to	write	and	publish	freely	was	being	infringed	upon	by	their	government.46		According	to	Laber’s	memoirs,	at	this	meeting	Ambassador	Goldberg	took	a	special	interest	in	the	activities	of	the	Fund	for	Free	Expression	precisely	because	it	was	one	of	the	only	organizations	in	attendance	that	day	whose	activities	were	not	limited	to	the	concerns	of	any	one	particular	group,	but	rather	based	its	efforts	around	the	defense	of	a	fundamental	principle	that	was	important	to	the	rights	of	people	everywhere.		The	freedom	of	expression	was	not	only	a	pertinent	matter	of	Helsinki	implementation,	but	was	also	a	core	value	that	was	central	to	the	Western	identity,	and	was	an	issue	that	could	be	expected																																																									45	See	Arthur	Goldberg’s	Right	of	Reply	to	the	Soviet	Delegation,	11	November	1977,	in	“U.S.	Statements	at	the	Belgrade	CSCE	Meeting.”	46	Jeri	Laber,	The	Courage	of	Strangers:	Coming	of	Age	with	the	Human	Rights	Movement	(New	York:	PublicAffairs,	2002),	7-8;	97;	Bernstein,	Speaking	Freely,	147–48.	
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to	resonate	among	the	American	people.		After	the	two	discussed	at	some	length	the	challenges	facing	freedom	of	expression	in	Soviet	bloc	countries,	Goldberg	asked	Laber	to	prepare	a	briefing	paper	on	some	of	the	challenges	free	expression	faced	in	Helsinki	signatory	states.		Her	report	emphasized	the	effects	that	the	denial	of	free	expression	had	on	individual	citizens,	and	focused	particularly	on	the	situation	facing	dissidents	like	Yuri	Orlov—the	founder	of	the	Moscow	Helsinki	Watch	Group—whose	efforts	to	establish	and	operate	a	nongovernmental	Helsinki	monitoring	organization	in	Moscow	had	led	to	his	persecution	by	Soviet	authorities.47		Orlov’s	plight	was	among	those	that	Goldberg	later	addressed	the	following	month	at	the	plenary	discussions	at	Belgrade,	as	part	of	his	strategy	of	publically	naming	and	shaming	state	governments	through	the	use	of	specific	examples	of	repression.		Such	a	strategy	fundamentally	relied	upon	detailed	information	that	groups	like	the	Fund	for	Free	Expression	could	provide.	The	Fund	for	Free	Expression	had	only	been	in	existence	for	several	months	by	the	time	Jeri	Laber	was	invited	to	meet	with	Ambassador	Goldberg	and	the	other	members	of	the	U.S.	delegation	to	Belgrade	in	Washington.		It	operated	out	of	just	a	single	repurposed	room	in	a	New	York	City	office	building.		And	yet,	by	the	time	of	this	meeting,	the	Fund	had	already	achieved	a	reputation	as	a	reliable	and	trustworthy	source	of	information	concerning	problems	of	free	expression	in	many	parts	of	the	world.		This	is	because	the	organization	had	its	roots	in	a	high	profile	network	of	activists	who	were	deeply	involved	in	the	New	York	publishing	world.		The	board	of	the	Fund	for	Free	Expression	included	the	heads	of	several	prominent	publishing	houses	and	well-known	American	writers.		Its	founder,	Robert	L.	Bernstein,	was	himself	the	CEO	of	Random	House,	an	American	book	publisher	that,	together	with	its	subsidiaries,	was	responsible	for	the	Western	distribution	of	many	progressive	Soviet	and	dissident	authors.48	Bernstein	had	long	been	an	ardent	supporter	of	human	rights,	and	was	extremely	active	throughout	his	career	in	advocating	for	greater	American	governmental	and	private	support	for	those	who	had	been	oppressed	for	their	political	beliefs.49		On	18	November	1975,	less	than	three	months	after	the	Final	Act	was	signed,	Bernstein	was	called	to	testify																																																									47	Laber,	The	Courage	of	Strangers,	97.		48	Ibid;	Bernstein,	Speaking	Freely,	147-48.	49	The	broad	extent	of	Bernstein's	involvement	with	human	rights	advocacy	is	perhaps	best	summarized	in	his	2016	memoir	Speaking	Freely.	
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before	the	U.S.	Senate	Subcommittee	on	Investigations,	concerning	the	freedom	to	write	and	publish	internationally.		As	a	member	of	the	publishing	community	with	many	substantive	business	dealings	in	the	USSR,	Bernstein	recounted	the	challenges	that	he	and	others	in	his	field	so	often	encountered	when	dealing	with	the	Soviet	government—particularly	when	it	came	to	the	publishing	of,	and	communication	with,	dissident	authors.		At	the	hearing,	Bernstein	spoke	at	length	about	specific	cases	of	repression	that	these	dissidents	and	their	families	faced	as	a	result	of	their	decision	to	speak	out	against	what	they	saw	as	injustice	within	their	own	society.		In	telling	these	stories,	Bernstein	hoped	to	illustrate	to	the	members	of	Congress	the	significant	challenges	the	Soviet	government	posed	to	the	free	expression	of	their	people,	and	the	significant	way	in	which	he	felt	that	American	publishers	were,	to	an	increasing	degree,	“influenced	by	and	involved	with	whom—and	what—we	are	publishing.”50		By	distributing	these	authors’	works,	Bernstein	believed	that	the	Western	publishers	of	Soviet	dissidents	had	become	every	bit	as	involved	in	the	struggle	between	these	citizens	and	their	government	as	the	writers	themselves—an	involvement	that	extended	to	those	in	the	West	who	went	on	to	then	read	those	works.		“You	can	see	how	being	a	publisher	can	lead	to	involvement	in	what	the	Soviet	Union	and	perhaps	even	our	own	State	Department	might	call	an	‘internal	affair,’”	Bernstein	testified.		“Yet,	is	a	matter	like	this	really	an	‘internal	affair,’	or	does	such	oppression	inevitably	influence	the	mind	and	life	of	every	person	who	comes	in	contact	with	it?”51	Throughout	his	testimony,	the	Random	House	CEO	suggested	that	the	U.S.	government’s	generally	dismissive	attitude	toward	matters	of	free	expression	and	other	basic	rights	up	to	this	point	was	misguided,	since	“respect	for	human	rights	was	so	deeply	ingrained	in	the	American	character.”52		But	beyond	the	important	place	that	free	expression	had	as	a	constituent	element	of	the	American	identity,	Bernstein	stressed	the	direct	and	inextricable	link	that	he	believe	existed	between	human	rights	and	the	preservation	of	peace	and	security	throughout	the	world.		At	several	points	in	his	remarks,																																																									50	Robert	L.	Bernstein,	"Remarks	before	the	Permanent	Subcommittee	on	Investigations	Hearing	on	International	Freedom	to	Write	and	Publish,"	18	November	1975,	Andrei	Sakharov	Papers,	MS	Russ	79,	folder	S.II.2.11.02.	51	Ibid.		52	Ibid.	
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he	provided	members	of	the	committee	with	numerous	detailed	examples	of	Soviet	repression,	and	asked	that	if	the	Communist	government	demonstrated	this	degree	of	disrespect	for	their	own	laws	as	well	as	what	he	called	the	“international	morality”	of	human	rights	norms—not	least	of	which,	the	recently	signed	Helsinki	Accords—then	what	reason	was	there	to	believe	that	they	would	regard	subjects	like	disarmament	with	any	greater	commitment?53	Bernstein’s	career	at	Random	House	began	in	1956.		After	ten	years	in	sales,	he	took	over	as	president	and	CEO	from	Random	House’s	co-founder,	Bennett	Cerf.		Cerf,	together	with	his	partner	Donald	Klopfer,	ran	Random	House	as	an	open	and	inclusive	environment,	both	for	the	company’s	staff	and	the	authors	they	signed.		As	Bernstein	described	in	a	2016	interview,	it	was	not	uncommon	for	Cerf	and	Klopfer	to	form	personal	relationships	with	many	of	their	house’s	authors,	making	them	feel	that	Random	House	was	“not	only	their	publisher,	but	a	part	of	their	life.”54		In	addition	to	the	care	that	these	men	showed	for	their	employees	and	authors,	they	were	also	outspoken	defenders	of	the	right	to	free	expression,	challenging	McCarthyism	in	the	1950s,	and	even	bringing	a	lawsuit	against	the	U.S.	government	for	its	censorship	of	James	Joyce’s	Ulysses.55		Bernstein	credited	both	men	as	having	had	a	formative	influence	on	his	own	approach	to	the	business,	and	after	taking	over	as	president	at	the	beginning	of	1966,	he	worked	hard	to	preserve	the	founders’	humanistic	spirit	through	a	number	of	mergers	and	acquisitions	that	transformed	Random	House	into	one	of	the	largest	and	most	influential	publishing	houses	in	the	United	States.		As	a	publisher,	Bernstein	considered	it	one	of	his	primary	responsibilities	to	protect	the	ability	of	authors	to	bring	forth	and	present	their	ideas	in	an	open	forum,	and	to	as	large	as	an	audience	as	possible.		“Only	through	the	free	exchange	of	ideas,”	Bernstein	once	remarked,	can	people	“hope	to	better	understand	each	other	and	build	for	our	future.”56																																																											53	Ibid.	54	John	Tebbel,	A	History	of	Book	Publishing	in	the	United	States,	vol.	IV	(New	York:	R.	R.	Bowker	Company,	1981);	Andrew	Albanese,	“Human	Rights	Watcher:	PW	Talks	with	Former	Random	House	President	Robert	Bernstein,”	Publishers	Weekly	263,	no.	20	(May	16,	2016):	4;	Bernstein,	Speaking	Freely,	xv.	55	Tebbel,	A	History	of	Book	Publishing	in	the	United	States,	193;	Anna	Bray	Duff,	"Publisher	Bennett	Cerf,"	
Investor's	Business	Daily,	17	March	1999.	56	“The	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch:	An	Interview	with	Robert	Bernstein,”	A	Chronicle	of	Human	Rights	in	the	USSR,	No.	34,	April-June	1979,	Human	Rights	Watch	Records:	Helsinki	Watch,	1952–2003,	Columbia	University	Library,	Rare	Book	and	Manuscript	Library	[hereafter	HRWR],	Series	I:	Jeri	Laber	Files,	Box	51,	Folder	15,	50;	Bernstein,	Speaking	Freely,	xv.	
	 42	
Robert	Bernstein	was	first	confronted	by	the	situation	facing	Soviet	writers	after	he	travelled	to	Moscow	in	1970	as	part	of	a	delegation	representing	the	Association	of	American	Publishers.		The	delegation’s	mission	was	to	establish	better	commercial	relations	with	the	Soviet	publishing	industry	and	learn	more	about	their	ways	of	doing	business,	while	also	advocating	for	the	Soviet’s	ratification	of	the	Universal	Copyright	Convention,	which	would	ensure	greater	international	copyright	protection.		Upon	his	return	from	the	Soviet	Union,	Bernstein	began	to	follow	the	struggle	of	Soviet	dissident	thinkers	more	closely,	and	learn	more	about	the	challenges	they	faced.		He	recognized	that	one	obvious	thing	Random	House	could	do	right	away	to	assist	these	writers	was	to	publish	their	works.57			As	the	head	of	a	major	New	York	publishing	corporation,	Bernstein’s	unique	advantage	in	the	field	of	human	rights	promotion	lay	in	his	access	to	well-known	authors,	publishers,	and	journalists,	as	well	as	high-ranking	members	of	public	service.		As	a	pillar	of	American	society,	his	voice	carried	substantial	weight,	and	commanded	the	kind	of	attention	that	Soviet	dissidents	so	badly	needed.		As	an	example	of	the	kind	of	access	that	Bernstein	enjoyed	by	virtue	of	his	position	at	Random	House,	by	the	early	1970s,	he	had	developed	a	personal	relationship	with	Henry	Kissinger,	whom	Bernstein	remembers	as	simply	having	contacted	him	one	day	“out	of	the	blue.”58		The	two	maintained	regular	contact	over	the	years—a	relationship	that	gave	Bernstein	a	unique	channel	through	which	he	could	petition	the	Nixon	administration	at	a	personal	level	on	behalf	of	Soviet	dissidents	and	their	fight	for	free	expression.59		In	a	telephone	conversation	with	Kissinger	in	July	1973,	Bernstein	advanced	his	human	rights	agenda	by	bringing	to	the	attention	of	the	National	Security	Advisor	the	recent	three-year	extension	of	the	dissident	Andrei	Amalrik’s	prison	sentence,	just	prior	to	the	conclusion	of	his	1970	conviction	for	slander	against	the	Soviet	state.		Kissinger	assured	Bernstein	that	the	matter	would	be	raised	with	Soviet	Ambassador	Anatoly	Dobrynin	later	that	day,	but	asked	Bernstein	to	make	no	mention	of	the	intervention	on	Amalrik’s	behalf.																																																										57	Ibid.,	118;	123;	128.	58	Ibid.,	115.	59	Such	a	backchannel	was	perhaps	ultimately	of	limited	use	to	Bernstein,	as	Nixon	and	Kissinger’s	views	toward	pressuring	the	Soviets	on	their	human	rights	record	were,	for	the	most	part,	obstinately	dismissive.		See	Barbara	J.	Keys,	“Nixon/Kissinger	and	Brezhnev,”	Diplomatic	History	42,	no.	4	(2018):	548–51.	
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“[M]y	experience	has	been	that	I’m	more	effective,”	Kissinger	said,	“by	not	making	a	public	issue	of	it.		That	doesn’t	mean	you	couldn’t	make	an	issue	of	it.”60		The	suggestion	that	Bernstein	use	his	position	as	an	influential	private	citizen	to	raise	awareness	of	these	kinds	of	issues	seems	to	demonstrate	that	even	a	consummate	realist	such	as	Henry	Kissinger	saw	the	benefit	of	well-placed	public	pressure	on	the	Soviet	government	in	helping	to	further	certain	American	objectives.		“It	is	appropriate	and	indeed	helpful,”	Kissinger	told	Bernstein	“to	have	private	groups	raise	hell.”61	The	extent	to	which	Kissinger	was	sincere	on	this	point	is	difficult	to	qualify.		What	is	clear,	however,	is	that	shortly	after	their	conversation,	Bernstein	began	investing	much	more	of	his	time	and	energy	into	his	human	rights	work.		In	the	spring	of	1973,	Bernstein	travelled	once	again	to	Moscow	as	part	of	an	AAP	delegation,	this	time	to	finalize	negotiations	concerning	the	Soviet’s	ascension	to	the	Universal	Copyright	Convention,	which	took	place	on	27	May.		Upon	his	return	to	the	United	States,	Bernstein	was	struck	by	how	unaware	average	citizens	seemed	to	be	concerning	the	ongoing	repression	of	dissidents	inside	the	Soviet	Union,	and	how	little	press	coverage	these	events	received	in	American	newspapers.		Bernstein	considered	this	to	be	highly	unfortunate	since,	after	having	gained	a	better	understanding	of	the	nature	of	the	leadership	within	the	Soviet	publishing	industry,	he	recognized	that	one	form	of	outside	influence	that	was	likely	to	be	effective	in	spurring	reform	would	be	to	better	publicize	the	Soviet’s	repressive	practices.62			Yet,	the	problem	as	he	saw	it	was	that,	apart	from	a	few	notable	exceptions,	very	few	people	in	the	United	States	had	ever	heard	of	many	of	these	Soviet	dissidents	or	even	knew	of	their	struggles.63		So	in	order	to	bring	greater	visibility	to	the	dissident	cause,	Bernstein	
																																																								60	“Memorandum	of	Telephone	Conversation	between	Henry	Kissinger	and	Robert	L.	Bernstein,”	10	July	1973,	Digital	National	Security	Archive,	The	Kissinger	Telephone	Conversations:	A	Verbatim	Record	of	U.S.	Diplomacy,	1969-1977	[hereafter	Kissinger	Telcons],	Proquest	Digital	Database,	accessed	7	August	2017,	https://search-proquest-com.ezproxy1.library.usyd.edu.au/docview/1679084759/569B3838F66E4EB5PQ/	4?accountid=14757.	61	Ibid.	62	Bernstein,	Speaking	Freely,	131.	63	These	exceptions	included	figures	such	as	Aleksandr	Solzhenitsyn,	whose	meteoric	rise	as	a	controversial	Thaw	era	Russian	novelist	culminated	with	the	1973	foreign	publication	of	his	novel	The	Gulag	Archipelago,	which	earned	him	superstar	status	in	the	West	and	his	banishment	from	Soviet	Russia	a	year	later,	and	Andrei	Sakharov,	the	renowned	nuclear	physicist	and	father	of	the	Soviet	hydrogen	bomb,	whose	criticism	of	the	Soviet	government	after	the	1968	invasion	of	Czechoslovakia	led	him	to	become	one	of	the	most	outspoken	proponents	of	the	Soviet	human	rights	movement.		For	more	on	these	and	other	notable	dissidents	
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took	action,	enlisting	the	help	of	several	prominent	American	authors	and	publishers	to	draft	letters	calling	public	attention	to	cases	of	individual	repression,	such	as	those	of	Andrei	Amalrik,	or	Vladimir	Bukovsky—members	of	the	new	generation	of	Soviet	dissidents	whose	fearlessness	in	challenging	the	regime	had	resulted	in	their	habitual	incarceration	from	a	young	age.		Originally	known	as	the	Soviet-American	Publishing	Committee,	the	group’s	membership	included	the	well-known	authors	John	Hersey,	Arthur	Miller,	and	Harrison	Salisbury,	as	well	as	the	heads	of	several	prominent	American	publishers,	including	William	Jovanovich	of	Harcourt,	Brace;	Brad	Wiley	of	John	Wiley	&	Sons;	and	Winthrop	Knowlton	of	Harper	and	Row.64		By	1975,	Bernstein	had	succeeded	in	petitioning	the	AAP	to	create	an	organization	whose	goal	it	would	be	to	promote	the	protection	and	expansion	of	freedom	of	written	communication	internationally.		The	group	became	known	as	the	International	Freedom	to	Publish	Committee,	with	Bernstein	serving	as	its	appointed	chair.		The	legitimacy	lent	to	the	organization	by	its	formal	connection	with	the	Association	of	American	Publishers	had	a	significant	impact	on	the	leadership	of	the	Soviet	publishing	industry,	which	regarded	the	official	seal	of	the	AAP	with	great	importance.		According	to	a	white	paper	released	by	the	Association,	the	goals	of	the	International	Freedom	to	Publish	Committee	were	to	lobby	members	of	Congress	and	the	U.S.	government—in	addition	to	foreign	governmental	officials—on	issues	concerning	international	free	expression,	and	on	behalf	of	persecuted	writers	and	publishers.		The	Committee	also	endeavored	to	send	fact-finding	missions,	issue	reports,	as	well	as	organize	exhibits	to	promote	freedom	of	expression	in	foreign	countries	where	that	right	was	threatened.65				Bernstein	described	the	group	as	a	follow	on	to	the	work	that	he	and	others	had	undertaken	as	part	of	the	Soviet-American	Publishing	Committee,	only	now	with	an																																																																																																																																																																																			of	this	period,	see	Vladislav	M.	Zubok,	Zhivago’s	Children:	The	Last	Russian	Intelligentsia	(Cambridge:	Harvard	University	Press,	2009).	64	The	enlistment	of	prominent	members	of	the	American	publishing	industry	and	literary	community	would	be	a	strategy	employed	countless	times	in	later	years	by	Helsinki	Watch,	when	working	to	bring	greater	public	attention	to	individual	Soviet	citizens’	struggle	for	their	human	rights.		In	fact,	many	of	the	same	authors	and	publishers	involved	in	the	letter	writing	campaign	in	1973	would	go	on	to	serve	as	influential	members	of	the	Helsinki	Watch	board.		Ibid.,	132–33.	65	Ibid.,	144;	Association	of	American	Publishers,	“A	Brief	History	of	the	International	Freedom	to	Publish	Committee,”	30	March	2015,	accessed	30	November	2017,	http://publishers.org/sites/default/files/uploads/PandP/aap_white_paper_international_freedom_to_	publish_march_30_2015.pdf.	
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enlarged	geographic	scope.		Focusing	primarily	on	government	censorship	of	authors	and	publishers,	the	International	Freedom	to	Publish	Committee	employed	the	same	strategies	that	Bernstein	had	previously	used	to	advocate	for	the	rights	of	Amalrik	and	Bukovsky—namely	a	publicity	campaign	of	letter	writing	targeting	government	officials	and	American	newspaper	outlets.		However,	it	wasn’t	long	before	the	activities	of	this	group	came	into	conflict	with	the	leadership	of	the	AAP,	which,	since	Moscow’s	ascension	to	the	Universal	Copyright	Convention,	had	been	working	with	the	Soviet	All-Union	Copyright	Agency	(VAAP)	to	develop	the	USSR	as	a	market	for	American	educational	publications,	and	which	had	little	patience	for	moralistic	sermonizing	about	human	rights.		This	continual	reticence	on	the	part	of	the	AAP	led	Bernstein	to	step	down	from	the	International	Freedom	to	Publish	Committee	in	early	1977,	but	his	determination	to	continue	to	defend	the	rights	of	Soviet	dissident	authors	persisted	unabated.66			Although	Bernstein	had	no	experience	managing	a	nonprofit	organization,	and	little	idea	of	how	to	finance	or	operate	one,	he	created	the	Fund	for	Free	Expression	several	months	after	stepping	down	from	the	International	Freedom	to	Publish	Committee,	so	that,	in	his	words,	he	could	better	“call	attention	to	writers	and	dissidents	in	the	Eastern	bloc	and	to	press	for	their	rights.”		Freed	from	the	conflicting	interests	of	the	AAP,	Bernstein	and	those	in	his	organization	were	now	able	to	pursue	the	fight	for	human	rights	as	best	as	they	saw	fit.		Like	the	Committee,	the	membership	of	the	Fund	was	made	up	almost	entirely	of	prominent	American	publishers	and	authors,	whose	stature	the	Fund	relied	upon	to	elevate	their	human	rights	efforts	in	the	public	eye.		The	contacts	and	influence	that	Bernstein	and	the	other	members	enjoyed	by	virtue	of	their	professional	accomplishments	provided	the	Fund	for	Free	Expression	with	the	ability	to	pursue	their	particular	human	rights	agenda	in	ways	that	other	nongovernmental	groups	of	the	time	could	not.67	Over	time,	it	was	these	types	of	personal	contacts	that	would	help	to	provide	important	access	to	funding	and	would	even	open	doors	for	the	expansion	of	Bernstein’s	human	rights	work.		By	the	mid-1970s,	another	personal	relationship—this	time	with	the	former	President	of	CBS,	Fred	Friendly—led	Bernstein	to	make	the	acquaintance	of	Ford	Foundation	President	McGeorge	Bundy	during	a	chance	meeting	at	the	Foundation’s	offices																																																									66	Bernstein,	Speaking	Freely,	142;	145–46.	67	Ibid.,	148.	
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in	New	York	City.		Bundy,	a	former	National	Security	Adviser	to	two	U.S.	presidents,	is	perhaps	best	remembered	for	the	role	he	played	in	American	foreign	policymaking	during	the	Vietnam	War.		But	as	president	of	the	Ford	Foundation	from	1966	to	1979,	Bundy	was	instrumental	in	advancing	the	cause	of	international	human	rights	through	the	Ford	Foundation’s	investment	in	nongovernmental	organizations.		Upon	getting	to	know	Bernstein,	Bundy	was	impressed	by	the	New	York	publisher’s	record	of	human	rights	activism	up	to	that	point,	and	in	following	years,	saw	fit	to	approve	several	Foundation	grants	to	finance	his	Fund	for	Free	Expression.68				When	Arthur	Goldberg	returned	from	the	Belgrade	meeting,	he	too	was	dismayed	by	the	American	public’s	negative	perception	of	the	Helsinki	Agreements,	and	the	poor	media	coverage	that	his	delegation’s	efforts	had	received	at	the	first	follow	up	conference.		Convinced	of	the	utility	of	this	mission,	the	former	Ambassador	and	Supreme	Court	Justice	took	up	the	effort	to	help	establish	a	nongovernmental	organization	that	could	help	to	combat	such	a	perception,	and	assist	in	future	efforts	of	the	U.S.	government	when	pursuing	these	humanitarian	issues	on	the	international	stage.		In	the	spring	of	1978,	Goldberg	came	to	Bundy—whom	he	knew	from	their	time	together	serving	in	the	Kennedy	administration—with	the	proposal	to	create	such	an	organization.		When	contemplating	the	possibility	of	an	organization	that	could	help	generate	greater	public	support	for	citizens	of	Soviet	and	Eastern	European	states	who	called	upon	their	governments	to	more	fully	comply	with	their	Helsinki	commitments,	Bundy	suggested	Robert	Bernstein	and	his	Fund	for	Free	Expression	for	the	job.		According	to	historian	William	Korey,	it	was	precisely	Bernstein’s	extensive	personal	network	of	influence	and	access	that	made	his	organization	such	an	appealing	choice	for	Bundy	and	later	Goldberg,	when	considering	the	publisher	to	spearhead	the	formation	of	a	U.S.	Helsinki	monitoring	group.		On	5	April	1978,	McGeorge	Bundy	and	Arthur	Goldberg	met	with	Bernstein	and	Jeri	Laber	to	discuss	the	possibility	of	creating	a	U.S.	Helsinki	monitoring	organization.69																																																														68	For	more	on	Bundy’s	long	record	of	human	rights	promotion	at	the	Ford	Foundation,	see	William	Korey,	
Taking	on	the	World’s	Repressive	Regimes:	The	Ford	Foundation’s	International	Human	Rights	Policies	and	
Practices	(New	York:	Palgrave	Macmillan,	2007);	Ralph	Engelman,	Friendlyvision:	Fred	Friendly	and	the	Rise	
and	Fall	of	Television	Journalism	(New	York:	Columbia	University	Press,	2011),	234.	69	Bernstein,	Speaking	Freely,	149;	Korey,	Taking	on	the	World’s	Repressive	Regimes,	97–100.	
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CONCLUSIONS		
	
	 The	U.S.	approach	toward	participation	in	the	CSCE	had	changed	dramatically	in	the	three	years	between	the	signing	of	the	Final	Act	and	the	proposed	creation	of	a	private	citizens’	Helsinki	monitoring	body.		These	changes	coincided	with	larger	shifts	in	American	attitudes	toward	the	place	of	human	rights	in	U.S.	foreign	relations	generally.		The	difference	in	Executive	and	Congressional	support	for	these	issues	during	both	the	Ford	and	Carter	administrations	is	perhaps	the	clearest	indicator	of	such	a	shift.		But	there	were	also	other,	more	subtle	transformations	taking	place	within	American	society	that	had	a	significant	impact	on	the	pace	of	these	changes.		Increased	economic	and	cultural	exposure	between	Eastern	and	Western	society	had	helped	to	create	greater	and	more	frequent	private	citizen	interactions.		These	increased	contacts	in	cultural	areas	such	as	music,	the	arts,	and	literature	often	threw	into	sharp	relief	the	restrictive	control	exercised	by	the	Soviet	government	within	these	fields—practices	which	drew	significant	public	attention,	and	which	would	inevitably	come	into	conflict	with	other	aspects	of	the	Helsinki	agreement.				 When	discussions	were	conducted	at	the	Belgrade	meeting	concerning	the	role	of	private	institutions,	organizations,	and	individuals	within	the	Helsinki	process,	it	was	in	this	area	of	cultural	cooperation	that	private	participation	was	most	actively	encouraged	by	the	Western	powers.		The	U.S.	delegation	saw	direct	governmental	involvement	in	the	expansion	of	cultural	contacts	as	limiting	and	cumbersome,	and	preferred	to	allow	these	developments	to	be	pursued	through	private	initiative.		Unlike	the	Soviet	states,	Western	governments	did	not	intercede	to	the	same	extent	in	order	to	control	and	direct	cultural	development	within	their	society.		It	was	the	opinion	of	Western	delegations	that	private	institutions	and	individuals	should	have	the	last	word	when	it	came	to	greater	cultural	relations,	and	should	determine	for	themselves	the	ways	in	which	pursuit	of	such	contact	should	be	carried	out.70		 When	it	came	to	nongovernmental	involvement	in	the	promotion	of	the	humanitarian	articles	of	the	Final	Act,	however,	the	U.S.	government	saw	private	
																																																								70	See	Summary	Regarding	Cultural	Exchange	by	Guy	Coriden,	2	November	1977,	in	“U.S.	Statements	at	the	Belgrade	CSCE	Meeting.”		
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organizations	playing	a	much	less	independent	role.		Traditionally,	NGOs	tended	to	function	by	voicing	their	support	for	or	resistance	to	existing	or	proposed	U.S.	policy	initiatives,	but	were	rarely	if	ever	the	driving	force	for	such	policy.		They	were	useful	political	allies	because	of	their	ability	to	organize	key	constituencies	in	support	of	specific	objectives	with	often	limited	outcomes.		These	NGOs	served	as	effective	and	reliable	lobbyists	due	to	their	capacity	to	mobilize	segments	of	the	U.S.	population	that	were	directly	invested	in	the	maintenance	of	a	particular	right	in	question.		This	lobbying	power	was	overwhelmingly	directed	toward	influencing	other	U.S.	policymakers	or	the	deliberations	of	international	organizations	such	as	the	UN,	but	was	seldom	primarily	geared	toward	shaping	public	opinion.		 It	was	Goldberg’s	personal	and	long-held	belief	of	the	utility	of	nongovernmental	involvement	in	the	process	of	U.S.	policymaking	that	provided	the	chance	for	one	American	NGO	to	assume	a	much	greater	public	profile	when	it	came	to	the	promotion	of	the	Helsinki	agreements.		He	argued	that	a	private	citizens’	group	could	prove	quite	useful	in	helping	to	legitimize	a	more	outspoken	American	policy	approach	to	Final	Act	implementation.		The	group	that	was	chosen	for	this	purpose	was	Robert	Bernstein’s	Fund	for	Free	Expression,	which	had	distinguished	itself	as	an	organization	willing	and	capable	of	challenging	the	Kremlin	on	its	record	of	censorship	toward	dissenting	opinion.		Goldberg	was	explicit	in	his	belief	that	the	purpose	of	such	an	organization	would	be	to	supplement	the	efforts	of	existing	nongovernmental	ethnic,	national,	and	religious	organizations,	as	well	as	the	work	undertaken	by	the	Congressional	Helsinki	Commission	to	better	promote	implementation	of	the	Final	Act.71			While	Bernstein’s	group	certainly	did	contribute	meaningfully	in	these	respects,	its	support	for	human	rights	reforms	did	not	remain	confined	to	the	realm	of	traditional	involvement	expected	of	nongovernmental	organizations,	but	instead	sought	to	sensitize	American	society	at	large	to	these	issues.		Once	created,	this	group	put	into	practice	a	much	more	publicly-facing	appeal	process—an	approach	that	had	served	its	members’	advocacy	efforts	well	in	the	past—and	began	to	adopt	a	more	independent	posture	when	publicizing	Helsinki	human	rights	violations.		This	was	quite	separate	and	apart	from	the	traditional																																																									71	See	“Statement	of	Hon.	Arthur	J.	Goldberg,"	21	March	1978.		
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channels	of	official	governmental	pressure,	where	such	maters	were	ultimately	adjudicated	in	the	course	of	these	states’	bilateral	relationships.		This	strategy	signaled	a	noticeable	shift	in	the	attitudes,	approaches,	and	scope	of	U.S.	nongovernmental	organizations,	and	their	involvement	in	the	process	of	U.S.	foreign	policymaking	up	to	that	point.		As	the	next	chapter	will	discuss	in	more	detail,	these	new	approaches	relied	substantially	upon	contact	across	transnational	advocacy	networks	in	order	to	be	effective,	and	helped	to	contribute	to	a	significant	change	in	U.S.	thinking	towards	humanitarian	problems	and	assistance.			
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CHAPTER	TWO:	
THE	U.S.	HELSINKI	WATCH	COMMITTEE	AND	THE	FORMULATION	OF	EARLY	
ADVOCACY	STRATEGIES		 This	chapter	will	explore	the	creation	of	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee.		More	specifically,	it	will	investigate	the	process	by	which	the	group	emerged	as	a	new	kind	of	nongovernmental	human	rights	organization	and	developed	a	uniquely	effective	strategic	approach	within	the	Helsinki	process.		As	an	organization,	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	was	distinct	in	its	mission	and	its	methods,	both	with	respect	to	existing	Helsinki	monitoring	groups,	as	well	as	other	Western	human	rights	NGOs.		The	high	profile	nature	of	its	elite	membership	provided	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	and	its	public	pronouncements	with	a	degree	of	media	attention	that	amplified	its	credibility	and	effectiveness	as	a	public	relations	organization.		But	in	addition	to	this,	the	elevated	public	and	professional	stature	of	many	the	group’s	members	bestowed	upon	the	Committee	an	unusual	degree	of	access	to	transnational	networks	of	communication,	which	made	possible	the	reliable	transmission	to	the	West	of	documented	human	rights	abuses	from	the	Soviet	Union	and	elsewhere.		Contact	with	Western	journalists,	U.S.	governmental	officials,	and	intellectuals	in	both	the	East	and	the	West	provided	the	group	with	access	to	information	and	opportunities	that	were	indispensible	to	the	strategies	they	pursued.	Such	unique	access	provided	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	with	the	resources	necessary	to	devise	a	“case	study”	method	when	publicizing	instances	of	Soviet	human	rights	abuses.		This	approach,	which	presented	emotionally	engaging	descriptions	of	the	suffering	of	individuals	who	had	been	denied	their	rights	by	state	governments	raised	Western	public	awareness	of	the	dissident	cause,	and	illustrated	the	very	human	cost	incurred	by	the	circumvention	of	states’	Helsinki	obligations.		At	the	same	time,	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	presented	these	findings	on	human	rights	abuses	in	detailed	reports	to	U.S.	policymakers	and	relevant	professional	organizations,	citing	specific	violations	of	international	agreement,	and	offering	recommendations	for	corrective	action.		Backed	by	the	new	sense	of	public	urgency	that	Helsinki	Watch’s	“case	study”	campaigns	
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would	generate,	U.S.	policymakers	were	free	to	act	more	forcefully	in	their	dealings	with	the	offending	government.			This	kind	of	support	for	governmental	action	was	primarily	the	role	that	proponents	of	a	private	U.S.	citizens’	Helsinki	monitoring	organization,	such	as	Arthur	Goldberg	and	members	of	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Commission,	had	envisioned	the	group	would	play.		And	while	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	did	provide	invaluable	public	support	for	a	more	outspoken	American	foreign	policy	position	in	defense	of	oppressed	Soviet	citizens,	Soviet	non-compliance	with	the	humanitarian	articles	of	the	Helsinki	Final	Act	remained	but	one	factor	the	U.S.	government	needed	to	consider	when	assessing	its	own	conduct	in	the	U.S.-Soviet	bilateral	relationship.		While	generating	public	support	for	U.S.	governmental	action	was	important,	the	truly	invaluable	impact	of	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee’s	efforts	to	promote	concern	for	Soviet	human	rights	abuses	stemmed	from	the	organization’s	ability	to	communicate	their	message	directly	to	specific	groups	and	individuals	within	American	civil	society.		This	allowed	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	to	serve	as	both	a	conduit	and	an	amplifier	in	the	West	for	the	activism	of	those	Eastern	European	and	Soviet	dissident	groups	that	they	championed,	helping	to	establish	these	dissidents’	struggle	as	a	fixture	in	American	culture	during	the	late	1970s	and	early	80s.		By	facilitating	private	sector	activism	taken	up	by	American	scientists,	scholars,	artists	and	businessmen,	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	introduced	the	issue	of	human	rights	advocacy	directly	into	areas	of	cross-cultural	East-West	exchanges,	rather	than	relying	solely	on	conventional	diplomatic	pressure.		This	chapter	focuses	on	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee’s	activities	during	the	first	several	months	of	the	group’s	existence.		An	analysis	of	this	period	will	show	how	the	Committee	relied	upon	the	personal	patronage	of	many	of	its	most	influential	members	to	achieve	organizational	efficacy.		As	esteemed	members	of	the	medical,	scientific,	artistic,	or	business	communities,	these	individuals	possessed	access	to	important	contacts	on	both	sides	of	the	expanding	transnational	networks	that	existed	between	East	and	West—networks	that	were	meant	to	serve	as	the	means	by	which	increased	cross-cultural	cooperation	would	take	place	in	the	era	of	détente.		This	provided	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	with	the	information	and	access	needed	to	succeed	as	a	monitor	of	other	states’	Helsinki	compliance	and	as	a	defender	of	transnational	human	rights.		
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This	chapter	will	begin	by	discussing	the	formation	of	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee,	and	the	advantages	and	challenges	that	faced	the	organization	as	a	consequence	of	their	decision	to	monitor	and	report	upon	Helsinki	compliance	in	other	countries.		Confronted	by	overwhelmingly	poor	public	opinion	of	the	Helsinki	Accords	at	the	time	of	the	NGO’s	creation,	as	well	as	internal	disagreement	concerning	the	group’s	central	mission	and	approach,	this	chapter	will	show	how	the	founding	members	of	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	sought	to	recommit	their	organization	to	the	defense	of	Helsinki	principles	within	these	closed	societies.		They	did	this	by	affirming	their	direct	connection	to	the	greater	Helsinki	activist	network	operating	in	the	Soviet	Union	and	across	Eastern	Europe.		The	chapter	then	goes	on	to	investigate	actions	taken	by	Helsinki	Watch	to	forge	and	strengthen	those	connections	in	the	early	months	of	the	group’s	existence.		These	efforts	illustrate	the	extent	to	which	the	founders	of	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	considered	their	organization	to	be	a	part	of	the	larger	transnational	Helsinki	activism	network,	and	how	their	investment	in	and	reliance	upon	transnational	advocacy	came	to	shape	not	just	their	mission,	but	their	strategies	as	well.			Through	a	detailed	look	at	one	of	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch’s	earliest	advocacy	campaigns—support	for	the	Soviet	writer	and	refusnik	Yuri	Druzhnikov—this	chapter	will	illustrate	how	the	group	utilized	its	members’	connections	in	various	fields	to	at	once	gather	information,	publicize	issues,	and	solicit	support	from	the	relevant	areas	of	civil	society	where	concerted	public	pressure	could	be	most	effective.		These	supplications	were	primarily	directed	at	the	various	professional	circles	that	had	some	fundamental	connection	to	the	subject	of	the	group’s	advocacy	efforts,	and	were	initially	carried	out	through	a	campaign	of	letter	writing.		This	tactic	was	a	mainstay	of	earlier	Western	human	rights	organizations	like	Amnesty	International,	and	one	that	several	senior	members	of	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	had	experience	with	through	their	previous	involvement	with	human	rights	advocacy.		The	chapter	then	briefly	presents	a	cursory	history	of	the	role	played	by	international	NGOs	like	Amnesty,	which	helped	forge	the	path	for	other	organizations	to	pursue	their	own	human	rights	agendas.		The	chapter	goes	on	to	reveal	the	ways	that	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	built	upon	that	tradition	and	distinguished	itself	from	its	peers	through	its	more	precise	focus,	addressing	patterns	of	
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abuse	perpetrated	by	specific	governments	that	ran	contrary	to	the	established	normative	framework	codified	through	international	agreements.1	Returning	to	the	Druzhnikov	campaign,	this	chapter	will	then	explore	the	ways	that	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	utilized	American	media—particularly	nationally	distributed	newspapers—to	disseminate	their	message	among	large	swaths	of	the	U.S.	population.		It	was	through	these	channels	that	the	group	would	reintegrate	its	public	awareness	campaign	concerning	the	plight	of	individual	Soviet	dissidents	with	their	efforts	to	build	popular	support	for	greater	U.S.	governmental	insistence	on	Helsinki	compliance	through	their	relations	with	other	signatory	governments.		Thus,	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	would	operate	simultaneously	on	several	unified	fronts	of	human	rights	advocacy—facilitated,	in	part,	by	their	complex	and	collaborative,	mutually	beneficial	relationship	with	major	American	news	outlets	like	the	Washington	Post	and	the	New	York	
Times.		The	extent	of	that	relationship	is	explored	further	in	the	following	chapter.		
CONTROLLING	THE	NARRATIVE:	THE	ESTABLISHMENT	OF	THE	U.S.	HELSINKI	
WATCH	COMMITTEE		After	the	discussions	between	Bernstein,	Laber,	Goldberg	and	Bundy	in	the	spring	of	1978,	a	$25,000	planning	grant	was	issued	by	the	Ford	Foundation	to	the	Fund	for	Free	Expression,	and	Bernstein’s	group	set	to	work	recruiting	participants	for	their	new	organization.2		The	press	release	announcing	the	establishment	of	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	touted	the	organization’s	membership,	consisting	of	“50	prominent	Americans	from	business,	law,	the	scientific	and	university	communities,	writing,	publishing,	the	labor	movement,	and	major	civil	rights	organizations.”		These	claims	sought	to	assure	the	public	of	the	group’s	significance,	and	its	natural	authority	as	a	true	voice	of	American	civil	society.		From	the	outset,	the	high	standing	and	personal	patronage	of	Helsinki	Watch’s	members	was	one	of	the	group’s	primary	assets	in	its	promotion	of	human	rights—an	
																																																								1	For	more	on	the	ways	in	which	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	stood	apart	from	other	contemporary	nongovernmental	human	rights	organizations,	see	Welch	Jr.,	NGOs	and	Human	Rights:	Promise	and	
Performance.	2	Korey,	Taking	on	the	World’s	Repressive	Regimes,	102.	
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aspect	of	the	organization	that	its	founders	assured	the	public	“would	in	time	be	enlarged.”3		Robert	Bernstein,	the	group’s	founder	and	chairman,	described	how	he	saw	the	high	profile	membership	of	the	organization	as	being	vital	for	gaining	the	visibility	needed	to	help	sway	public	opinion:	“I	looked	to	put	together	a	masthead	that	would	lend	weight	to	our	reports	and	press	releases.	.	.	.	When	I	contacted	people,	I	let	them	know	that	if	they	didn’t	have	time	to	actively	participate,	their	names	could	be	very	useful,	as	it	was	a	new	organization	and	a	new	idea,	and	both	needed	stature	and	publicity.”4				 In	much	the	same	way	that	Bernstein	considered	Random	House	subsidiaries	like	Knopf,	Pantheon,	and	Ballantine	as	a	collection	of	creative	units	that	retained	their	autonomy	to	develop	authors	and	pursue	ideas	as	they	saw	fit,	Bernstein’s	leadership	of	Helsinki	Watch	operated	in	a	way	that	provided	its	members	with	the	freedom	to	use	their	expertise	to	develop	the	most	effective	approach	toward	advocating	for	a	specific	issue.		As	described	in	the	group’s	first	annual	report,	Helsinki	Watch	boasted	a	“relatively	decentralized”	organizational	structure,	comprised	of	“seven	subcommittees,	each	responsible	for	a	different	aspect	of	Helsinki	work.”5		These	subcommittees	would	each	report	to	their	own	Subcommittee	Chairman,	who	was	themselves	supervised	by	the	Executive	Director	and	the	Executive	Committee.		In	this	way,	Helsinki	Watch	was	able	to	monitor	and	act	upon	many	of	the	issues	that	they	found	important	to	their	mission	simultaneously,	developing	the	ability	to	project	significant	international	influence	in	a	relatively	short	period	of	time.6			 Although	formally	established	in	February	1979	with	a	$400,000	grant	from	the	Ford	Foundation,	which	was	meant	to	finance	the	group	through	the	start	of	the	second	CSCE	review	conference	scheduled	to	begin	in	Madrid	in	November	1980,	members	of	Helsinki	Watch	spent	most	of	their	first	several	months	seeking	to	define	themselves	as	an	organization	and	determine	the	strategies	that	most	suited	their	resources	and	expertise.7		
																																																								3	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee,	“U.S.	Citizens’	Group	Forms	‘Helsinki	Watch’	Committee,”	n.d.,	Andrei	Sakharov	Papers.		4	Bernstein,	Speaking	Freely,	152.	5	Tebbel,	A	History	of	Book	Publishing,	190;	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee,	‘‘The	First	Fifteen	Months:	A	Summary	of	the	Activities	of	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	from	its	founding	in	February,	1979,	through	April,	1980,’’	n.d.,	HRWR,	Series	I:	Jeri	Laber	Files,	Box	70,	Folder	2-4:	Annual	Reports,	1979-1991,	3.	6	Ibid.		7	Laber,	The	Courage	of	Strangers,	98-99.		
	 55	
This	uncertainty	of	purpose	called	into	question	the	proper	balance	that	should	be	struck	between	domestic	and	international	Helsinki	monitoring,	leaving	the	group’s	members	with	conflicting	assumptions	about	their	fundamental	objectives,	and	confused	as	to	the	organization’s	ultimate	direction	and	strategies.		Evidence	of	this	tension	was	reflected	in	the	organization’s	early	staff	restructuring.		By	April	of	its	first	year,	Helsinki	Watch	had	already	parted	ways	with	its	first	executive	director,	David	Fishlow,	who	had	come	on	board	after	making	a	name	for	himself	at	the	ACLU.		When	taking	the	job,	Fishlow	assumed	that	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch—like	the	other	Helsinki	monitoring	groups	that	had	existed	up	to	that	point—would	be	primarily	concerned	with	the	observation	of	human	rights	domestically,	and	was	not	comfortable	with	the	international	focus	that	some	of	the	group’s	members	envisioned.8			It	seems	clear	that	the	short	tenure	and	abrupt	departure	of	David	Fishlow	was	by	no	means	an	anticipated	turn	of	events	for	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee,	as	it	left	the	nascent	organization	under	pressure	to	fill	the	office.		After	almost	two	months	without	an	executive	director,	Jeri	Laber	eventually	stepped	into	the	position	in	spite	of	the	fact	that	the	appointment	of	a	woman	to	such	a	role	sat	uneasy	with	some	of	the	Committee’s	other	founding	members.9		This	initial	sense	of	disarray	and	confusion	concerning	the	group’s	ultimate	purpose	was	not	merely	confined	to	those	within	the	ranks	of	the	organization.		Initial	public	reception	seemed	to	be	equally	at	odds	with	the	seemingly	unclear	intentions	of	the	group’s	founders.		The	title	of	the	New	York	Times	article	that	announced	the	formation	of	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	declared:	“Panel	in	New	York	to	Monitor	Human	Rights	in	the	U.S.”		The	piece	went	on	to	explain	the	group’s	intention	to	“monitor	United	States	compliance	with	the	1975	Helsinki	agreements	on	human	rights,”	and	to	report	on	the	degree	to	which	the	U.S.	government	had	lived	up	to	its	agreements	guaranteeing	the	freedom	of	thought,	conscience,	religion,	speech,	travel,	and	the	reunification	of	families	among	its	own	people.10																																																											8	Laber,	The	Courage	of	Strangers,	100;	103;	“U.S.	Citizens’	Group	Forms	‘Helsinki	Watch’	Committee,”	Andrei	Sakharov	Papers.		For	a	more	in-depth	but	still	somewhat	speculative	account	of	the	conditions	surrounding	David	Fishlow’s	appointment	and	sudden	departure,	see	Korey,	Taking	on	the	World’s	Repressive	Regimes,	108-113	9		Laber,	The	Courage	of	Strangers,	104-105.	10	"Panel	in	New	York	to	Monitor	Human	Rights	in	U.S.,"	New	York	Times,	25	February	1979.	See	also	“Helsinki	Watch	Unit	Set	to	Monitor	U.S.	on	Rights,”	by	Dusko	Doder,	The	Washington	Post,	18	March	1979.	
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The	United	States	by	no	means	boasted	a	perfect	record	on	the	inviolability	of	its	own	citizens’	rights	during	this	time.		Equal	rights	for	women	and	minorities,	as	well	as	economic	and	social	rights	continued	to	elude	many	disenfranchised	groups	throughout	the	country.		Yet	despite	these	ongoing	challenges,	the	suggestion	that	there	was	some	measure	of	equivalence	between	the	conduct	of	the	American	government	and	those	of	the	closed	societies	of	Eastern	Europe	for	which	similar	citizens’	Helsinki	monitoring	groups	had	been	established	drew	sharp	and	immediate	rebuke.		In	a	letter	to	the	editor	of	the	New	York	
Times	published	a	week	after	the	announcement	of	the	newly	formed	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee,	professor	of	American	Studies	at	Brandeis	University	Stephen	Whitfield	excoriated	the	group,	calling	it	“superfluous,”	and	remarked	that	its	very	existence	“must	baffle	Soviet	dissidents	and	cheer	their	tormentors.”11		Whitfield	accused	the	Committee’s	founders	of	taking	for	granted	the	liberties	that	allowed	them	to	even	issue	such	a	call	for	Helsinki	implementation,	while	their	opposite	numbers	in	the	Moscow	Helsinki	Watch	Group	languished	in	Soviet	prisons	and	forced	labor	camps.12		Such	a	scathing	public	indictment	of	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	at	the	very	moment	of	its	inception	threatened	the	efficacy	of	the	organization	as	a	shaper	of	public	opinion—jeopardizing,	as	it	did,	the	group’s	credibility	in	the	eyes	of	its	target	audience—and	demanded	an	immediate	response.		Although	still	in	the	process	of	coming	to	grips	with	their	own	sense	of	purpose	internally,	the	organization’s	leaders	were	forced	to	rebut	these	charges,	and	clarify	their	mission	once	and	for	all—for	the	public	as	much,	perhaps,	as	for	themselves.		Turning	the	editorial	pages	of	the	New	York	Times	as	a	public	forum	for	such	discussion,	Bernstein	and	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Vice-Chairman	Orville	Schell—a	distinguished	Wall	Street	lawyer	and	former	president	of	the	New	York	City	Bar	Association,	who	had	a	long	record	of	championing	human	rights	causes—rebutted	the	charges	leveled	against	their	organization	by	professor	Whitfield.		In	their	letter,	they	thanked	the	professor	for	acknowledging	the	degree	to	which	the	United	States	and	the	Soviet	Union	differed	on	their	defense	of	human	rights,	but	insisted	that	their	organization’s	true	purpose	was	“incorrectly	reported”	by	the	New	York	Times	when	the	
																																																								11	'Superfluous'	Panel	on	Helsinki	Accords,"	New	York	Times,	5	March	1979.	12	Ibid.	
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original	article	was	published	in	late	February.13		In	actuality,	the	Helsinki	Watch	press	release	announcing	the	formation	of	Committee	began	by	unequivocally	stating	the	group’s	intention	to	“monitor	U.S.	compliance	with	the	human	rights	provisions	of	the	Helsinki	accords”—a	point	it	reiterated	several	more	times	throughout	the	document,	only	once	amending	this	directive	to	include	the	phrase	“the	U.S.	and	other	countries.”14		If	a	chief	responsibility	of	the	new	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	was	to	exercise	its	power	as	public	relations	vehicle,	these	first	fumbling	steps	cast	doubt	at	the	outset	concerning	the	group’s	effectiveness	and	ability	to	control	its	own	public	image.			Instead	of	simply	setting	the	record	straight	with	this	editorial,	Bernstein	and	Schell	took	the	opportunity	to	resituate	the	group’s	purpose	on	a	more	solid	foundation,	publically	committing	their	organization	once	and	for	all	to	the	documentation	and	publication	of	violations	committed	by	any	and	all	signatory	states	of	the	Helsinki	accords.		Bernstein	and	Schell’s	letter	sought	to	emphasize	the	group’s	credibility	and	fairness,	stressing	their	organization’s	belief	that	only	by	“holding	ourselves	accountable	in	an	open	and	forthright	manner	[can]	we	earn	the	right	to	hold	others	accountable	as	well.”		In	this	respect,	the	group	pledged	to	take	seriously	any	allegations	regarding	the	U.S.	government’s	violation	of	Helsinki	principles	that	it	encountered,	and	would	call	upon	domestic	rights	groups	to	investigate	any	of	these	alleged	violations.15		But	the	letter	concluded	by	unambiguously	declaring	the	group’s	connection	to	the	greater	Helsinki	network	which	was	tirelessly	fighting	for	the	rights	of	citizens	in	Eastern	Europe:	“[W]e	will	pay	particular	attention	to	East	European	countries	where	independent	civil	rights	groups	are	suppressed	and	remedies	are	seldom	available.		In	fact,	the	formation	of	our	committee	is	a	direct	response	to	the	appeal	of	the	Moscow	Helsinki	Watch	urging	creation	of	such	groups	in	other	countries.”16			
																																																								13	“U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	with	a	Purpose,"	New	York	Times,	13	March	1979.	14	"U.S.	Citizens’	Group	Forms	‘Helsinki	Watch’	Committee,”	Andrei	Sakharov	Papers.	15	“U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	with	a	Purpose,"	13	March	1979.		In	fact,	in	the	first	year	of	its	existence,	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	did	press	the	U.S.	government	for	reforms	to	the	federal	prison	system,	as	well	as	commissioned	studies	on	migrant	labor,	racial	and	sexual	discrimination,	and	Native	American	rights	for	use	at	the	upcoming	CSCE	review	conference	in	Madrid.		See	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee,	‘‘The	First	Fifteen	Months,’’	10-11.			16	“U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	with	a	Purpose,"	13	March	1979.	
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THE	TRANSNATIONAL	DIMENSION	OF	U.S.	HELSINKI	ADVOCACY		After	having	publically	declared	the	organization’s	direct	link	to	the	activist	networks	of	Eastern	Europe	and	the	Soviet	Union,	the	next	step	was	for	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	to	begin	to	prove	itself	capable	of	utilizing	contact	with	those	networks	to	aid	in	the	defense	of	Helsinki	principles	within	those	closed	societies.		This	meant	coordinated	action	with	other	Helsinki	monitoring	groups	in	a	way	that	could	present	U.S.	lawmakers	and	the	American	public	with	a	clear	and	unified	message	concerning	the	plight	of	these	dissidents.		U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	sought	to	collect	and	disseminate	information	that	could	highlight	the	ongoing	repression	of	Soviet	and	Eastern	European	governments,	which	stood	in	flagrant	violation	of	the	Helsinki	agreements.		The	group’s	members	began	to	actively	cultivate	relationships	with	Soviet	and	Eastern	European	exiles	now	living	in	the	West,	which	could	provide	important	contact	information,	and	the	introductions	needed	to	effectively	collaborate	with	activists	still	involved	with	Helsinki	monitoring	inside	those	closed	societies.			In	a	memo	to	Jeri	Laber	transmitted	in	April	1979,	Helsinki	Watch	member	Betsy	Bullard	detailed	her	recent	contact	with	the	Czech	writer	and	publisher	Antonín	Liehm,	who	had	emigrated	to	the	West	ten	years	earlier	and	who	was,	at	that	time,	serving	as	a	professor	at	the	University	of	Pennsylvania	after	having	previously	held	a	teaching	position	at	the	City	University	of	New	York.17		In	this	case,	it	was	contact	with	Liehm	that	was	the	important	first	step	to	establishing	a	meaningful	link	with	Charter	77	activists	in	Czechoslovakia.		“Liehm	had	telephoned	yesterday	to	give	me	some	additional	addresses	of	Charter	77	members,”	Bullard	reported	to	Laber.		Contacts	such	as	these	often	provided	additional	access	to	a	wider	network	of	supporters	who	were	sympathetic	to	the	dissidents’	cause,	which	served	to	strengthen	crucial	transnational	ties,	and	helped	the	group	to	develop	increasingly	sophisticated	and	effective	systems	of	exchange.	“[Liehm]	also	gave	me	the	name	and	address	of	a	Czech	atomic	scientist,	Dr.	Frantisek	Janouch,”	Bullard	continued,	“who	is	exiled	in	Sweden	and	with	whom	we	should	be	in	contact.		He	is	
																																																								17	Miroslav	Rechcigl	Jr.,	Beyond	the	Sea	of	Beer:	History	of	Immigration	of	Bohemians	and	Czechs	to	the	New	
World	and	Their	Contributions	(Bloomington:	AuthorHouse,	2017),	619.	
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a	very	resourceful	man,	works	closely	with	the	Charter	77	people,	and	should	be	helpful	to	us.”18		 Liehm’s	introduction	of	Janouch	to	committee	members	provided	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	not	only	with	a	reliable	and	ongoing	point	of	contact	to	Charter	77—and	thus	ability	to	consistently	transmit	information	both	to	and	from	that	country—but	also	the	means	to	contribute	materially	to	the	Czech	organization’s	efforts.		Earlier	that	year,	a	special	fund	had	been	established	in	Sweden	to	support	persecuted	Czech	dissidents.		Janouch	served	as	the	trustee	of	that	fund,	and	could	be	relied	upon	to	ensure	that	donations	from	the	West	made	their	way	to	the	intended	recipients.		Among	the	fund’s	contributors	were	the	Danish	and	Norwegian	branches	of	P.E.N.,	and	the	Norwegian	Writers’	Union.		In	her	memo,	Bullard	made	clear	that	such	an	avenue	for	financial	support	would	prove	quite	useful	for	Helsinki	Watch’s	efforts	to	assist	these	Czech	dissidents,	recommending	to	Laber	that	“contributions	should	be	sent	to	Sweden.”19	Finally,	beyond	advancing	the	quality,	frequency,	and	value	of	transnational	communication	between	activist	organizations	in	the	East	and	West,	Western	émigrés	like	Liehm	would,	at	times,	even	serve	as	the	very	mode	of	transmission—particularly	in	the	early	days	of	the	organization’s	existence,	when	financial	resources	were	limited	and	in-country	experience	was	hard	to	come	by.		As	with	journalists	and	diplomats,	these	émigrés’	familiarity	with	the	native	language	and	customs—as	well	as	an	insider’s	knowledge	of	the	dissident	networks	operating	within	a	particular	country—provided	an	invaluable	resource	for	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	hoping	to	facilitate	the	flow	of	information	into,	and	out	of,	these	closed	societies.			It	was	not	unusual	for	individual	citizens	associated	with	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	to	serve	as	couriers	of	information	when	travelling	to	the	Soviet	bloc,	often	at	significant	risk	to	their	own	safety	or	interests.		According	to	Bullard,	Liehm	played	just	such	a	role	on	one	of	his	returns	to	Europe.		At	that	time,	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	was	preparing	to	make	contact	with	Eastern	dissident	organizations,	to	announce	to	these	groups	the																																																									18	Memorandum	from	Betsy	Bullard	to	Jeri	Laber,	27	April	1979,	HRWR,	Series	I:	Jeri	Laber	Files,	Box	51,	Folder	12.	19	Ibid.		For	more	on	the	challenges	posed	by	foreign	support	for	the	dissident	cause	in	the	Eastern	bloc,	see	Walker,	“Moscow	Human	Rights	Defenders	Look	West:	Attitudes	toward	U.S.	Journalists	in	the	1960s	and	1970s”;	Ibid.,	“The	Moscow	Correspondents,	Soviet	Human	Rights	Activists,	and	the	Problem	of	the	Western	Gift”.		
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Committee’s	formation,	and	to	declare	their	intention	to	lend	support	to	the	dissidents’	cause.		As	postal	communication	between	Western	activists	and	Eastern	European	dissidents	was	famously	unreliable,	Liehm	agreed	to	personally	carry	these	dispatches	to	several	of	the	founding	members	of	Charter	77.		This	willingness	by	individuals	to	take	on,	in	some	cases,	significant	liability	in	order	to	ensure	the	greatest	chance	of	success	for	these	transnational	advocacy	efforts	seemed	to	impress	upon	the	members	of	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	the	responsibility	that	they	had	to	serve	as	a	reliable	partner	in	this	relationship.		In	this	way,	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	became	ever	more	tightly	bound	within	the	greater	transnational	Helsinki	network,	and	by	extension,	invested	in	the	fate	of	the	individuals	who	served	it.		“Next	week	we	should	write	to	Dr.	Janouch,”	Bullard	concluded	in	her	memo	to	Laber,	“enlisting	his	help	and	cooperation	and	offering	ours.”20	Similar	tactics	to	the	ones	used	to	make	contact	and	secure	mailing	addresses	for	Charter	77	members	were	also	used	at	this	time	for	members	of	the	Lithuanian	Helsinki	Watch	Group	as	well	as	several	of	the	founders	of	the	Polish	Workers’	Defense	Committee—or	KOR—which	had	taken	on	the	responsibility	of	monitoring	Helsinki	compliance	in	in	that	country.		On	21	June	1979,	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	released	a	mailing	to	these	organizations,	informing	them	of	the	creation	of	the	United	States	Helsinki	monitoring	group	and	declaring	its	members’	intention	to	seek	active	collaboration	with	other	Helsinki	organizations	in	future	monitoring	efforts.		In	this	letter	signed	by	Bernstein	and	Schell,	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	solemnly	declared	its	unity	of	purpose	with	the	greater	transnational	Helsinki	network,	and	made	clear	that	they	deferred	to	these	European	organizations’	long	histories	of	activism	and	experience	in	publicizing	human	rights	abuses	in	their	own	countries.			We	are	very	pleased	to	inform	you	of	the	formation	of	a	U.S.	citizens’	group	dedicated	to	monitoring	government	compliance	with	the	Helsinki	Final	Act.		We	have	organized	our	group	in	large	measure	out	of	respect	for	the	work	of	the	brave	men	and	women	who	organized	the	first	such	watch	group	in	Moscow	in	1976	and	those	who	carry	on	the	work	of	promoting	observance	with	the	Accords	in	each	of	the	signatory	states.	.	.	.	[W]e	intend	to	monitor	implementation	of	the	Final	Act	both	
																																																								20	Memo	from	Bullard	to	Laber,	27	April	1979.	
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in	the	United	States	and,	by	working	with	other	citizens	groups,	in	other	countries	which	have	signed	the	accords.21				These	remarks	reflect	the	extent	to	which	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	considered	the	formation	of	their	organization	to	be	in	direct	response	to	the	appeals	made	by	the	Moscow	Helsinki	Watch	Group	in	their	founding	document	released	in	May	1976,	calling	on	“the	public	of	other	states	participating	in	the	Helsinki	Conference	to	form	their	own	national	Support	Groups	to	promote	full	implementation	of	the	Helsinki	Accords.”22			The	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee’s	letter	to	Eastern	monitoring	groups	continued:		Consistent	with	this	aim	is	our	hope	of	cooperating	on	a	regular	basis	with	watch	groups	in	Eastern	and	Western	Europe.	.	.	.	We	will	remain	in	touch	with	you	in	the	future,	and	we	solicit	your	suggestions	on	how	we	can	most	fruitfully	pursue	our	work.	.	.	.	[W]e	share	a	common	responsibility	as	citizens	of	Helsinki	signatory	states	to	report	on	violations	of	the	Final	Act	and	to	work	for	their	correction.		Your	advice	will	be	very	valuable	to	us,	and	we	hope	that	in	the	future	we	will	be	able	to	communicate	regularly.23		It	is	clear	that	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	saw	this	kind	of	transnational	activism	as	an	essential	element	for	the	successful	promotion	of	the	Helsinki	Accords,	and	their	importance	to	global	security,	to	audiences	back	in	the	United	States.		However,	it	was	the	implementation	of	the	Accords	themselves	that	helped	ensure	that	such	transnational	contact	continued	to	be	possible.		The	Accords	thus	became	the	very	mechanism	through	which	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	could	fulfill	its	directive	to	monitor	and	report	on	Helsinki	abuses	in	other	signatory	states.			
RELIANCE	ON	TRANSNATIONAL	ADVOCACY	IN	THE	DEVELOPMENT	OF	HELSINKI	
WATCH	STRATEGIES		At	the	same	time	that	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	was	developing	connections	across	transnational	networks	for	the	purposes	of	exchanging	information	and																																																									21	Memorandum	from	Debbie	Lauter	to	Jeri	Laber	and	Andy	Sommer	concerning	Letters	to	Soviet	and	East	European	Helsinki	Watch	Groups,	21	June	1979,	HRWR,	Series	I:	Jeri	Laber	Files,	Box	51,	Folder	12.	22	"On	the	Founding	of	the	Public	Group	to	Support	Compliance	with	the	Helsinki	Accords	in	the	USSR,"	12	May	1976,	in	Orlov,	Dangerous	Thoughts,	Appendix	Two.		The	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	was	explicit	on	this	point	elsewhere	in	public	statements—perhaps	most	conspicuously	in	the	organization’s	first	annual	report.		See	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee,	‘‘The	First	Fifteen	Months,’’	3.			23	Memorandum	from	Lauter	to	Laber	and	Sommer,	21	June	1979.	
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generating	support,	the	group	also	needed	to	seek	ways	to	build	encouragement	for	their	cause	among	American	audiences.		After	Fishlow’s	resignation	in	April,	a	small	steering	committee	began	to	meet	on	a	regular	basis,	to	determine	how	best	the	organization	should	proceed	in	its	efforts	to	aid	in	the	fight	for	human	rights.		Comprised	of	many	of	Helsinki	Watch’s	most	active	members,	the	steering	committee’s	job	was	to	reaffirm	several	of	the	organization’s	primary	objectives—chief	among	those	was	substantive	participation	in	the	CSCE	Madrid	Review	Conference,	due	to	convene	in	November	1980.		At	Madrid,	Bernstein’s	organization	would	be	expected	to	provide	the	conference	delegations	with	verifiable	documentation	of	human	rights	abuses	that	could	be	used	as	evidence	for	determining	the	progress	or	limitations	of	Helsinki	implementation	up	to	that	point.		But	the	ways	in	which	the	group	should	gather	and	best	present	such	information	both	to	the	American	government	and	to	the	general	public	was	still	very	much	up	for	debate,	and	with	only	a	little	more	than	eighteen	months	before	the	Madrid	Review	was	to	begin,	there	was	not	much	time	remaining	for	Helsinki	Watch	to	organize	an	approach	to	their	human	rights	campaigning	that	could	be	expected	to	reliably	deliver	results.24	By	May	1979,	weeks	after	Davd	Fishlow	had	stepped	down,	and	while	the	organization	was	still	without	an	Executive	Director,	psychiatrist	and	human	rights	advocate	Willard	Gaylin,	who	was	co-founder	of	the	Hastings	Center	and	who	sat	on	the	Helsinki	Watch	board,	contacted	Jeri	Laber	to	suggest	steps	that	might	move	the	strategic	approach	of	the	group	forward.		Gaylin	served	on	the	Subcommittee	on	the	Free	Flow	of	People	and	Ideas	along	with	Laber,	and	in	his	letter,	he	echoed	the	feelings	of	the	Subcommittee’s	chairman,	publisher	and	activist	Winthrop	Knowlton,	when	he	said	that	the	group’s	efforts	must	not	only	be	concerned	with	defining	issues	important	to	the	maintenance	of	the	Helsinki	Accords	and	human	rights	protections	generally,	but	must	also	be	capable	of	helping	real	people	in	concrete	ways—people	who	faced	specific	obstacles	as	a	consequence	of	the	Soviet	government’s	failure	to	live	up	to	those	same	Helsinki	agreements.		Gaylin	explained	in	his	letter	to	Laber	that	“given	the	nature	of	the	problem	[of	free	expression]	and	the	almost	total	impossibility	of	an	American	to	visualize	the	kinds	
																																																								24	Laber,	The	Courage	of	Strangers,	100;	103;	“U.S.	Citizens’	Group	Forms	‘Helsinki	Watch’	Committee,”	Andrei	Sakharov	Papers.	
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of	controls	.	.	.	that	exist	in	the	Soviet	Union,”	when	seeking	to	raise	American	awareness,	“the	only	way	we	can	define	issues	is	by	personalizing.”25		To	this	end,	Gaylin	suggested	that	the	organization	adopt	a	“case	study	method”	in	which	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	would	collect	and	present	highly	detailed	and	personal	accounts	depicting	the	struggles	of	real	individuals,	and	the	very	human	cost	that	the	Soviet	government’s	repressive	actions	and	failure	to	abide	by	its	international	agreements	had	upon	the	lives	of	its	own	citizens.		In	his	letter	to	Jeri	Laber,	Gaylin	proposed	that	the	first	such	“test	case”	be	that	of	Yuri	Druzhnikov,	a	Soviet	Russian	writer	and	playwright	whose	petition	to	emigrate	from	the	Soviet	Union	had	led	to	his	persecution	by	the	authorities.		The	Druzhnikov	case	could	be	of	particular	use	for	Helsinki	Watch,	Gaylin	said,	not	only	because	the	Soviet	author	was	nonpolitical,	having	never	taken	part	in	any	political	demonstrations	or	protests	against	his	government,	but	because	the	information	could	be	relied	upon	to	be	detailed	and	accurate.		“I	have	absolute	confidence	in	the	facts	as	stated,”	wrote	Gaylin,	“because	they	have	been	verified	by	someone	whom	I	know,	of	impeccable	integrity.”		Although	it	is	not	clear	from	this	letter	who	Gaylin’s	contact	was,	this	ability	to	have	faith	in	the	quality	of	the	reporting	of	events	was	absolutely	essential	for	the	integrity	of	Helsinki	Watch.		Accurate	reporting	provided	the	nascent	organization	with	the	credibility	and	legitimacy	it	needed	to	be	effective	in	the	eyes	of	the	American	public	as	well	as	government	officials	when	challenging	the	Soviet	Union	on	their	record	of	human	rights.26	This	contact	that	Gaylin	had	with	individuals	who	could	reliably	provide	detailed	information	of	events	taking	place	inside	the	Soviet	Union	was	just	one	more	example	of	the	larger	transnational	network	that	existed	linking	dissidents	in	the	USSR	with	activists	in	the	United	States	fighting	to	raise	awareness	on	their	behalf.		The	existence	of	these	relationships	and	their	ability	to	function	as	channels	through	which	valuable	information	concerning	human	rights	abuses	could	be	passed	made	Helsinki	Watch	reporting	possible	and	effective	during	the	first	critical	few	months	of	the	organization’s	existence,	when	information	gathering	missions	undertaken	by	group	members	themselves	were	much	more	difficult.		During	this	initial	period,	the	personal	relationships	maintained	by																																																									25	Letter	to	Jeri	Laber	from	Willard	Gaylin,	18	May	1979,	HRWR,	Series	I:	Jeri	Laber	Files,	Box	52,	Folder	9.	26	Ibid.	
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members	were	often	times	the	difference	maker,	providing	Helsinki	Watch	with	crucial	access	to	information	that	could	then	be	used	for	their	organization’s	purposes.		Thus,	the	participation	and	contribution	of	influential	members	of	American	society	who	had	access	to	those	involved	in	this	transnational	network—journalists,	politicians,	scientists,	and	academics—was	extremely	significant	to	the	organization’s	efforts,	not	only	as	far	their	access	to	information	inside	closed	Soviet	society	was	concerned,	but	also	in	their	ability	to	effectively	disseminate	that	information	back	in	the	United	States.27			Gaylin,	in	a	second	letter	to	Jeri	Laber,	who	by	June	of	1979	had	assumed	her	place	as	Executive	Director	of	Helsinki	Watch,	once	again	brought	up	the	case	of	Druzhnikov	as	a	compelling	opportunity	for	Helsinki	Watch	to	advance	a	personalizing	approach	when	raising	awareness	of	human	rights	violations	inside	the	USSR.		In	his	letter,	Gaylin	informed	Laber	about	an	article	he	had	recently	received	that	was	written	by	Druzhnikov,	in	which	the	Soviet	writer	detailed	his	ordeal	in	requesting	permission	to	emigrate	from	the	Soviet	Union.		Again	relying	on	a	personal	acquaintance,	Gaylin	took	this	opportunity	to	publicize	Druzhnivkov’s	account:	“The	article	seemed	so	timely	that	I	took	a	chance	of	calling	a	friend	at	the	Washington	Post.		To	my	delight,	it	will	be	printed.”28		That	Gaylin	did	this	without	prior	consultation	with	the	rest	of	the	Free	Flow	Subcommittee	demonstrates	the	relative	freedom	of	action	that	Helsinki	Watch	members	enjoyed	at	this	time,	to	pursue	the	group’s	human	rights	interests	as	they	best	saw	fit.		Gaylin	apologized	to	Laber	for	his	impetuosity,	explaining	that	“things	moved	so	fast	that	I	didn’t	have	time	to	consult	with	the	rest	of	you	about	how	this	might	be	tied	into	the	work	of	Helsinki	Watch.”		“It	will,	of	course,”	Gaylin	assured	the	new	Executive	Director,	provided	that	they	adopt	the	case	study	method	that	he	was	proposing.29	The	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee’s	ability	to	acquire	and	transmit	highly	descriptive	and	emotional	accounts	of	a	Soviet	citizen’s	struggle	for	individual	rights	
																																																								27	Support	for	the	importance	of	transnational	networks	to	Western	nongovernmental	human	rights	efforts	generally	and	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	specifically	can	be	found	throughout	David	P.	Forsythe’s	edited	five-volume	series	Encyclopedia	of	Human	Rights	(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	2009),	particularly	in	the	contributions	of	Ann	Marie	Clark,	“Nongovernmental	Organizations:	Overview,”	vol.	4,	87–96;	Robert	Horvath,	“Demise	of	Soviet	Communism,”	vol.	4,	505–12;	Patrice	C.	McMahon,	“Helsinki	Accords	and	CSCE/OSCE,”	vol.	2,	377–83;	Claude	E.	Welch	Jr.,	“Human	Rights	Watch,”	vol.	2,	478–85.	28	Letter	to	Jeri	Laber	from	Willard	Gaylin,	9	July	1979,	HRWR,	Series	I:	Jeri	Laber	Files,	Box	52,	Folder	9.		29	Ibid.	
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provided	the	organization	with	a	great	advantage	when	promoting	awareness	of	Soviet	governmental	repression	to	the	American	public.		While	Gaylin	made	his	case	to	the	rest	of	the	Free	Flow	Subcommittee	by	citing	specific	Soviet	violations	of	Helsinki	protocols	concerning	family	reunification	and	the	free	movement	of	peoples,	Druzhnikov’s	article	on	the	other	hand,	published	in	the	Sunday	edition	of	the	Washington	Post	on	15	July,	struck	a	very	different	tone.		The	article	made	no	mention	of	the	Soviet	government’s	defiance	of	its	international	agreements,	and	in	fact	scarcely	addressed	the	matter	of	emigration	at	all.		Rather	than	a	scathing	indictment	of	the	Kremlin’s	Helsinki	transgressions,	the	educational	scholar	and	children’s	author	took	a	decisively	apolitical	approach—in	keeping	with	his	character	and	past	behavior—in	which	he	chose	instead	to	present	a	highly	personal	account	of	life	under	Soviet	rule,	by	providing	to	his	reader	an	in-depth	look	at	a	particular	phenomenon	which	was	perennial	to	the	Soviet	experience:	lines.30			Coming	as	the	article	did	in	the	midst	of	the	U.S.	energy	crisis	of	the	late	1970s,	the	imagery	of	men	and	women	waiting	in	line	was	a	deliberate	choice	on	the	part	of	the	author,	meant	to	portray	a	shared	sense	of	experience	between	both	Soviet	and	American	citizens.		But	whereas	the	lines	in	the	United	States	were	forming	outside	gas	stations,	Druzhnikov	wrote	of	lines	in	the	Soviet	Union	that	existed	for	things	which	most	Americans	at	that	time	would	have	certainly	considered	to	have	been	basic	everyday	amenities,	and	which	access	to	in	the	United	States	would	have	been	largely	taken	for	granted.		Drawing	upon	personal	details,	Druzhnikov	endeared	himself	to	his	American	readers	with	emotionally	driven	stories	concerning	his	birth,	the	circumstances	under	which	he	met	his	wife,	and	his	desire	to	achieve	a	more	comfortable	life	for	himself	and	his	family—personal	milestones	that	were	universal	to	the	human	experience,	and	that	American	audiences	would	easily	have	been	able	to	understand	and	identify	with.31			In	an	effort	to	further	connect	with	his	readers,	Druzhnikov	went	on	to	describe	yet	another	prototypically	American	experience—attending	the	cinema.		His	presentation	of	Soviet	movie-going	was	meant	to	highlight	the	kind	of	deprivation	and	chronic	dysfunction	that	average	Soviet	citizens	faced	in	their	daily	lives,	presenting	the	occasion	as	an	absurd																																																									30	Letter	to	Laber	from	Gaylin,	18	May	1979;	Yuri	Druzhnikov,	“I	Was	Born	in	a	Line	.	.	.”	Washington	Post,	July	15,	1979.	31	Ibid.	
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distortion	of	what	Americans	would	naturally	picture	as	cinema	attendance	within	their	own	society.		American	readers	(certainly	almost	all	of	whom	would	have	had	personal	experience	attending	movies	themselves,	and	could	therefore	intimately	relate	to	Druzhnikov’s	story)	were	told	of	Soviets’	need	to	have	to	wait	in	line,	not	just	for	new	movies,	but	for	old	movies	as	well,	and—showing	further	deference	to	his	American	audience	by	appealing	their	natural	sense	of	pride	in	their	culture—of	having	to	wait	in	line	to	buy	tickets	to	a	much-anticipated	American	movie	more	than	a	month	in	advance.32		Druzhnikov’s	article	went	on	to	tell	of	his	ordeal	to	buy	a	refrigerator	and	then	a	car	in	which	he	was	forced	to	wait	for	a	period	of	three	years	and	seven	years,	respectively.		Once	again,	these	examples	were	both	universal	comforts	of	American	living	and	thus	evoked	imagery	that	further	helped	demonstrate	the	contrast	between	the	Soviet	and	American	experience.		In	a	particularly	vivid	passage,	he	confessed	that	only	pictures	of	fresh	fruit	and	vegetables—photographs	cut	out	from	an	American-printed	calendar—are,	for	him,	as	close	as	he	and	his	family	could	get	to	such	rare	commodities	in	the	Soviet	Union.		It	was	only	after	this	long	list	of	common	everyday	items	that	Druzhnikov	presented	to	his	reader	a	wholly	foreign	reason	to	need	to	wait	in	line:	the	permission	to	emigrate	from	one's	nation.33			This	was	the	point	in	the	article	in	which	Druzhnikov	chose	to	invoke	the	bond	which	he	had	established	with	his	reader	through	his	tales	of	common	experience,	to	elicit	sympathy	for	what	his	American	audience	would	consider	an	inalienable	right	that	he	and	others	like	him	were	deprived	of.34		According	to	Gaylin,	Druzhnikov’s	ability	to	“dramatize”	the	plight	of	dissatisfied	Soviet	citizens	in	this	way	was	exactly	what	made	this	case	study	strategy	he	was	proposing	so	effective,	since	it	gave	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	the	chance	to	frame	the	violation	of	Helsinki	agreements	in	terms	of	their	real-world	consequences.		The	compelling	nature	of	these	sorts	of	personal	appeals	provided	the	opportunity	for	Helsinki	Watch	to	powerfully	mobilize	public	support	behind	defense	of	
																																																								32	Ibid.	33	Ibid.		For	more	on	the	explanatory	power	of	emotional	appeals	by	nongovernmental	organizations,	see	Bradley,	The	World	Reimagined.		For	a	more	comprehensive	overview	of	the	place	of	emotion	in	the	study	of	contemporary	human	rights	histories,	see	Roland	Burke,	“Flat	Affect?	Revisiting	Emotion	in	the	Historiography	of	Human	Rights,”	Journal	of	Human	Rights	16,	no.	2	(2017):	123–41.	34	Druzhnikov,	"I	Was	Born	in	a	Line	.	.	.".	
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international	human	rights	agreements	in	a	way	that	Gaylin	assured	Laber	would	“be	most	important	for	us.”35				
TACTICS	OF	THE	U.S.	HELSINKI	WATCH	COMMITTEE	IN	THE	CONTEXT	OF	EXISTING	
NONGOVERNMENTAL	HUMAN	RIGHTS	ADVOCACY		With	the	“case	study”	approach	officially	underway	after	the	publication	of	Druzhnikov’s	Washington	Post	article,	the	efforts	of	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	began	to	organize	around	a	strategy	that	would	best	capitalize	on	the	emotionally	engaging	presentation	of	the	Soviet	government’s	Helsinki	violations	and	human	rights	abuse.		Gaylin’s	decision	to	go	public	with	Druzhnikov’s	article	seems,	at	least	to	some	extent,	to	have	forced	the	hand	of	Helsinki	Watch,	since	it	was	only	after	the	story	ran	in	the	
Washington	Post	that	Laber	sent	Gaylin	her	reply,	notifying	him	of	the	approval	of	his	proposal.		In	her	letter,	Laber	informed	Gaylin	that,	after	consultation	with	other	Helsinki	Watch	members,	it	had	been	decided	that	the	group	would	use	Druzhnikov’s	petition	to	emigrate	as	the	basis	for	a	publicity	campaign	aimed	at	highlighting	the	Soviet’s	failure	to	abide	by	the	terms	of	the	Helsinki	Final	Act.		This	was	to	be	done	using	methods	that	the	members	of	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	were	most	familiar	with,	and	had	employed	to	some	success	in	the	past.		“We	agreed,”	Laber	wrote	on	26	July,	“since	he	has	now	‘gone	public’	with	his	Washington	Post	article,	to	use	that	article	as	the	taking	off	point	for	letters	on	his	behalf.”36		This	campaign	of	letter	writing	was,	in	many	ways,	a	continuation	of	strategies	used	by	the	organizational	predecessors	of	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee—the	International	Freedom	to	Publish	Committee	and	the	Fund	for	Free	Expression—of	which	prominent	Committee	members	including	Robert	Bernstein,	Winthrop	Knowlton,	Jeri	Laber	and	others	had	all	been	involved.		 It	should	be	noted	that	the	practice	of	raising	awareness	through	letter	writing	was	by	no	means	a	new	phenomenon	among	nongovernmental	human	rights	organizations,	and	had	been	a	strategy	perhaps	made	most	visible	through	the	efforts	of	Amnesty	International,	which,	by	the	time	Helsinki	Watch	was	established,	boasted	more	than	200,000	active	members	and	supporters	across	125	countries,	and	had	a	Nobel	Peace	Prize																																																									35	Letter	to	Laber	from	Gaylin,	May	18,	1979.	36		Letter	to	Willard	Gaylin	from	Jeri	Laber,	26	July	1979,	HRWR,	Series	I:	Jeri	Laber	Files,	Box	52,	Folder	9.	
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to	its	credit.37		Amnesty	was	in	many	ways	a	model—and	indeed,	a	training	ground—for	many	individuals	who	would	later	go	on	to	be	instrumental	in	other	Western	human	rights	organizations	throughout	the	1970s	and	80s.		Jeri	Laber	herself	had	begun	her	human	rights	work	in	Amnesty’s	New	York	chapter,	and	it	was	through	those	activities	that	she	had	first	made	the	acquaintance	of	Robert	Bernstein.38		 Although	Amnesty’s	place	in	the	field	of	human	rights	promotion	at	this	time	was	arguably	second	to	none,	its	unparalleled	stature	was,	in	many	ways,	reflected	in	the	somewhat	restrained	scope	and	limited	depth	of	the	organization’s	advocacy	strategies.		By	the	late	1970s,	the	activity	of	Amnesty	International	consisted	primarily	of	awareness-raising	campaigns	surrounding	individual	prisoners	of	conscience,	and	largely	refrained	from	addressing	broader	patterns	of	abuse	perpetrated	by	specific	actors	or	governments.		Furthermore,	because	of	its	desire	to	maintain	its	appeal	and	credibility	internationally,	the	group	rarely	participated	in	the	public	“naming	and	shaming”	of	specific	violators,	and—in	an	effort	to	remain	impartial,	objective,	and	nonpartisan	in	its	reporting—generally	abstained	from	making	particular	policy	recommendations	for	the	purposes	of	counteracting	abuse.39		 Amnesty’s	strategies	were	ill-equipped	to	adapt	to	certain	post-Helsinki	changes	taking	place	within	the	societies	of	Eastern	Europe,	and	the	organization	was	slow	to	respond	to	the	changing	patterns	of	adjudication,	which	increasingly	relied	upon	the	support	of	public	opinion	for	the	denunciation	of	human	rights	violations.		An	example	of	this	adaptation	problem	involves	one	of	Amnesty’s	most	well	known	strategies:	the	symbolic	adoption	of	“prisoners	of	conscience.”		By	the	late	1970s,	it	was	quickly	becoming	clear	that	there	were	a	number	of	extra-legal	ways	in	which	a	government	could	punish	individuals	and	suppress	dissent,	short	of	actual	arrest	and	imprisonment—particularly	in	states	like	the	Soviet	Union.		Extrajudicial	methods	of	coercion	included	harassment,	eviction,	threat	of	unemployment,	and	reprisals	taken	against	family	members,	just	to	
																																																								37	Amnesty	International,	“Amnesty	International	Annual	Report,	1979”	(London:	Amnesty	International	Publications,	1979),	accessed	20	February	2018,	www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/001/1979/en.	38	Morton	E.	Winston,	“Assessing	the	Effectiveness	of	International	Human	Rights	NGOs:	Amnesty	International,”	in	Welch	Jr.	ed.,	NGOs	and	Human	Rights:	Promise	and	Performance,	25–29;	Laber,	The	Courage	
of	Strangers,	73–75.	39	Winston,	“Assessing	the	Effectiveness	of	International	Human	Rights	NGOs,”	36–39.	
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name	a	few,	and	represented	patterns	of	behavior	for	which	the	existing	strategies	of	Amnesty	International	at	that	time	had	little	means	of	effectively	combatting.40			While	Bernstein	considered	the	efforts	of	Amnesty	International	to	be	admirable,	he	saw	their	scope	as	too	limited,	and	firmly	believed	that	international	agreements	like	the	Universal	Declaration	of	Human	Rights,	and—most	significantly—the	Helsinki	Final	Act	provided	valuable	starting	points	from	which	international	pressure	could	effectively	be	organized	to	stress	responsibilities	that	existed	between	a	government	and	its	citizens.		Bernstein	and	others	saw	in	their	own	organization	the	opportunity	to	move	beyond	Amnesty’s	limited	focus	on	prisoners,	and	instead	work	to	retrain	world	attention	upon	sustained	patterns	of	continual	abuse,	perpetrated	systematically	by	state	governments	that	were	party	to	international	agreement.41			Furthermore,	as	a	vanguard	of	the	modern	human	rights	movement,	Amnesty	International,	which	was	founded	in	1961,	found	it	necessary	to	devote	much	of	their	time	to	developing	and	legitimizing	a	universally	accepted	notion	of	human	rights	standards	and	international	norms	capable	of	effectively	circumscribing	what	could	be	broadly	considered	as	acceptable	or	undesirable	behavior	of	governments	across	a	spectrum	of	global	society.		In	large	part	due	to	these	efforts	of	Amnesty’s,	successive	human	rights	NGOs	such	as	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	were	not	similarly	constrained	by	such	time-consuming	practices,	and	thus	enjoyed	the	freedom	to	pursue	much	more	specific	indictments	of	states’	behavior,	operating	largely	upon	the	assumption	that	the	various	international	covenants	to	which	their	work	so	closely	hewed—the	Universal	Declaration	of	Human	Rights,	the	ICCPR/ICECSR,	and,	most	recently,	the	Helsinki	Final	Act—effectively	served	as	the	universally	agreed-upon	norms	from	which	claims	concerning	the	violation	of	human	rights	could	be	measured	and	adjudicated.42			
GETTING	THE	MESSAGE	OUT:	THE	EVOLUTION	OF	U.S.	HELSINKI	WATCH	
INFORMATION	CAMPAIGNS	AND	THE	ALLIANCE	WITH	AMERICAN	MEDIA																																																										40	Welch	Jr.,	“Amnesty	International	and	Human	Rights	Watch:	A	Comparison,”	in	Welch	Jr.	ed.,	NGOs	and	
Human	Rights:	Promise	and	Performance,	93–94;	“An	Interview	with	Robert	Bernstein,"	A	Chronicle	of	Human	
Rights,	50-51.				41	Bernstein,	Speaking	Freely,	151.	42	Ibid.,	37-39;	Welch	Jr.,	"Amnesty	International	and	Human	Rights	Watch,"	86-94.		
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In	addition	to	overtures	made	directly	to	Soviet	officials,	Helsinki	Watch’s	letter	writing	campaign	sought	to	elicit	targeted	support	from	American	citizens	with	professional	ties	to	the	Soviet	Union,	who	would	have	been	capable	of	bringing	greater	visibility	to	the	case	of	Yuri	Druzhnikov	and	applying	pressure	within	their	respective	industries.		A	draft	appeal	produced	by	Helsinki	Watch	in	October	1979,	which	was	intended	for	circulation	among	Americans	within	various	professional	fields,	presented	a	brief	biographical	summary	of	Druzhnikov’s	personal	and	professional	life—as	well	as	a	description	of	his	recent	difficulties	with	the	Soviet	authorities—and	called	upon	its	recipients	to	do	what	they	could	to	make	their	voices	heard	on	his	behalf.		The	appeal	instructed	that	such	expressions	of	support	“should	take	the	form	of	letters	to	Soviet	political	and	literary	officials,	to	the	Union	of	Soviet	Writers,	to	the	Soviet	Copyright	Agency	(VAAP),	to	all	those	Soviet	groups	and	institutions	which	presently	maintain	business,	scholarly	and	cultural	relations	with	the	West	and	hope	to	broaden	them	in	the	future.”43			By	tying	the	Soviet’s	compliance	in	the	field	of	human	rights	to	the	development	of	further	economic,	scientific,	and	technological	relations	between	individuals	and	organizations	within	the	United	States	and	the	USSR,	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee—whether	incidentally	or	deliberately—had	invoked	an	integral	concept	codified	within	the	international	agreements	of	the	Helsinki	Final	Act:	the	linkage	between	the	treatment	of	citizens,	and	the	cross-cultural	cooperation	that	the	Soviet	Union	desired.		This	approach	conformed	to	many	of	the	calls	for	support	made	by	Eastern	European	and	Soviet	dissidents	in	their	appeals	to	the	West,	whom	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	had	actively	sought	to	align	itself	with	at	this	time.		Bernstein’s	group	endeavored	to	become	the	embodiment	of	that	principle	of	linkage,	by	making	it	a	centerpiece	of	their	efforts	to	advocate	for	the	observance	of	human	rights	in	the	future.		These	early	campaigns	of	letter	writing	were	a	crucial	first	step	toward	making	that	goal	a	reality.44																																																									43	Unknown	author,	“Draft	Appeal	for	Western	Support	of	Yuri	Druzhnikov,”	c.	October	1979,	HRWR,	Series	I:	Jeri	Laber	Files,	Box	52,	Folder	9.	44	Evidence	of	dissidents’	support	for	such	an	approach	can	be	found	throughout	a	multitude	of	different	public	statements,	writings,	and	Congressional	testimonies	made	in	the	West	by	several	high	profile	Soviet	activists	during	this	period,	including	“Andrei	Amalrik,	on	Détente,”	New	York	Times,	22	October	1975;	Aleksandr	Solzhenitsyn’s	speech	delivered	to	the	AFL-CIO	trade	union	meeting	in	Washington	D.C.,	30	June	1975,	reprinted	in	“Solzhenitsyn:	The	Voice	of	Freedom,”	Pamphlet	published	by	American	Federation	of	Labor	and	Congress	of	Industrial	Organizations,	Internet	Archive,	accessed	29	August	2015,	https://archive.org/stream/SolzhenitsynTheVoiceOfFreedom/SVF2_djvu.txt;	Testimony	of	Vladimir	
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This	appeal	to	American	professionals	claimed	that	Druzhnikov’s	decision	to	speak	out	publically	against	what	Helsinki	Watch	called	his	“continued	detention	in	the	USSR”	had	made	the	Soviet	writer	more	vulnerable	to	further	reprisals	by	his	government.		By	appealing	to	the	West	for	support,	Druzhnikov’s	situation	had	now	become	“precarious,”	and	the	group	warned	that	his	efforts	to	resist	persecution	“could	not	continue	long	without	support	from	abroad.”45		Such	petitions	made	by	Helsinki	Watch	were	often	careful	to	stress	the	notion	of	individual	responsibility—whether	normative,	professional	or	moral—that	those	in	the	West	had	to	those	who	sought	their	assistance.		The	participation	and	support	of	individuals	from	a	variety	of	different	professional	backgrounds	helped	to	bolster	the	credibility	of	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch,	drawing	upon	a	participating	individual’s	respective	expertise,	as	well	as	extensive	professional	network,	when	advancing	their	future	advocacy	efforts	and	seeking	to	generate	greater	public	awareness.		By	enlisting	the	support	of	professionals	in	various	outside	fields,	the	organization	sought	to	amplify	its	human	rights	message	in	key	areas,	and	target	those	industries	and	individuals	whose	action	might	have	the	greatest	effect	in	the	context	of	the	particular	case	in	question.		Thus,	Helsinki	Watch	tailored	their	approach	to	each	case	in	ways	that	would	foster	the	greatest	amount	of	support	from	the	most	relevant	and	useful	areas	of	society.		“Colleagues	in	related	professions—writers,	publishers,	editors,	educators,	psychologists,	social	scientists—are	also	asked	to	protest	and	to	publicize	his	situation	in	progressional	[sic]	organs	as	well	as	open	letters	to	the	press	and	in	articles.”46			Another	useful	stratagem	employed	by	Helsinki	Watch	in	their	campaign	of	letter	writing	was	the	practice	of	drafting	letters	to	the	editorial	boards	of	American	news	outlets.		As	such	letters	are	often	published,	this	gave	the	organization	the	opportunity	to	speak	directly	to	one	of	their	primary	target	audiences,	the	American	people,	as	well	as	provided	better	control	over	how	each	message	was	conveyed,	stressing	the	details	about	a	state’s	
																																																																																																																																																																																		Bukovsky	before	the	Commission	on	Security	and	Cooperation	in	Europe,	23	February	1977,	reproduced	in	
Basket	Three:	Implementation	of	the	Helsinki	Accords,	vol.	I,	Human	Rights	(Washington	D.C.:	Government	Printing	Office,	1977),	27-28;	Testimony	of	Lyudmila	Alekseyeva	before	the	Commission	on	Security	and	Cooperation	in	Europe,	11	July	1978,	reproduced	in	Basket	Three:	Implementation	of	the	Helsinki	Accords,	vol.	VII,	Repercussions	of	the	Trials	of	Helsinki	Monitors	in	the	USSR	(Washington	D.C.:	Government	Printing	Office,	1978),	47-52;	Andrei	Sakharov,	Alarm	and	Hope	(London:	Collins	and	Harvill	Press,	1979),	25–26;	178.	45	“Draft	Appeal	for	Western	Support	of	Yuri	Druzhnikov,”	Jeri	Laber	Files.	46	Ibid.	
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human	rights	violations	in	a	way	that	supported	their	cause.		One	such	letter,	sent	to	the	editors	of	the	Washington	Post	less	than	two	weeks	after	Druzhnikov’s	article	appeared	in	print,	demonstrates	the	way	that	the	organization’s	rather	anodyne	political	message—advocating	for	the	observance	of	international	covenants—often	complemented	the	personalized,	highly	emotional	accounts	put	forth	by	Soviet	dissidents.		Such	an	appeal	consciously	traded	on	the	emotional	currency	generated	by	Druzhnikov’s	article,	and	underscored	the	point	that	the	Soviets’	repudiation	of	the	Helsinki	Accords	had	real	and	painful	consequences	upon	the	lives	of	ordinary	people.			Without	addressing	their	own	role	in	getting	Druzhnikov’s	article	onto	the	pages	of	the	Washington	Post,	Helsinki	Watch’s	letter	to	the	editor,	signed	by	Bernstein,	Knowlton,	and	Gaylin,	lamented	the	piece	as	“a	timely	but	grim	reminder	of	the	contrasting	realities	of	daily	life,	East	and	West.”47		Using	the	case	to	emphasize	their	goal	of	promoting	observance	of	the	Helsinki	Accords,	the	letter	went	on	to	stress	that	“Mr.	Druzhnikov’s	.	.	.	ordeal	seems	especially	incomprehensible	in	light	of	the	Soviet	Union’s	pledge	in	good	faith	to	promote	the	reunification	of	families,	made	four	years	ago	when	Chairman	Brezhnev	signed	the	Helsinki	Final	Act.”48			
RESOURCES	AND	NETWORKS	OF	THE	U.S.	HELSINKI	WATCH	COMMITTEE	IN	ACTION		Although	Helsinki	Watch	records	indicate	that	Bernstein,	Knowlton	and	Gaylin’s	letter	to	the	editor	of	the	Washington	Post	was	drafted	on	26	July—the	same	day	that	Laber	had	initially	responded	to	Gaylin’s	proposal—the	Post	did	not	publish	the	letter	until	31	August.		While	this	delay	after	the	initial	publication	of	Druzhnivkov’s	article	may	at	first	seem	to	be	at	cross-purposes	to	the	interests	of	the	organization,	the	political	circumstances	surrounding	the	timing	of	the	letter’s	publication	are	worth	appreciating	in	the	context	of	larger	American	news	developments.		By	taking	care	to	acknowledge	the	contemporaneous	political	and	social	contexts	in	which	these	events	unfolded,	it	is	possible	to	see	more	clearly	how	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee’s	efforts	to	raise	public	awareness	of	Soviet	repression	benefitted	directly	from	the	personal	friendships	and																																																									47	Letter	to	the	Editor	of	the	Washington	Post	from	Robert	L.	Bernstein,	Winthrop	Knowlton,	and	Willard	Gaylin,	26	July	1979,	HRWR,	Series	I:	Jeri	Laber	Files,	Box	52,	Folder	9.	48	Ibid.	
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common	sympathies	that	members	of	the	organization	shared	with	many	of	those	on	the	editorial	boards	of	certain	American	media	outlets.	On	the	morning	24	August	1979,	Americans	awoke	to	find	the	story	of	Soviet	ballet	dancer	Aleksandr	Gudonov	on	the	front	pages	of	newspapers	all	across	the	country.	The	previous	day	Godunov,	a	star	dancer	with	the	Bolshoi	ballet,	had	left	the	supervision	of	his	Soviet	handlers	while	his	company	had	been	on	tour	in	the	United	States,	and	walked	into	a	New	York	immigration	office	to	declare	his	intention	to	defect	from	the	Soviet	Union.	Godunov's	sudden	and	unexpected	defection	shocked	the	art	world,	not	only	because	he	was	an	internationally	renowned	dancer,	but	also	because	no	member	of	the	Bolshoi	ballet	had	ever	defected	before.		But	as	significant	as	the	Soviet	performer’s	decision	was,	the	situation	quickly	became	mired	in	a	larger	political	conflict,	after	Godunov	told	State	Department	officials	that	he	had	reason	to	believe	that	his	wife,	Lyudmila	Vlasova—another	Bolshoi	dancer	who	was	with	the	company	on	its	international	tour—was	being	forced	to	return	to	the	Soviet	Union	against	her	will.49	In	response	to	these	charges,	the	U.S.	State	Department	interdicted	the	Aeroflot	jetliner	bound	to	depart	for	Moscow	which	had	Ms.	Vlasova	aboard,	until	it	could	be	determined	that	she	was	leaving	of	her	own	free	will.		A	72-hour,	diplomatic	standoff	ensued	between	U.S.	and	Soviet	officials,	during	which	time	the	plane	remained	grounded	at	Kennedy	International	Airport,	dominating	American	news	coverage.		Arguments	made	by	State	Department	officials,	analysts,	and	reporters	brought	to	the	fore	of	American	public	attention	matters	concerning	the	free	movement	of	peoples	and	the	reunification	of	families—both	principles	explicitly	addressed	within	the	Helsinki	Final	Act,	and	poignantly	encapsulated	by	the	plight	of	Yuri	Druzhnikov.50			The	relevance	of	these	events	to	the	efforts	of	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	was	not	merely	limited	to	the	continuity	of	their	subject	matter.		Through	a	circuitous	series	of	personal	contacts,	and	in	a	compelling	demonstration	of	the	robust	activism																																																									49	Eric	Pace,	“Godunov,	Bolshoi	Dancer,	Defects	to	U.S.,”	New	York	Times,	24	August	1979;	Tony	Kornheiser,	“Soviet	Ballet	Star	Granted	U.S.	Asylum,”	Washington	Post,	24	August	1979;	Eric	Pace,	“U.S.	Halts	Soviet	Airliner	to	Ask	If	Dancer’s	Wife	Is	Going	Freely,”	New	York	Times,	25	August	1979.	50	Robert	D.	McFadden,	“Plane	and	Dancer	Still	Held	as	Russians	Protest	to	U.S.,”	New	York	Times,	26	August	1979;	Robert	D.	McFadden,	“Standoff	Continues	as	U.S.	Authorities	Block	Soviet	Plane,”	New	York	Times,	27	August	1979;	Robert	D.	McFadden,	“Soviet	Ballerina	Goes	Home	After	Meeting	U.S.	Officials,”	New	York	Times,	28	August	1979.	
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network	to	which	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	belonged	and	operated	within,	the	lawyer	retained	by	Godunov	to	assist	in	the	negotiation	process	was	none	other	than	Orville	Schell	Jr.,	the	vice-chairman	of	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch.		When	asked	by	journalists	how	he	came	to	find	himself	representing	Godunov	at	the	center	of	this	international	diplomatic	incident,	Schell	declined	to	answer,	saying	only	that	he	was	acting	at	the	behest	of	“mutual	friends,”	and	that	he	would	be	providing	his	services	free	of	charge.51			According	to	sources	close	to	those	involved,	once	Godunov	had	decided	that	he	would	defect,	he	had	made	contact	with	a	friend	in	New	York	whom	the	Soviet	ballet	star	believed	could	be	of	some	assistance,	and	began	making	inquiries	as	to	how	he	might	go	about	seeking	asylum.		After	affirming	the	sincerity	of	Godunov’s	intention,	and	his	genuine	desire	to	go	through	with	his	decision,	the	friend	telephoned	the	exiled	Soviet	poet	and	dissident	Joseph	Brodsky,	who	was	at	the	time	living	in	New	York	after	being	forced	to	leave	the	Soviet	Union	in	1972.		In	1964,	Brodsky	had	been	arrested	in	Leningrad	and	tried	for	“parasitism”	by	the	Soviet	authorities.		His	was	perhaps	the	earliest	case	in	which	the	transcript	of	the	trial	had	been	successfully	smuggled	out	of	the	country	via	samizdat	and	circulated	throughout	the	West,	later	resulting	in	significant	outside	pressure	on	Soviet	authorities	for	the	commutation	of	the	remainder	of	his	sentence.52		Upon	learning	of	Godunov’s	situation,	Brodsky	brought	the	matter	to	the	attention	of	Ed	Kline,	one	of	the	founding	members	of	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	and	close	personal	friend	of	Robert	Bernstein’s,	whom	Brodsky	had	known	from	Kline’s	earlier	work	as	a	publisher	of	Russian	dissident	literature.		Kline	purportedly	then	raised	the	matter	with	Orville	Schell,	and	suggested	that	Schell	intervene	on	Godunov’s	behalf.53		Retaining	the	services	of	Schell	did	not	merely	provide	the	Soviet	defector	with	a	top-notch	attorney	who	held	a	strong	personal	belief	in	human	rights.		It	also	extended	to	Godunov’s	case	the	sort	of	affluence	and	personal	network	that	members	of	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	so	frequently	utilized	and	that	the	organization	actively	sought	to	cultivate.		Schell’s	impressive	career	as	a	corporate	lawyer	on	Wall	Street	provided	him																																																									51	Tom	Goldstein,	“Lawyer	for	Bolshoi	Defector:	Orville	Hickok	Schell,”	New	York	Times,	28	August	1979.	52	Lyudmila	Alekseyeva,	Soviet	Dissent:	Contemporary	Movements	for	National,	Religious,	and	Human	Rights	(Middletown:	Wesleyan	University	Press,	1985),	297;	Philip	Boobbyer,	Conscience,	Dissent,	and	Reform	in	
Soviet	Russia,	(New	York:	Routledge,	2005),	77–78.	53	Statement	by	Joseph	Brodsky,	in	“Alexander	Godunov	Defected,	23	August	1979,”	Russian	Life	52,	no.	4	(2009):	24–25;	Bernstein,	Speaking	Freely,	124;	153-156.	
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with	unsurpassed	reputation	within	the	American	legal	community,	and,	like	so	many	other	members	of	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch,	he	had	no	shortage	of	personal	friends	in	high	places.		In	1972,	Schell	had	served	as	the	president	of	the	New	York	City	Bar	Association—a	post	he	held	until	1974,	when	he	ceded	the	office	to	his	close	personal	friend	Cyrus	Vance,	who,	by	1979	was	serving	as	President	Carter’s	Secretary	of	State.		According	to	Bernstein,	it	was	at	Schell’s	urging	that	the	State	Department	acted	to	keep	Vlasova’s	plane	from	departing	in	the	first	place.54	Schell’s	professional	prominence	and	highly	visible	role	as	Godunov’s	personal	lawyer	and	spokesperson	raised	the	public	profile	of	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	in	newspapers	and	among	the	American	public	in	the	final	week	of	August	1979.		By	the	end	of	the	month,	after	days	of	front	page	coverage	involving	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee,	in	what	the	
New	York	Times	had	called	“a	human	rights	confrontation	that	had	grown	into	an	international	test	of	wills,”	the	organization	and	its	members	once	again	found	themselves	back	in	the	news,	this	time	after	the	sudden	and	unexplained	cancellation	of	Bernstein’s	visa	to	travel	to	the	Soviet	Union.		At	the	time,	Bernstein	was	preparing	to	head	to	Moscow	as	president	of	Random	House	publishing,	to	take	part	in	the	Second	International	Moscow	Book	Fair,	which	was	to	be	held	at	the	beginning	of	September.		On	the	eve	of	his	departure,	the	Soviets	revoked	his	visa,	leaving	Random	House’s	delegation	as	well	as	other	American	publishers	scrambling	to	make	other	arrangements.			There	was	a	good	deal	of	speculation	among	American	journalists	and	political	observers	at	the	time	whether	this	move	by	the	Soviets	was	in	some	way	in	retaliation	to	Schell’s	role	in	the	Godunov-Vlasova	affair.		Bernstein’s	relationship	to	Schell—as	well	as	both	men’s	involvement	in	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch—was	well	known,	and	not	twenty-four	hours	after	Godunov	had	declared	his	intention	to	defect,	had	the	Soviets	announced	the	cancellation	of	Bernstein’s	visa.		Nevertheless,	regardless	of	cause,	news	of	the	Soviets’	decision	to	revoke	Bernstein’s	visa	prompted	immediate	reactions	by	American	journalists,	leading	them	to	inevitably	draw	connections	between	the	recent	concern	for	Soviet	human	rights	practices	as	a	result	of	the	Godunov-Vlasova	affair,	the	rejection	of	Bernstein’s	visa,	
																																																								54	Goldstein,	“Lawyer	for	Bolshoi	Defector”;	Bernstein,	Speaking	Freely,	156.	
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the	free	flow	of	information	in	to	and	out	of	the	Soviet	Union,	and	the	work	of	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch.55			It	was	at	this	moment,	in	this	politically	charged	environment,	after	more	than	a	week	of	public	appearances	and	published	interviews,	first	by	Schell	and	then	by	Bernstein,	that	the	Washington	Post	chose	to	run	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	letter	to	the	editor	concerning	the	plight	of	Druzhnikov.		Efforts	such	as	this,	made	by	American	news	outlets	like	the	Washington	Post	to	present	their	reporting	to	readers	with	an	emphasis	on	continuity	of	message	helped	to	amplify	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch’s	public	awareness	campaigns,	making	these	news	outlets	powerful	allies	in	the	work	to	spread	information	and	raise	public	awareness	about	human	rights.		By	utilizing	the	personalizing	nature	of	the	case	study	method	that	they	had	engineered,	Helsinki	Watch	found	effective	ways	to	communicate	to	the	American	people	reasons	to	care	about	specific	violations	of	international	agreements—violations	that,	up	to	this	point,	had	gone	on	for	years	with	little	public	objection.		In	their	letter	to	the	editor,	Bernstein	and	Schell	concluded	with	a	charge	that	reaffirmed	their	group’s	purpose	and	portended	their	future	efforts,	saying	that	“the	Soviet	government	[should	be]	reminded	constantly	of	its	commitments	under	the	Helsinki	Final	Act.”56			
CONCLUSIONS	
	 In	the	first	several	months	of	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee’s	existence,	Bernstein	and	the	group’s	other	founding	members	sought	to	define	their	organization,	and	to	find	their	place	within	the	rapidly	expanding	environment	of	nongovernmental	human	rights	activism	that	was	taking	shape	during	this	time.		Most	of	the	group’s	members	had	some	previous	experience	with	human	rights	advocacy—for	Bernstein	and	several	others	in	the	leadership,	this	was	often	closely	tied	to	their	work	as	publishers,	and	involved	the	defense	of	free	expression	for	writers	and	dissidents	abroad.		This	kind	of	activism	often	required	direct	collaboration	and	contact	with	Soviet	political	dissidents,	through																																																									55	Herbert	Mitgang,	“Moscow	Bars	U.S.	Publisher’s	Trip	to	Fair,”	New	York	Times,	29	August	1979;	Lee	Lescaze,	“Soviets	Cancel	U.S.	Publisher’s	Trip	for	Book	Fair,”	Washington	Post,	29	August	1979;	“After	Delay,	Soviet	Grants	Visa	to	Morrow’s	Head	for	Book	Fair,”	New	York	Times,	30	August	1979;	“Learning	the	Book	Fair	Lesson,”	New	York	Times,	2	September	1979.	56	Letter	to	the	Editor,	26	July	1979.	
	 77	
negotiations	and	publication	of	their	written	works.		Furthermore,	as	influential	figures	within	their	field,	it	was	quite	common	for	these	future	Helsinki	Watch	members	to	utilize	many	of	the	personal	and	professional	contacts	they	possessed	as	a	means	of	facilitating	this	human	rights	work.		This	reliance	on	personal	and	professional	connections	would	later	become	a	defining	feature	of	many	of	the	strategies	that	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	pursued	during	the	group’s	earliest	campaigns.		Such	advantages	helped	the	organization	to	quickly	become	a	formidable	champion	of	human	rights	on	the	national	and	international	stage.		 As	a	U.S.-based	Helsinki	monitoring	organization,	there	was	some	expectation,	both	within	the	organization	and	without,	that	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	would	perform	some	measure	of	oversight	when	it	came	to	its	own	government’s	deficiencies	with	respect	to	the	Helsinki	Agreements.		However,	as	the	group’s	founders	made	clear,	they	did	not	want	to	simply	duplicate	the	efforts	of	work	being	done	by	existing	American	nongovernmental	organizations	such	as	the	National	Association	for	the	Advancement	of	Colored	People	and	the	American	Civil	Liberties	Union,	along	with	the	many	other	ethnic	and	religious	organizations	that	had	carved	out	well-defined	roles	for	themselves	as	facilitators	of	American	social	progress.		Instead,	in	the	context	of	domestic	compliance	with	the	Final	Act,	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	aimed	to	supplement	the	work	being	done	by	these	organizations	by	using	research	these	groups	collected	to	answer	key	questions	about	the	U.S.	government’s	fulfillment	of	the	agreement,	thus	helping	to	generate	greater	public	awareness	of	the	Helsinki	Accords’	value	in	human	rights	advocacy.57					 When	it	came	to	the	Committee	members’	primary	area	of	interest—monitoring	the	Helsinki	compliance	of	other	participating	states,	particularly	the	closed	societies	of	the	Soviet	Union	and	Eastern	Europe—it	seems	that	a	strikingly	similar	approach	was	adopted	with	respect	to	Helsinki	monitoring	groups	in	those	countries.		Individual	dissidents	and	groups	who	faced	persecution	by	their	own	governments	as	a	result	of	their	political	or	cultural	activities	could	provide	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	with	valuable	documentation	of	specific	Helsinki	violations	that	the	American	organization	could	then																																																									57	Statements	made	by	Robert	Bernstein	at	the	outset	of	his	organization’s	formation	reflect	just	such	an	approach.		See	“An	Interview	with	Robert	Bernstein,"	A	Chronicle	of	Human	Rights,	49-50.				
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use	to	assist	in	their	efforts	to	publicize	foreign	governments’	failure	to	live	up	to	their	multilateral	commitments.58		Committee	members,	drawing	upon	their	previous	human	rights	experience	in	fields	like	literary	freedom,	where	collaboration	with	the	victims	of	repression	figured	so	prominently,	found	these	dissident	groups	to	be	a	natural	and	important	ally	in	their	work	to	defend	Helsinki	guarantees	in	the	Soviet	Union	and	elsewhere	throughout	Eastern	Europe.		Personal	and	professional	connections	helped	to	advance	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch’s	interests	in	this	respect	as	well,	as	the	Committee	took	conscious	steps	to	expand	its	influence	network	transnationally	by	cultivating	substantive	and	robust	contacts	with	individuals	and	groups	that	could	provide	their	organization	with	the	resources	they	needed	to	be	effective.			 This	broad	approach	helped	to	establish	a	reputation	for	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	as	an	organization	that	could	be	relied	upon	to	provide	detailed	documented	cases	of	abuse	to	representatives	of	the	U.S.	government	and	international	organizations	seeking	to	hold	governments	accountable	for	their	commitment	to	the	Final	Act.		But	where	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	exerted	its	most	significant	influence	was	in	the	minds	and	hearts	of	the	American	public.		With	the	use	of	savvy	media	strategies,	the	group’s	early	advocacy	campaigns	made	a	concerted	effort	to	humanize	the	struggle	of	Soviet	dissidents,	and	bring	the	desire	and	responsibility	to	defend	Helsinki	principles	out	of	the	halls	of	Congress	and	the	State	Department,	and	into	the	hands	of	the	American	people.		It	was	this	ability	of	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	to	sensitize	the	American	public	to	the	persecution	of	dissidents	that	enabled	the	organization	to	begin	to	pursue	more	sophisticated	and	complex	advocacy	strategies	by	the	end	of	their	first	year	of	activity.		These	strategies	involved	subtle	but	important	attempts	to	recast	popular	American	perceptions	concerning	the	violations	of	citizens’	rights	in	other	countries.			Building	upon	their	own	public	awareness	campaigns,	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	made	a	concerted	effort	to	appeal	directly	to	key	segments	of	the	American	private	sector.		The	Committee	solicited	support	from	individuals	and	groups	by	calling	attention	to	known	cases	of	repression,	and	asking	that	such	violations	be	addressed	in	the																																																									58	To	the	extent	that	this	approach	resembled	that	of	earlier	Soviet	dissident	practices,	see	Benjamin	Nathans,	“The	Dictatorship	of	Reason:	Aleksandr	Vol’pin	and	the	Idea	of	Rights	under	‘Developed	Socialism,’”	Slavic	
Review	66,	no.	4	(2007):	630–65.	
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course	of	any	economic,	scientific,	or	cultural	exchange	between	those	private	individuals	and	groups	and	the	offending	state	in	question.		Specific	human	rights	violations	became	the	grounds	upon	which	private	citizens	and	policymakers	alike	could	claim	that	Soviet	and	East	European	governments	were	failing	to	uphold	their	commitment	to	foster	greater	cooperation	in	these	fields,	by	virtue	of	the	fact	that	such	repressive	action	inevitably	harmed	the	ability	of	such	cross-cultural	cooperation	to	take	place.		By	promoting	a	strategy	of	“moral	linkage,”	in	which	progress	in	greater	scientific,	economic	and	cultural	cooperation	between	societies	could	be	measured	as	a	function	of	the	degree	to	which	humanitarian	protections	were	being	observed,	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	sought	to	reinforce	within	American	society	the	internalization	of	some	of	the	most	extraordinary	provisions	that	the	Helsinki	Final	Act	had	to	offer.		This	strategy	not	only	invoked	the	foundational	concept	contained	within	the	Helsinki	agreements,	which	demanded	that	participating	state	governments	demonstrate	respect	for	the	rights	and	freedoms	of	their	citizens	in	the	course	of	all	their	continuing	mutual	relations,	but	it	also	directly	empowered	individual	citizens	to	know	and	act	upon	their	rights	in	the	course	of	those	interstate	relations.		These	campaigns	and	their	effects	are	explored	in	more	detail	in	the	following	chapter.			
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CHAPTER	THREE:	
THE	IMPLEMENTATION	OF	THE	HELSINKI	PROCESS	BY	NONGVERNMENTAL	ACTORS	
FOR	THE	DEFENSE	OF	HUMAN	RIGHTS		 The	advocacy	strategies	developed	by	Helsinki	Watch	in	the	first	year	of	the	organization’s	existence	illustrate	the	extent	to	which	the	group	relied	upon	coordination	and	collaboration	with	Eastern	activists	and	the	transnational	networks	that	connected	them.		A	closer	examination	of	these	strategies	reveals	the	contribution	that	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	made	to	the	field	of	international	human	rights	advocacy	as	a	result	of	the	organization’s	work	to	bring	concern	for	the	abridgement	of	human	rights	more	prominently	into	the	process	of	nongovernmental	East-West	exchange.		This	chapter	will	look	more	closely	at	the	contexts	in	which	Helsinki	Watch	invoked	the	observation	of	the	Helsinki	Accords’	humanitarian	articles,	and	by	extension,	advocated	for	the	observance	of	new,	human	rights	norms.		The	analytical	focus	of	this	chapter	will	center	upon	the	specific	tactics	used	by	the	organization	when	promoting	its	human	rights	advocacy	campaigns	to	American	audiences.			Earlier	human	rights	organizations	such	as	Amnesty	International	or	the	International	League	for	the	Rights	of	Man	approached	their	human	rights	advocacy	from	a	conceptual	foundation	that	drew	legitimacy	from	an	inherent	respect	for	particular	human	rights	ideals.1		By	contrast,	in	the	earliest	years	of	its	existence,	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	pursued	the	achievement	of	its	human	rights	objectives,	not	through	lofty	campaigns	calling	for	the	abolition	of	torture,	or	the	release	of	all	political	prisoners,	but	rather	through	targeted	appeals	focusing	on	a	particular	obstacle	to	the	process	of	cultural	
exchange	taking	place	between	Eastern	and	Western	society.		The	signing	of	the	Helsinki	Final	Act	in	1975	had	bestowed	upon	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	a	codified	framework	through	which	the	citizens’	organization	could	encourage	the	arbitration	of	particular	human	rights	violations	by	advancing	calls	for	progress	in	improving	practical,	measurable	areas	of	cooperation	in	other	fields.		This	chapter	will	illustrate	that	process.																																																											1	See	Eckel,	“The	International	League	for	the	Rights	of	Man,	Amnesty	International,	and	the	Changing	Fate	of	Human	Rights	Activism.”		
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By	engaging	with	professional	organizations	and	individuals	involved	in	cross-cultural	exchanges	where	a	particular	human	rights	violation	was	in	some	way	directly	relevant,	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	sought	to	reinforce	a	kind	of	“moral	linkage”	between	ongoing	East-West	cooperation	and	a	government’s	treatment	of	its	own	citizens.		This	helped	to	expand	the	existing	normative	international	framework	for	the	defense	of	human	rights	by	increasing	the	opportunities	for	a	wider	number	of	interest	holders	to	effectively	arbitrate	alleged	abuses.		The	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee—equipped	with	detailed	information	provided	by	Eastern	Helsinki	monitoring	groups	across	transnational	activism	networks	that	they	helped	establish,	enlarge	and	reinforce;	assisted	by	members’	abundance	of	contacts	throughout	American	government,	the	media,	and	a	variety	of	professional	fields;	and	armed	with	the	text	of	the	Helsinki	Final	Act—was	in	a	unique	position	to	conduct	highly	visible	advocacy	campaigns	in	support	of	specific	human	rights	protections.		It	was	this	distinctiveness	as	a	Western	nongovernmental	human	rights	organization	that	enabled	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	to	so	effectively	target	appeals	toward	private	actors	outside	the	bounds	of	official	governmental	policymaking,	whose	involvement	with	these	closed	societies	was	the	result	of	the	increased	cultural	cooperation	encouraged	through	the	process	of	détente	and	the	Final	Act	specifically.		In	this	chapter	I	will	delve	more	deeply	into	several	specific	human	rights	advocacy	campaigns	mounted	by	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	in	the	earliest	years	of	the	group’s	existence.		I	will	the	investigate	various	strategies	used	by	the	Committee	in	the	context	of	these	campaigns,	paying	close	attention	to	the	pragmatic,	real-world	terms	in	which	the	organization	articulated	the	violation	of	individual	rights,	as	well	as	the	way	in	which	the	group	framed	its	proposals	for	corrective	action.		I	will	begin	by	examining	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	members’	involvement	in	the	Second	International	Moscow	Book	Fair,	which	took	place	in	September	1979—one	of	the	organization’s	first	sustained	attempts	to	actively	confront	the	Soviet	authorities	for	their	ongoing	obstruction	of	individual	rights	through	the	framework	of	cultural	exchange.			Within	the	context	of	the	Book	Fair	example,	I	will	show	how	American	journalists	functioned	as	an	indispensible	part	of	the	transnational	networks	that	were	used	by	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	to	publicize	the	repressive	action	taken	by	the	Soviets	to	censor	various	books	and	authors.		I	will	also	show	how	such	contact	with	journalists	
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simultaneously	provided	members	of	the	organization	with	greater	access	to	dissident	networks	inside	the	USSR.2		These	connections	with	dissidents	ultimately	enabled	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	to	develop	more	sophisticated	advocacy	strategies,	as	they	were	able	to	build	upon	their	increased	coordination	with	activists	to	better	highlight	the	exact	nature	and	extent	of	Soviet	human	rights	abuses.		The	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	then	used	its	extensive	social	and	professional	contacts	to	effectively	present	this	information	to	those	American	professional	communities	with	whom	these	appeals	were	most	likely	to	resonate—whether	due	to	some	degree	of	perceived	personal	complicity,	professional	solidarity,	or	the	preservation	of	ethical	standards	called	for	within	their	field.		Next,	I	will	examine	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	campaign	against	the	Soviet	government’s	interruption	of	international	postal	communication—an	issue	that	had	been	pursued	by	the	organization	at	some	level	since	the	summer	of	1979.		After	briefly	describing	the	documented	extent	of	the	Soviet	government’s	non-delivery	of	mail,	I	will	trace	how	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	seized	upon	the	promises	of	due	regard	for	existing	international	obligations	contained	within	Basket	I	of	the	Helsinki	Final	Act	as	a	way	to	challenge	this	abuse.		By	taking	this	approach,	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	made	a	conscious	choice	to	frame	the	Soviets’	disruption	of	postal	communication	as	a	failure	of	that	government	to	comply	with	the	internationally	agreed–upon	framework	governing	the	process	of	free	and	fair	international	exchange,	rather	than	as	a	violation	of	Soviet	citizens’	fundamental	human	rights.3		An	examination	of	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee’s	public	outreach	surrounding	this	issue	reveals	that,	once	again,	a	concerted	effort	was	made	by	the	group	to	convey	to	members	of	particular	American	professional	communities—scientists,	psychologists,	and	publishers—the	onerous	burden	that	such	disregard	for	existing	international	obligations	placed	upon	cross-cultural	cooperation	within	their	fields.		In	addition	to	providing	information,	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	encouraged	individuals	
																																																								2	For	more	on	the	influence	that	journalism	has	on	human	rights	efforts,	see	Clair	Apodaca,	“The	Whole	World	Could	Be	Watching:	Human	Rights	and	the	Media,”	Journal	of	Human	Rights	6,	no.	2	(2007):	147–64.	3	On	the	historical	limits	of	East-West	exchange	leading	up	to	this	period,	see	Mario	Daniels,	“Controlling	Knowledge,	Controlling	People:	Travel	Restrictions	of	U.S.	Scientists	and	National	Security,”	Diplomatic	
History	43,	no.	1	(2019):	57–82;	Paul	Rubinson,	“‘Crucified	on	a	Cross	of	Atoms’:	Scientists,	Politics,	and	the	Test	Ban	Treaty,”	Diplomatic	History	35,	no.	2	(2011):	283–319;	Dina	Fainberg,	“Unmasking	the	Wolf	in	Sheep’s	Clothing:	Soviet	and	American	Campaigns	against	the	Enemy’s	Journalists,	1946-1953,”	Cold	War	
History	15,	no.	2	(2015):	155–78.	
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to	speak	out	in	opposition	of	these	restrictions	on	postal	communication,	and	even	counseled	them	on	how	to	do	so.		Finally,	I	will	explore	perhaps	some	of	the	most	explicit	steps	taken	by	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	to	reinforce	the	relationship	between	international	cooperation	and	the	observation	of	human	rights	in	the	minds	of	American	citizens.		The	Conference	on	Soviet-American	Exchange	and	Human	Rights—organized	and	hosted	by	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	in	the	spring	of	1980—sought	to	educate	American	professionals	involved	in	cross	cultural	exchanges	about	the	impact	that	Soviet	disregard	for	the	humanitarian	articles	of	the	Helsinki	Final	Act	had	on	the	process	of	more	free	and	forthright	exchanges	between	societies.		The	conference	emphasized	the	ways	in	which	restrictions	on	the	free	flow	of	people,	ideas,	and	information	within	Soviet	society	impeded	the	success	of	American	efforts	in	these	exchanges.		The	conference	organizers	used	case	studies	of	various	past	cross-cultural	events	to	present	participants	with	practical	training	on	ways	to	address	the	obstacles	encountered	in	their	dealings	with	closed	societies.		In	the	course	of	this	training,	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	members	also	proposed	steps	that	could	be	taken	by	Americans	to	press	Soviet	officials	on	their	government’s	denial	of	human	rights	in	the	course	of	their	mutual	relations,	further	reinforcing	their	strategy	of	“moral	linkage.”			
	
ADVANCING	U.S.	HELSINKI	WATCH	STRATEGIES:	THE	SECOND	INTERNATIONAL	
MOSCOW	BOOK	FAIR		In	September	1979,	the	opportunity	arrived	to	expand	the	work	of	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	in	substantial	ways.		This	came	with	the	start	of	the	Second	International	Book	Fair,	to	be	held	in	Moscow.		Both	Robert	Bernstein	and	Jeri	Laber	had	made	arrangements	to	travel	to	Moscow	to	participate	in	the	fair—Bernstein,	in	his	capacity	as	president	of	Random	House	publishing,	and	Laber	as	part	of	a	delegation	from	the	Association	of	American	Publishers.		Both	had	expected	to	use	this	opportunity	to	advance	the	work	of	the	their	organization,	but	after	Bernstein’s	visa	was	revoked	on	the	eve	of	his	departure,	the	task	fell	to	Laber	to	represent	the	interests	of	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	alone.4																																																											4	Laber,	The	Courage	of	Strangers,	109;	Bernstein,	Speaking	Freely,	155–56.	
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Bernstein’s	prominence	in	the	publishing	industry,	his	history	of	outspokenness	on	human	rights	issues,	and	his	indisputable	notoriety	as	the	head	of	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	made	him	a	natural	target	for	Soviet	officials	concerned	with	Western	ideological	subversion.		Jeri	Laber,	on	the	other	hand,	did	not	elicit	the	same	degree	of	scrutiny	from	Soviet	officials.		In	her	visa	application,	Laber	made	no	mention	of	her	association	with	the	human	rights	organization	Helsinki	Watch.		The	official	stated	purpose	of	her	trip	was	to	help	organize	the	AAP	exhibit,	“America	through	American	Eyes”	at	the	Moscow	Book	Fair—a	carefully	selected	anthology	of	works	by	American	authors	covering	a	variety	of	different	subjects	all	chosen	to	highlight	the	diversity	of	thought	that	existed	in	the	United	States.		In	addition	to	her	work	for	the	AAP,	Laber	sought	to	use	her	access	to	the	Second	International	Moscow	Book	Fair	to	illustrate	the	ways	in	which	the	Soviet	government’s	failure	to	realize	its	pledge	for	more	open	dissemination	of	information	had	adversely	affected	the	process	of	greater	cultural	exchange	between	the	East	and	West.		Her	responsibilities	to	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	included	documenting	violations	of	free	expression	and	censorship	at	the	exhibition,	publicizing	at	every	opportunity	the	arbitrary	revocation	of	Robert	Bernstein’s	visa,	and	making	contact	with	various	Soviet	dissidents,	including	the	remaining	members	of	the	Moscow	Helsinki	Watch	Group	who	were	not	yet	imprisoned	or	in	exile.5	In	the	days	prior	to	the	start	of	the	Moscow	Book	Fair,	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	members	back	in	New	York	utilized	the	heightened	public	profile	their	group	had	achieved	as	a	result	of	members’	involvement	in	the	recent	Godunov	affair	and	the	denial	of	Robert	Bernstein’s	visa	to	express	through	American	media	the	ways	in	which	the	Soviet	government’s	recent	actions	stood	in	opposition	to	the	promotion	of	greater	cooperation	between	American	and	Soviet	society.		After	the	decision	to	bar	Bernstein	from	the	exhibition	had	been	affirmed	by	the	Soviet	Embassy	in	Washington,	Random	House	released	a	statement	to	the	press	describing	the	move	as	“wholly	incompatible	with	the	spirit	of	free	exchange	of	ideas”	that	the	Soviet	government	had	committed	itself	to	when	it	accepted	the	terms	of	the	Final	Act.6		In	his	own	statements	to	the	press,	Robert	Bernstein	further	stressed	this	link	between	the	abridgement	of	individual	rights	and	the	process	of	economic	and	cultural	exchange,																																																									5	Laber,	The	Courage	of	Strangers,	101;	109-110.	6	“Random	House	Press	Release,”	29	August	1979,	HRWR,	Series	I:	Jeri	Laber	Files,	Box	52,	Folder	3.	
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remarking	that	although	"the	Soviets	have	said	repeatedly	that	they	want	to	do	business	with	the	West,”	the	action	taken	against	him	suggested	that	they	were	less	than	sincere	about	a	truly	honest	and	forthright	exchange.		“Businessmen	should	take	note,”	Bernstein	cautioned,	“that	[when]	dealing	with	the	Soviets,	good	faith	is	not	enough.”		He	added	that	while	Random	House	declined	to	send	along	the	rest	of	its	delegation	in	protest	of	the	decision,	it	would	still	allow	its	materials	to	be	sent	to	the	book	fair	and	displayed	by	other	participants	since,	unlike	the	Soviet	government,	the	American	publishing	house	“shouldn’t	be	in	the	position	of	blocking	the	free	flow	of	ideas.”7	Once	again	in	this	example,	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	is	seen	using	American	media	to	publicize	the	restrictive	practices	of	the	Soviet	government,	while	simultaneously	helping	to	shape	the	narrative	to	convey	the	Soviet’s	behavior	as	a	refusal	to	comply	with	Helsinki	principles,	and	an	obstacle	greater	cooperation.		This	use	of	American	media	to	further	tie	the	protection	of	rights	like	free	expression	to	the	issue	of	cultural	exchange	continued	even	among	participants	in	the	exhibition	itself.		Prior	to	her	arrival	in	the	Soviet	Union,	Laber	had	sent	letters	to	various	foreign	correspondents	serving	in	Moscow,	informing	them	of	the	potential	for	censorship	at	the	Moscow	Book	Fair	and	volunteering	her	services	as	a	source	of	information	for	that	story.		That	Laber	chose	to	utilize	the	foreign	correspondents	in	this	way	was	in	keeping	with	Helsinki	Watch	members’	experience	when	dealing	with	American	news	media	up	to	this	point.		This	usefulness	was	reflected	in	comments	made	by	Willard	Gaylin	in	a	letter	he	wrote	to	Jeri	Laber	the	previous	July,	when	he	was	seeking	to	publicize	Yuri	Druzhnikov’s	situation.		At	that	time,	Gaylin	described	the	Washington	Post	as	being	“most	cooperative”	in	assisting	the	organization’s	efforts	to	publicize	the	human	rights	abuses	the	Soviet	writer	faced,	and	suggested	that	such	news	outlets	“may	be	a	strong	potential	ally	for	us	in	future	work.”8	Once	in	the	USSR,	Laber	kept	careful	track	of	the	work	of	Soviet	censors	at	the	Moscow	Book	Fair,	closely	monitoring	their	activity	relating	to	the	AAP’s	“America	through	American	Eyes”	exhibit.		Each	day,	she	would	also	stop	into	other	exhibitors’	booths,	asking	after	information	concerning	missing	or	confiscated	books.		At	night,	she	would	work	in	her																																																									7	“Soviet	Bars	an	American	from	Moscow	Book	Fair,”	New	York	Times,	29	August	1979;	Lee	Lescaze,	“Soviets	Cancel	U.S.	Publisher’s	Trip	for	Book	Fair,”	Washington	Post,	29	August	1979.	8	Laber,	The	Courage	of	Strangers,	110;	Letter	to	Laber	from	Gaylin,	9	July	1979.	
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hotel	room,	updating	the	handwritten	lists	of	censored	material	from	the	previous	day,	and	drafting	duplicate	copies	for	distribution	among	American	correspondents	the	following	morning.		Laber	remarked	in	her	memoirs	that	these	journalists	had	been	most	focused	on	the	number	of	censored	books—totals	that	changed	by	the	day—which	allowed	these	newspapers	to	keep	their	readers	informed	on	the	latest	developments.		Having	these	correspondents	continually	at	her	disposal	in	this	way	gave	Laber	ample	opportunities	to	publicize	Soviet	efforts	to	restrict	the	flow	ideas	and	information,	and	to	press	the	matter	of	the	denial	of	visas	to	people	like	Robert	Bernstein.		This	ensured	that	Bernstein’s	name—as	well	as	the	connection	between	the	Soviet	Book	Fair	and	issues	of	free	expression	and	human	rights—remained	a	central	part	of	the	American	news	coverage	of	this	cultural	event.9			Since	the	inception	of	the	Soviet	human	rights	movement	in	the	mid-1960s,	foreign	journalists	had	played	an	important	part	in	supporting	dissidents’	human	rights	activities—raising	these	activists’	international	notoriety	and	publicizing	their	struggles	in	the	West.		Over	time,	a	number	of	foreign	correspondents	stationed	in	Moscow	came	to	be	personally	acquainted	with	many	of	these	individuals,	who	had	either	served	at	one	time	or	another	as	sources	for	their	reporting,	or	were	the	subjects	of	stories	that	these	reporters	covered.		Eventually,	these	connections	often	led	American	journalists	to	form	personal	relationships	with	many	of	the	most	important	figures	in	the	dissident	movement.		Foreign	correspondents’	unique	place	as	outsiders	who	possessed	the	time,	resources,	and	will	to	develop	meaningful	contact	with	known	and	often	targeted	enemies	of	the	state	created	a	dependable	link	between	Soviet	activists	and	Western	publics,	which	increasingly	provided	these	dissidents	with	an	otherwise	unattainable	degree	of	international	attention,	as	well	as	access	to	assistance	and	information	from	abroad.		As	time	passed,	these	relationships	grew	stronger,	reinforcing	what—by	the	mid-to-late	1970s—would	become	critical	
																																																								9	Laber,	The	Courage	of	Strangers,	111-112;	Kevin	Klose,	“Moscow	Book	Fair	Marred	by	Censorship,	Visa	Disputes,”	Washington	Post,	3	September	1979;	Anthony	Austin,	“U.S.	Embassy	Protests	Soviet	Denial	of	Visa	by	Barring	Reception,”	New	York	Times,	3	September	1979;	Kevin	Klose,	“Moscow	Official	Defends	Ban	of	U.S.	Books	at	Fair,”	Washington	Post,	4	September	1979;	Anthony	Austin,	“Soviet	Union	Seizes	More	Books	From	American	Exhibits	at	Fair,”	New	York	Times,	4	September	1979;	Anthony	Austin,	“Americans	Protest	Curbs	as	Soviet	Book	Fair	Opens,”	New	York	Times,	5	September	1979;	Anthony	Austin,	“U.S.	Books	in	Soviet	Draw	Large	Crowd,”	New	York	Times,	6	September	1979;	Kevin	Klose,	“U.S.	Publishers	Threaten	Boycott	of	Future	Moscow	Book	Fairs,”	Washington	Post,	5	September	1979.	
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channels	of	communication	over	which	the	passage	of	information	and	even	coordination	between	organized	human	rights	groups	could	take	place.10	The	personal	and	professional	relationships	that	developed	between	Jeri	Laber	and	American	foreign	correspondents	during	the	Moscow	Book	Fair	allowed	Laber	to	become	particularly	close	to	Anthony	Austin	of	the	New	York	Times	and	Kevin	Klose	of	The	
Washington	Post—two	veteran	journalists	who	had	made	a	name	for	themselves	while	serving	in	Moscow,	and	who	were	responsible	for	some	the	most	regular	and	extensive	coverage	of	the	cultural	exhibition	in	American	newspapers.11		But	as	important	as	it	was	for	the	advocacy	efforts	of	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	to	have	a	reliable	channel	through	which	its	members	could	frame	Soviet	censorship	to	audiences	back	home	as	an	obstacle	to	greater	cultural	cooperation,	perhaps	the	most	valuable	role	these	journalists	played	was	as	facilitators	of	direct	personal	contact	between	Laber	and	Soviet	dissidents	in	Moscow.		Contributing	to	the	development	of	in-person	communication	was	yet	one	more	way	that	journalists	served	as	crucial	intermediaries	in	the	transnational	networks	that	were	developing	between	Western	activists	and	dissidents	inside	the	Soviet	Union.			
																																																								10	There	is	much	written	concerning	Soviet	dissidents’	relationships	with	Western	correspondents,	both	by	the	dissidents	and	journalists	themselves,	as	well	as	subsequent	scholarly	analysis.		While	there	is	some	difference	of	opinion	among	participants	and	scholars	on	the	interests,	intentions	and	consequences	of	these	relationships,	there	seems	to	be	little	disagreement	that	these	relationships	were	highly	impactful.		For	more	on	these	contacts	from	the	perspective	of	Soviet	dissidents,	see	Lyudmila	Alekseyeva,	Soviet	Dissent:	
Contemporary	Movements	for	National,	Religious,	and	Human	Rights	(Middletown:	Wesleyan	University	Press,	1985),	particularly	Chapters	15-17;	Lyudmila	Alekseyeva	and	Paul	Goldberg,	The	Thaw	Generation:	Coming	of	
Age	in	the	Post-Stalin	Era	(Pittsburgh:	University	of	Pittsburgh	Press,	1990),	particularly	Chapters	5-8;	Aleksandr	Solzhenitsyn,	Invisible	Allies,	trans.	Alexis	Klimoff	and	Michael	Nicholson	(Washington	D.C.:	Counterpoint,	1995),	particuarly	Chapter	13;	Andrei	Amalrik,	Notes	of	a	Revolutionary,	trans.	Guy	Daniels	(New	York:	Alfred	A.	Knopf,	1982);	Vladimir	Bukovskii,	To	Build	a	Castle:	My	Life	as	a	Dissenter	(London:	Deutsch,	1978),	particularly	Chapter	8.		For	more	on	these	contacts	from	the	perspective	of	American	correspondents,	see	Whitman	Bassow,	The	Moscow	Correspondents:	Reporting	on	Russia	from	the	Revolution	
to	Glasnost	(New	York:	William	Morrow	and	Company,	Inc.,	1988);	Hedrick	Smith,	The	Russians	(New	York:	Quadrangle/The	New	York	Times	Book	Co.,	1976),	particularly	Chapters	15-20;	Kevin	Klose,	Russia	and	the	
Russians:	Inside	the	Closed	Society	(New	York:	W.W.	Norton	&	Company,	1984);	Peter	Osnos,	“Soviet	Dissidents	and	the	American	Press,”	Columbia	Journalism	Review	16,	no.	4	(1977):	32-36.		For	scholarly	analysis	of	the	relationships	between	Soviet	dissidents	and	correpsondents,	see	Walker,	“Moscow	Human	Rights	Defenders	Look	West:	Attitudes	toward	U.S.	Journalists	in	the	1960s	and	1970s”;	Ibid.,	“The	Moscow	Correspondents,	Soviet	Human	Rights	Activists,	and	the	Problem	of	the	Western	Gift”;	Dina	Fainberg,	“Notes	from	the	Rotten	West,	Reports	from	the	Backward	East:	Soviet	and	American	Foreign	Correspondents	in	the	Cold	War,	1945-1985”	(PhD	Dissertation,	Rutgers	University,	2012),	particualrly	Chapter	4;	Friederike	Kind-Kovács,	Written	Here,	Published	There:	How	Underground	Literature	Crossed	the	Iron	Curtain	(Budapest:	Central	European	University	Press,	2014),	particularly	Chapters	2-3.	11	See	footnote	6.		
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At	one	point	during	the	week-long	exhibition,	Klose	and	Austin	brought	Laber	to	the	home	of	Lev	Kopelev	and	Raisa	Orlova—two	dissidents	who	were	little	known	at	the	time	outside	of	their	own	circles,	but	were	widely	renowned	among	Moscow	intellectuals	as	dedicated	activists	on	the	forefront	of	the	human	rights	movement.		The	meeting	occurred	in	the	Kopelevs’	tiny,	two-room	apartment	on	Red	Army	Street	in	Moscow.		That	apartment	had	long	been	a	fixture	of	Moscow’s	intellectual	life,	and	was	later	described	by	Klose,	who	was	well	acquainted	with	the	Kopelevs,	as	“an	intellectual	switchboard	where	people	from	all	over	the	country	could	plug	in,	cross-connect,	and	transfer	ideas.”12		Laber’s	access	to	such	a	network,	and	to	Soviet	dissidents	so	centrally	embedded	in	Russia’s	activist	culture	propelled	the	work	of	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	forward	during	this	critical	time	in	the	organization’s	development—augmenting	the	group’s	already	notable	sway	in	American	society	by	virtue	of	its	elite	membership	and	well-placed	connections,	with	more	direct	and	substantive	contacts	to	a	dissident	network	that	could	be	reliably	depended	upon	to	provide	detailed	and	accurate	information	concerning	Soviet	human	rights	abuse.	One	evening	during	the	Moscow	Book	Fair,	in	the	spirit	of	cultural	exchange	and	in	an	effort	to	help	promote	freer	expression,	the	Association	of	American	Publishers	had	arranged	to	host	a	dinner	for	Soviet	writers	whose	work	was	known	in	the	West.		This	included	writers	whose	work	was	prohibited	in	the	Soviet	Union	for	political	reasons.		As	a	delegate	of	the	AAP,	the	task	of	organizing	this	dinner	fell	to	Jeri	Laber.		Eager	to	further	advance	the	development	of	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee’s	communication	network	inside	the	USSR,	Laber	used	the	occasion	to	expand	her	contacts	into	the	Soviet	dissident																																																									12	Laber,	The	Courage	of	Strangers,	113–14;	Klose,	Russia	and	the	Russians,	320.		Laber’s	intention	to	meet	with	Raisa	Orlova	and	Lev	Kopelev	was	itself	a	consequence	of	an	earlier	encounter	facilitated	by	another	American	journalist,	Peter	Osnos,	this	time	between	the	Kopelev’s	and	Robert	Bernstein.		During	Bernstein’s	third	trip	to	Moscow	in	1976	he	had	contacted	Osnos	who	was	at	that	time	serving	as	the	Moscow	Bureau	Chief	for	the	Washington	Post,	and	expressed	his	desire	to	see	the	less	accessible	parts	of	the	city.		Much	like	the	role	Kevin	Klose	and	Anthony	Austin	played	for	Jeri	Laber	in	1979,	Osnos	drew	upon	his	intimate	knowledge	of	Soviet	intellectual	circles	and	dissident	networks	and	introduced	Bernstein	to	scores	of	Soviet	writers,	as	well	as	many	other	prominent	dissidents.		This	not	only	included	both	Raisa	Orlova	and	Lev	Kopelev,	but	also	the	mathematician	and	refusenik	Anatoly	Shcharansky	(later	known	as	Natan	Sharansky	after	his	emigration	to	Israel	in	1986),	and	by	extension,	the	world-renowned	physicist	and	human	rights	activist	Andrei	Sakharov	and	his	wife	and	activist	Elena	Bonner.		Bernstein	later	attributed	these	meetings—and	Osnos’	part	in	them—as	a	seminal	moment	in	the	course	of	his	own	involvement	with	human	rights.		Bernstein,	Speaking	Freely,	137-139;	"Robert	Bernstein	–	Book	Publishing	and	Human	Rights:	What’s	Ahead	in	Perilous	Times,"	YouTube	video,	53:42,	recorded	by	the	City	University	of	New	York	(CUNY)	on	8	February	2017,	posted	by	"	Roosevelt	House	Public	Policy	Institute	at	Hunter	College,"	14	February	2017,	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XNjWl8v4Mak.	
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literary	community.		She	worked	in	close	collaboration	with	Raisa	Orlova	when	compiling	the	guest	list	for	the	dinner,	which	was	to	be	held	on	7	September	at	the	Aragvi,	a	fashionable	Georgian	restaurant	in	the	heart	of	central	Moscow.13			Among	the	more	than	forty	guests	in	attendance	were	Vasily	Aksyonov,	the	writer	and	cultural	pioneer	of	the	shestidesyatniki,	or	“generation	of	the	1960s,”	whose	work	fell	out	of	favor	after	his	participation	in	the	unsanctioned	publication	of	the	samizdat	(meaning	“self-published”)	journal	Metropol,	which	skirted	official	state	censorship;	Vladimir	Voinovich,	the	Russian	poet	and	satirist	expelled	from	the	Soviet	Writers’	Union	in	1974	after	his	solidarity	protests	in	favor	of	greater	freedom	of	expression	for	writers;	Pyotr	Yegides,	who	had	been	dismissed	from	his	job	and	ejected	from	the	Communist	Party	in	response	to	his	role	as	the	primary	editor	of	the	unsanctioned	Soviet	political	journal	
Poizki,	or	Searches;	Georgi	Vladimov,	the	well-known	Thaw	era	author	who,	in	1977,	had	renounced	his	membership	in	the	Soviet	Writers’	Union	and	began	serving	as	president	of	the	Moscow	Chapter	of	Amnesty	International;	and	Viktor	Erofeyev,	a	French-born	Russian	novelist	who	was	ostracized	within	the	Soviet	Union	following	the	foreign	publication	of	
Metropol,	which	he	helped	to	edit.14	In	addition	to	these	and	other	censored	writers,	internationally	recognized	members	of	the	Soviet	dissident	community	were	also	in	attendance,	including	the	historian	Roy	Medvedev,	Anatoly	Marchenko,	his	wife	and	outspoken	Soviet	dissident	Larisa	Bogoraz,	as	well	as	the	renowned	nuclear	physicist	and	international	figurehead	of	the	Soviet	human	rights	movement,	Andrei	Sakharov.		In	a	direct	connection	to	the	ongoing	work	of	Helsinki	Watch,	Laber	also	made	sure	to	extend	an	invitation	to	Yuri	Druzhnikov,	with	whom	she	wished	to	meet	to	discuss	his	status	as	a	test	case	for	the	organization.		The	
																																																								13	Laber,	The	Courage	of	Strangers,	114–16;	Jeri	Laber,	“Confidential	Memorandum	to	Winthrop	Knowlton,	Michael	Sovern,	Willard	Gaylin,	John	Hersey,	Freeman	Dyson	and	Lewis	Thomas	Concerning	Meeting	with	Yuri	Druzhnikov,	Moscow,	September	9,	1979,”	26	September	1979,	HRWR,	Series	I:	Jeri	Laber	Files,	Box	52,	Folder	9.	14	Laber,	The	Courage	of	Strangers,	114–19;	Victor	Terras,	ed.,	Handbook	of	Russian	Literature	(New	Haven:	Yale	University	Press,	1985),	444;	“Vladimir	Voinovich,”	Russian	Life	45,	no.	5	(2002):	16;	Kevin	Klose,	“Moscow	Steps	Up	Pressure	on	Two	Dissident	Journals,”	Washington	Post,	October	23,	1979;	Jeri	Laber,	“The	Moscow	Book	Fair:	But	Where	Are	the	Writers?,”	Washington	Post,	6	May	1981;	Joseph	Mozur,	“Georgi	Vladimov:	Literary	Path	into	Exile,”	World	Literature	Today	59,	no.	1	(1985):	21–26;	Arnold	McMillan,	“Georgi	Vladimov:	Dissident	Ukrainian	Writer	Hailed	as	New	Hope	of	Russian	Literature,”	The	Guardian,	11	November		2003;	Roger	Cohen,	“A	Novelist	at	the	Crossroads	of	Soviet	Society,”	New	York	Times,	15	February	1990.	
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event	was	monitored	closely	by	the	police,	and	condemned	in	that	evening’s	broadcast	over	Moscow	radio.15	While	Laber	only	had	the	chance	to	speak	to	Druzhnikov	briefly	during	their	initial	meeting	at	the	AAP	dinner,	after	introducing	herself	and	telling	him	of	her	connection	with	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee,	the	Soviet	writer	invited	her	to	dinner	with	his	family	in	two	days’	time.		In	a	confidential	memorandum	delivered	to	the	rest	of	the	Free	Flow	Subcommittee,	the	Executive	Director	gave	her	impressions	of	the	man,	and	summarized	that	encounter:	“I	found	Druzhnikov	extremely	likeable,	quick,	lively,	sophisticated,	well	read—all	in	all	quite	suitable	as	a	‘test	case’	as	suggested	by	Will	Gaylin.”		Laber	was	thoroughly	impressed	by	Druzhnikov’s	level	of	insight	concerning	opportunities	for	potential	advocacy	on	his	behalf,	remarking	at	one	point	that	it	was	“as	if	he	were	reading	my	mind.”		“[H]e	was	consistently	one	step	ahead	of	me	in	making	suggestions	about	specific	things	that	we	had	already	discussed	at	our	subcommittee	meetings	and	that	I	had	intended	to	ask	him,”	Laber	reported	to	the	group’s	other	members.		“It	was	as	if	he	had	thought	these	things	through	on	his	own	and	had	come	to	similar	conclusions	before	I	even	had	the	opportunity	to	suggest	them	to	him.”16	This	level	of	perceptiveness	and	insight	is	a	testament	to	the	degree	to	which	Druzhnikov—like	so	many	other	dissidents	involved	in	the	Soviet	human	rights	movement	of	the	1960s	and	70s—was	capable	of	assisting	Western	groups	like	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	in	their	efforts	to	promote	individual	rights.		Dissidents	frequently	functioned	as	highly	valuable	and	proficient	partners	in	the	work	of	Western	human	rights	activism,	despite	the	fact	that	very	few	of	them	had	any	formal	training	in	key	areas	such	as	legal	justice	or	human	rights	advocacy.		These	dissidents	could	reliably	provide	useful	guidance	concerning	the	specific	social	contexts	in	which	a	particular	advocacy	effort	would	be	most	effective—insights	which	Western	activists	unfamiliar	with	the	exigencies	of	Soviet	society	often	lacked.		Using	the	lessons	learned	through	their	own	lived	experience,	members	of	organized	Soviet	dissident	groups—whether	independently	or	in	collaboration	with	
																																																								15	Laber,	The	Courage	of	Strangers,	115-116.	16	Laber,	“Confidential	Memorandum,”	26	September	1979.	
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Western	actors—were	well	equipped	to	address	some	of	the	most	pressing	challenges	facing	individual	rights	within	their	society.17				
THE	SYSTEMS	OF	SUPPORT	ESTABLISHED	THROUGH	TRANSNATIONAL	ADVOCACY		During	Laber	and	Druzhnikov’s	meeting,	one	issue	the	pair	discussed	was	the	matter	of	Druzhnikov’s	petitioned	emigration	to	Israel.		Because	of	the	ease	with	which	Soviet	citizens	were	able	to	obtain	exit	visas	to	immigrate	to	Israel	relative	to	any	other	country,	the	overwhelming	majority	of	citizens	seeking	to	depart	the	Soviet	Union	filed	requests	listing	Israel	as	the	desired	destination	for	emigration.18		So	too	was	this	the	case	with	Druzhnikov.		However,	since	his	closest	living	relatives	resided	in	the	United	States	and	not	Israel,	some	members	of	the	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	had	misgivings	about	the	effectiveness	of	using	Druzhnikov	as	a	“test	case”	for	issues	concerning	family	reunification	so	long	as	his	official	destination	was	somewhere	other	than	where	his	family	resided.		Although	Druzhnikov	sincerely	desired	to	be	reunited	with	his	sister	and	brother-in-law	in	the	United	States,	Helsinki	Watch	members	did	not	wish	for	him	to	take	any	action	that	might	jeopardize	his	chances	of	securing	approval	from	his	government	to	leave	the	Soviet	Union.19			Yet	in	discussions	with	Laber,	it	was	Druzhnikov	who	broached	the	matter	of	family	reunification,	expressing	his	interest	in	switching	the	destination	of	his	emigration	application	to	the	United	States.		He	also	inquired	as	to	the	possibility	that	Helsinki	Watch	would	be	able	to	secure	a	formal	invitation	for	him	to	relocate	there.		“He	would	like	to	be	invited	by	a	publisher	or	a	university	to	come	to	the	States	for	one	year,”	Laber	informed	the	rest	of	the	Free	Flow	Subcommittee	in	her	memo,	“in	order	to	lecture	on	modern	Soviet																																																									17	For	more	on	how	the	moral,	philosophical,	and	intellectual	position	of	dissidents	within	Soviet	society	helped	to	shape	dissidents’	approaches	to	human	rights	activism,	see	Robert	Horvath,	“Breaking	the	Totalitarian	Ice:	The	Initiative	Group	for	the	Defense	of	Human	Rights	in	the	USSR,”	Human	Rights	Quarterly	36,	no.	1	(February	2014):	147–75;	Nathans,	“Soviet	Rights-Talk	in	the	Post-Stalin	Era,”	in	Hoffmann	ed.,	
Human	Rights	in	the	Twentieth	Century;	Michael	Meerson-Aksenov	and	Boris	Shragin,	eds.,	The	Political,	Social	
and	Religious	Thought	of	Russian	“Samizdat”—An	Anthology	(Belmont:	Nordland	Publishing	Company,	1977);	Alekseyeva,	Soviet	Dissent.	18	For	more	on	the	details	surrounding	Soviet	Jewish	emigration	to	Israel,	see	Pauline	Peretz,	Let	My	People	
Go:	The	Transnational	Politics	of	Soviet	Jewish	Emigration	During	the	Cold	War	(London:	Routledge,	2017);	Noah	Lewin-Epstein,	Yaacov	Ro’i,	and	Paul	Ritterband,	eds.,	Russian	Jews	on	Three	Continents:	Migration	and	
Resettlement	(London:	Routledge,	1997).	19	Letter	to	Laber	from	Gaylin,	18	May	1979.		
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literature	or,	alternatively,	on	the	history	of	Russian	and	Soviet	pedagogy	or	Soviet	children’s	literature.		All	of	these	are	subjects	on	which	he	feels	competant	[sic]	to	speak.”20		By	facilitating	such	an	invitation,	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	helped	to	bolster	Druzhnikov’s	request	for	resettlement	in	the	United	States	by	providing	his	application	for	emigration	with	a	dimension	of	cultural	and	professional	exchange,	in	addition	to	his	existing	claim	of	family	reunification.			The	decision	by	Druzhnikov	to	accept	foreign	assistance	in	an	attempt	to	relocate	to	the	United	States	after	having	already	been	denied	permission	to	emigrate	to	Israel	illustrates	the	extent	to	which	the	Soviet	writer	had	come	to	rely	upon	this	system	of	transnational	advocacy	for	his	deliverance.		Druzhnikov’s	case	stands	as	a	testament	to	the	many	political	dissidents	at	this	time	who	understood	that	when	challenging	the	will	of	the	Soviet	authorities,	their	most	likely	chance	of	success	lay	in	their	total	commitment	to	a	strategy	of	international	public	pressure.		“[Druzhnikov]	seems	completely	aware	of	the	fact	that	he	has	now	‘gone	public’	and	he	is	prepared	to	do	whatever	is	necessary	to	secure	his	right	to	emigrate,”	Laber	reported	to	her	colleagues.		“He	has	obviously	made	the	decision	to	solicit	as	much	publicity	as	possible	and	seems	aware	of	the	pros	and	cons	of	doing	so.”21		Those	“cons”—in	addition	to	increasing	persecution	by	the	authorities—involved	being	ostracized	from	the	lifelong	social	and	professional	communities	that	Druzhnikov	had	made	himself	a	part	of,	and	being	subjected	to	heightened	attack	by	the	members	of	those	communities	who	were	convinced	that	the	Soviet	writer	had	become	yet	another	pawn	of	Western	imperialist	subversion.		The	“pros”	however,	like	Fenwick’s	“spotlight,”	meant	heightened	visibility	among	a	larger	transnational	community,	including	a	professional	network	that	could	provide	an	individual	with	the	resources	and	attention	necessary	to	withstand	such	an	onslaught.		In	his	conversation	with	Laber,	Druzhnikov	actively	solicited	such	support,	and	suggested	certain	steps	that	might	be	taken	on	his	behalf,	which	the	members	of	the	Free	Flow	Subcommittee	had	not	yet	explored.		“Druzhnikov	had	other	suggestions	to	make,”	the	Executive	Director	continued	in	her	memo.		“[H]e	suggested	that	we	get	him	a	membership	in	PEN,	something	which	I	promised																																																									20	Laber,	“Confidential	Memorandum,"	26	September	1979.		21	Ibid.		
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to	arrange.”22		The	provision	of	this	type	of	support	by	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	not	only	fostered	greater	resiliency	among	these	individual	dissidents,	but	also	expedited	the	development	and	reinforcement	of	the	transnational	connections	that	formed	the	basis	of	their	organization’s	unique	brand	of	human	rights	advocacy.		Because	of	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	members’	visibility	within	the	publishing	and	literary	communities,	as	well	as	Yuri	Druzhnikov’s	standing	as	a	well-known	Soviet	author,	a	letter	writing	effort	to	members	of	the	literary	world	was	a	natural	avenue	of	appeal,	and	an	example	of	the	kind	of	specialized	targeting	utilized	in	the	advocacy	strategies	of	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee.		In	addition	to	the	membership	in	PEN	secured	by	Jeri	Laber,	archival	evidence	shows	that	over	the	course	of	the	Druzhnikov	campaign,	Helsinki	Watch	members	consistently	took	steps	to	enlist	the	help	of	those	in	the	literary	community	when	raising	the	matter	of	Druzhnikov’s	emigration.23		In	letters	sent	to	several	prominent	American	authors	who	would	be	participating	in	an	international	writers’	conference	due	to	take	place	in	the	autumn	of	1980,	Helsinki	Watch	members	implored	these	individuals	to	bring	the	recent	persecution	of	Yuri	Druzhnikov	to	the	attention	of	their	Soviet	colleagues,	and	to	question	the	de	facto	expulsion	of	Druzhnikov	from	the	Writers’	Union,	as	well	as	the	grounds	on	which	multiple	Moscow	publishing	houses	had	chosen	to	cancel	the	production	of	several	of	his	most	recent	works.		Ultimately,	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	had	received	the	list	of	conference	participants	too	late	to	organize	their	appeal	for	intervention	at	the	conference	itself.		However,	they	nevertheless	passed	along	the	information	they	had	gathered	concerning	Druzhnikov’s	case,	with	the	expectation	that	these	authors	could	be	of	some	assistance	in	their	future	endeavors.24		These	transnational	networks	that	developed	between	Soviet	dissidents	and	American	human	rights	organizations	were	more	than	just	avenues	of	communication.		They	were	robust	support	systems	that	provided	resiliency	for	their	most	vulnerable	members	through	opportunities	for	professional	advancement,	increased	public	visibility,	and	concentrated	lobbying	efforts	by	those	in	positions	of	real	authority.		This	type	of																																																									22	Ibid.		23	Letter	to	Jeri	Laber	from	PEN	America	Center,	6	December	1979,	HRWR,	Series	I:	Jeri	Laber	Files,	Box	52,	Folder	9.		24	Letter	to	Helen	Sen	and	Jeri	Laber	from	Ella	Minuhin,	15	October	1980,	HRWR,	Series	I:	Jeri	Laber	Files,	Box	52,	Folder	9;	Letter	to	Ella	Minuhin	from	Helen	Sen,	8	December	1980,	Ibid.	
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support	was	exemplified	in	the	relationships	that	Druzhnikov	developed	with	individuals	in	the	West	as	a	result	of	his	connections	with	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee.		By	November	1979,	Druzhnikov	had	received	the	fourth	denial	of	his	application	for	emigration	from	the	Soviet	Union.		There	he	was	forced	to	remain,	unable	to	find	work	as	a	result	of	his	efforts	to	emigrate.		His	written	works	were	systematically	removed	from	circulation	and	he	was	effectively	blocked	from	any	and	all	attempts	to	practice	his	profession.			It	was	only	by	virtue	of	these	contacts	with	the	West	that	he	managed	to	continue	to	be	published.		As	Druzhnikov	later	explained:	“I	was	living	and	writing	in	the	70s	and	80s	in	Moscow,	but	being	published	in	the	Washington	Post,	and	the	New	York	Times,	and	in	the	Swedish	[newspaper]	Expressen;	in	Russian	in	[Sergei]	Dovlatov's	Novy	Americanets,	the	New	York	magazine	Vremya	i	my,	and	the	[Israeli-based	Russian	literary]	magazine	Dvadtsat'	dva.”		“I	frequently	didn't	even	know	where	else,”	Druzhnikov	continued,	“since	what	I	had	sent	out	to	the	West	had	trickled	everywhere	throughout	the	world.”25		It	was	only	thanks	to	these	transnational	networks	that	Druzhnikov	was	able	to	continue	to	publish	over	the	period	of	several	years	that	he	was	ostensibly	barred	from	working	in	his	own	country.			Eventually,	Druzhnikov’s	prolonged	participation	in	underground	literary	and	
samizdat	networks	had	provoked	retaliation	on	the	part	of	the	Soviet	government.		By	the	mid-1980s,	the	Soviet	refusnik	writer	was	detained	by	the	KGB	and	given	the	“choice”	of	imprisonment	in	a	labor	camp,	or	forced	confinement	in	a	psychiatric	hospital.		Once	again,	sustained	pressure	on	the	part	of	American	human	rights	organizations	like	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch,	along	with	public	protests	of	writers	such	as	Kurt	Vonnegut	(a	one-time	member	of	Robert	Bernstein’s	Fund	for	Free	Expression	and	the	Chair	of	the	AAP	committee	responsible	for	organizing	the	“America	through	American	Eyes”	exhibit	at	the	1979	Moscow	Book	Fair)	and	Arthur	Miller	(a	long-time	champion	of	free	expression	who	was	a	founding	member	of	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee)—as	well	as	Druzhnikov’s	
																																																								25	Yuri	Druzhnikov,	“The	Cancellation	of	Writer	No.	8552,”	Washington	Post,	18	November	1979;	Yuri	Druzhnikov,	“The	Helix	of	My	Life:	A	Loner’s	Fate	Tracked	Against	His	Generation,”	2003,	accessed	4	April	2018,	http://www.druzhnikov.com/english/autobio.html.	
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membership	in	the	International	PEN	Club	(which	Jeri	Laber	was	responsible	for	arranging)—was	all	that	kept	Druzhnikov	from	incarceration.26				
INTERRUPTION	OF	POSTAL	COMMUNICATION			 Another	suggestion	made	by	Druzhnikov	in	his	meeting	with	Laber	concerned	his	willingness	to	act	as	a	recipient	for	test	mailings	of	certain	articles,	magazines,	and	books	sent	from	the	West	to	the	Soviet	Union.		Beginning	in	the	early	1970s,	the	United	States	Postal	Service	had	begun	to	see	a	significant	increase	in	the	number	of	complaints	it	received	from	U.S.	citizens	regarding	the	non-delivery	of	registered	mail	sent	to	the	Soviet	Union.		According	to	investigations	conducted	by	the	United	States	Postal	Service,	the	number	of	inquires	concerning	registered	mail	for	which	the	sender	had	not	received	confirmation	of	delivery	totaled	2,936	in	1976;	2,859	in	1977;	and	2,302	in	1978.		Furthermore,	the	study	found	that	a	disproportionate	amount	of	those	cases	involved	letters	that	were	intended	for	members	of	the	Soviet	Jewish	community,	as	well	as	those	Soviet	citizens	with	known	affiliations	to	activist	or	dissident	networks.27	Since	1874,	international	postal	communication	had	been	regulated	by	the	Universal	Postal	Union,	which	after	1947,	had	come	to	exist	as	a	specialized	agency	under	the	auspices	of	the	United	Nations.		More	recently,	the	ratification	of	the	Constitution	of	the	Universal	Postal	Union	at	the	Congress	of	Vienna	in	1964,	along	with	its	General	and	Detailed	Regulations,	had	codified	the	legal	framework	of	modern	international	postal	communication—international	agreements	that	both	the	United	States	and	the	Soviet	Union	were	party	to.		Within	these	conventions,	it	was	determined	that	“a	postal	item	shall	remain	the	property	of	the	sender	until	it	is	delivered	to	the	rightful	owner,	except	when																																																									26	Unknown	author,	“Biography	of	Yuri	Druzhnikov,”	n.d.,	accessed	4	April	2018,	http://www.druzhnikov.com/english/bio1.html;	Letter	to	Jeri	Laber	from	PEN	America	Center,	6	December	1979,	HRWR,	Series	I:	Jeri	Laber	Files,	Box	52,	Folder	9.		Such	support	for	Druzhnikov	continued	well	beyond	this	period.		By	the	summer	of	1987,	continued	Western	public	pressure	in	support	of	Druzhnikov	led	eighty-four	members	of	the	U.S.	Congress	to	sign	a	letter	to	Mikhail	Gorbachev,	calling	on	the	Soviet	government	to	allow	the	Soviet	writer	to	emigrate.		In	August,	Gerry	Sikorski,	a	Congressional	Representitive	from	Ella	Minuhin’s	home	state	of	Minnesota,	even	flew	to	Moscow	to	raise	the	matter	in	person	with	Soviet	officials.		By	September,	the	Soviet	Ministry	of	Internal	Affairs	(MVD)	contacted	Druzhnikov,	to	offer	him	and	his	family	his	long-awaited	exit	visa.		Kate	Parry,	“Soviets	Free	Area	Woman’s	Brother:	’Refusnik	Writer	Yuri	Druzhnikov	is	Waiting	in	Vienna,”	Minneapolis	Star	Tribune,	29	September	1987.	27		125	Cong.	Rec.	S14324	(1979),	HRWR,	Series	I:	Jeri	Laber	Files,	Box	52,	Folder	14.	
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the	item	had	been	seized	in	pursuance	of	the	legislation	of	the	country	of	destination."		For	Soviet	Russia,	the	frequent	legal	justification	for	the	interference	of	postal	communication	was	Article	70	of	the	Criminal	Code,	which	prohibited	any	“agitation	or	propaganda	carried	out	with	the	purpose	of	undermining	or	weakening	the	state,”	as	well	as	“the	dissemination	of	libelous	fabrications	defaming	the	Soviet	government	and	social	system.”28	While	the	matter	of	postal	communication	was	not	explicitly	addressed	in	the	Helsinki	Final	Act,	the	signatories	did	declare	themselves	“conscious	of	the	need	for	an	ever	wider	knowledge	and	understanding	of	the	various	aspects	of	life	in	other	participating	States,”	and	had	pledged	to	“make	it	their	aim	to	facilitate	the	freer	and	wider	dissemination	of	information	of	all	kinds,	to	encourage	co-operation	in	the	field	of	information	and	the	exchange	of	information	with	other	countries.”29		Furthermore,	because	the	participating	states	were	obliged	through	the	Final	Act	to	ensure	the	good	faith	fulfillment	of	all	existing	obligations	under	international	law,	the	actions	taken	by	the	Soviet	government	to	restrict	the	flow	of	communication	between	citizens	of	Western	countries	and	certain	ethnic,	religious	or	political	minorities	in	the	Soviet	Union	seemed	to	many,	to	be	in	clear	violation	of	the	spirit—if	not	the	letter—of	Helsinki.		In	their	efforts	to	challenge	such	behavior,	members	of	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	invoked	agreements	like	the	Universal	Postal	Union,	and	the	obligation	to	respect	international	agreements	contained	in	Basket	I	of	the	Helsinki	Final	Act.		By	relying	on	the	normative	authority	of	these	international	protocols,	the	Committee	was	able	to	seek	arbitration	for	violation	of	citizens’	individual	rights	and	freedoms	without	having	to	resort	to	appeals	which	relied	only	upon	a	moral	foundation	for	their	legitimacy,	and	the	highly	relative,	value	laden,	culturally	specific	assumptions	that	necessarily	accompanied	such	claims.			This	effort	to	tie	the	protection	of	individual	rights	to	a	more	full	and	forthright	implementation	of	states’	Helsinki	obligations	was	a	theme	that	was	repeatedly	stressed	by	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee.		In	an	interview	given	to	the	émigré	dissident	journal	A	
Chronicle	of	Human	Rights	in	the	USSR	in	the	spring	of	1979,	shortly	after	the	establishment																																																									28	Benjamin	Gilman,	“Allegation	of	Noncompliance	with	Implementation	of	the	Helsinki	Final	Act:	United	Soviet	Socialist	Republics’	Interruption	of	International	Postal	Communication,”	New	York	Legal	Coalition	for	Soviet	Jewry,	1977,	HRWR,	Series	I:	Jeri	Laber	Files,	Box	52,	Folder	14;	Article	70,	“Criminal	Code	of	the	RSFSR,”	U.S.	Joint	Publications	Research	Service,	accessed	9	December	2017,	https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP65-00756R000400010001-6.pdf.	29	"Conference	on	Security	and	Cooperation	in	Europe	Final	Act.”	
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of	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch,	Robert	Bernstein	articulated	what	he	believed	to	be	the	central	mission	of	his	new	organization.		Bernstein	stressed	the	importance	of	human	rights	to	greater	global	security	and	stability,	and	the	unquestionable	value	that	communication	across	international	and	ideological	boundaries	had	for	the	maintenance	of	an	international	dialogue	that	could	support	such	a	goal,	saying	“the	American	Helsinki	Watch	believes	that	the	foundation	of	international	cooperation	depends	on	each	nation	giving	its	own	citizens	the	basic	rights	that	make	trusting	and	meaningful	exchanges	between	both	individuals	and	nations	possible.”		“The	Helsinki	Final	Act,”	Bernstein	continued,	“if	observed,	provides	a	framework	for	such	cooperation.”30	For	Bernstein,	“trusting	and	meaningful	exchanges”	demanded	that	governments	respect	citizens’	freedom	to	share	ideas	and	information,	particularly	since	meaningful,	in-person	contact	between	members	of	his	organization	and	dissidents	inside	the	Soviet	Union	was	exceedingly	difficult	in	the	first	several	months	of	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee’s	existence.		In	his	interview	with	the	Chronicle,	Bernstein	lamented	the	“difficulty	of	corresponding	with	citizens	in	some	countries,”	and	expressed	his	belief	that	his	organization	would	be	a	failure	unless	frequent	contact	between	all	other	Helsinki	monitoring	groups	could	be	maintained.31		For	this	reason,	the	campaign	to	bring	public	attention	to	the	Soviet	interruption	of	postal	communication	became	one	of	the	very	first	projects	taken	up	by	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch’s	Subcommittee	on	the	Free	Flow	of	People	and	Ideas.32	The	challenge	before	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	was	to	devise	a	strategy	for	publicizing	the	Soviets’	interruption	of	postal	communication	in	a	way	that	could	most	effectively	utilize	the	strengths	of	the	nascent	organization,	while	at	the	same	time,	continue	to	fulfill	the	group’s	core	mission	of	helping	to	improve	the	lives	of	real	people	subjected	to	governmental	persecution.		By	the	end	of	1979,	the	Committee	had	outlined	a	proposal	to	conduct	a	series	of	test	mailings	targeting	specific	individuals	throughout	the	Soviet	Union	and	other	Eastern	European	states,	in	order	to	systematically	evaluate	the	incidence	of	non-delivery	in	various	socialist	countries.		These	mailings	would	be	sent	via																																																									30	“An	Interview	with	Robert	Bernstein,"	A	Chronicle	of	Human	Rights,	49.				31	Ibid.,	51.				32	See	Letter	to	Winthrop	Knowlton	from	Jeri	Laber,	2	July	1979,	HRWR,	Series	I:	Jeri	Laber	Files,	Box	52,	Folder	5.	
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registered	international	mail,	and	a	record	of	their	delivery	would	be	tracked	through	their	returned	receipts.33		In	a	clear	signal	of	the	Committee’s	intention	to	frame	their	campaign	against	the	Soviet’s	interruption	of	postal	communication,	not	as	a	plea	to	defend	the	fundamental	human	rights	of	Soviet	citizens,	but	as	a	violation	of	international	protocol	and,	by	extension,	the	Helsinki	Final	Act,	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	public	statements	accompanying	the	mailing	project	were	careful	to	describe	the	group’s	efforts	as	an	attempt	to	“test	[Soviet]	compliance	with	the	Universal	Postal	Convention.”		These	statements	went	on	to	declare	that	a	record	of	this	compliance	would	then	be	transmitted	to	the	delegations	participating	in	the	Madrid	CSCE	Review	Conference,	taking	place	later	that	year.34			The	list	of	Soviet	and	Eastern	European	participants	included	citizens	from	Poland,	Czechoslovakia,	and	the	USSR.		Of	the	twenty-one	individuals	chosen,	the	overwhelming	majority	had	been	members	of	their	own	country’s	Helsinki	monitoring	organizations	themselves.35		By	selecting	these	citizens	to	serve	as	the	recipients	of	these	mailings,	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	brought	greater	visibility	to	the	challenges	facing	Helsinki	monitoring	and	the	ability	of	citizens	to	“know	and	act	upon”	their	rights.		As	for	individuals	such	as	Yuri	Druzhnikov—who	was	one	of	the	first	to	agree	to	participate	in	these	test	mailings,	and	who	was	instrumental	in	providing	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	with	the	names	and	addresses	of	other	Soviet	dissidents	willing	to	take	part—the	approach	taken	enabled	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	to	further	publicize	the	personalized	impact	of	Soviet	human	rights	violations	to	their	American	audiences,	and	demonstrate	the	way	that	these	practices	affected	the	everyday	lives	of	individual	Soviet	citizens.36	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	records	indicate	that,	from	the	outset	of	the	mailing	project,	the	Committee	had	attempted	to	frame	the	Soviet	government’s	interference	with	postal	communication	in	a	way	that	would	most	highlight	the	practice’s	detrimental	influence	on	other	areas	of	East-West	cooperation.		Evidence	for	this	can	be	found	in	correspondence	between	Robert	Bernstein	and	Free	Flow	Subcommittee	member	Jeri	Laber.		In	a	letter	written	in	the	summer	of	1979,	Laber	reminded	the	Chairman	of	the	subcommittee’s																																																									33	Letter	to	Marty	Perez	from	Helen	Sen,	30	January	1980,	HRWR,	Series	I:	Jeri	Laber	Files,	Box	52,	Folder	14;	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee,	“Mailing	Instructions	for	the	Soviet	Union	and	Eastern	Europe,”	n.d.,	in	Ibid.	34	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee,	‘‘The	First	Fifteen	Months,’’	18.	35	Ibid.	36	See	Laber,	“Confidential	Memorandum,”	26	September	1979.	
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intention	to	undertake	the	mailing	project,	and	alluded	to	efforts	made	by	subcommittee	members	to	contact	and	solicit	information	from	the	private	scientist	and	psychiatric	organizations	with	which	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	regularly	liaised.		These	requests	sought	any	documentary	evidence	that	these	group’s	could	provide,	which	detailed	incidence	of	interrupted	or	unanswered	correspondence	between	their	organization’s	members	and	Soviet	counterparts	or	officials	in	the	East.		The	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	intended	to	use	these	reports	to	compel	professional	organizations	to	speak	out	in	protest	of	such	obstruction,	by	articulating	the	extent	to	which	this	discriminatory	practice	served	as	an	impediment	to	cross-cultural	progress	in	their	field.37	As	a	long-time	employee	of	the	Association	of	American	Publishers	with	extensive	experience	in	dealing	with	the	Soviet	literary	establishment,	Laber	was	tasked	with	compiling	a	report	detailing	the	disruption	of	postal	communication	in	the	publishing	world.		In	her	letter,	Laber	asked	Bernstein	whether	he	could	suggest	any	other	professional	fields	that	would	be	appropriate	for	the	group	to	contact	in	addition	to	the	organizations	she	had	proposed,	and	requested	his	assistance	as	the	CEO	of	Random	House,	in	compiling	evidence	for	her	own	publisher’s	report	on	the	interruption	of	postal	communication.		“As	the	individual	who	has	probably	sent	more	unanswered	mail	to	Soviet	officials	than	anyone,”	Laber	told	Bernstein,	“it	would	be	good	if	you	went	through	your	files	and	compiled	a	list	for	us.		I	suspect	you’ll	come	up	with	quite	a	dossier.”38		These	tactics	used	by	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	to	link	the	disruption	of	postal	communication	to	the	violation	of	existing	international	protocols	such	as	the	Universal	Postal	Union,	and	by	extension,	to	charges	of	obstruction	in	other	fields	of	East-West	cooperation	contributed	to	a	conceptual	shift	taking	place	in	American	conceptions	of	human	rights	in	the	1970s	and	80s.		Appeals	such	as	these	helped	to	bring	considerations	for	human	rights	from	a	place	of	somewhat	vague	and	sweeping	idealistic	generalities,	to	one	where	their	defense	could	be	articulated	through	a	much	more	granular	and	tangible	understanding	of	what	the	protection	of	such	rights	actually	entailed.		This	shift	was	one	of	individual	empowerment,	and	personal	involvement,	and	comported	with	the	provision	called	for	in	the	Helsinki	Final	Act	for	individuals	to	“know	and	act	upon”	their	rights.																																																									37	Letter	to	Robert	Bernstein	from	Jeri	Laber,	2	July	1979,	HRWR,	Series	I:	Jeri	Laber	Files,	Box	52,	Folder	5.	38	Ibid.	
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The	early	advocacy	campaigns	of	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	encouraged	such	a	shift	by	articulating	much	more	seemingly	concrete	and	achievable	solutions	for	the	resolution	of	a	particular	human	rights	concern	than	that	which	had	previously	been	on	offer	by	other	human	rights	organizations	such	as	Amnesty	International.		While	many	Americans	at	this	time	no	doubt	supported	the	advancement	of	human	rights	inside	the	Soviet	Union	in	theory,	there	were	limited	avenues	available	to	them	as	individual	citizens	in	which	they	could	constructively	contribute	to	these	desired	outcomes.		These	early	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	campaigns	are	important	because	they	provided	Americans	with	alternative	frameworks	for	thinking	about	the	“transactional	value”	of	human	rights	compliance.		
THE	CONFERENCE	ON	SOVIET-AMERICAN	EXCHANGE	AND	HUMAN	RIGHTS		The	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee’s	strategy	of	using	detailed	information	concerning	abuses	provided	by	dissidents	across	transnational	networks	to	target	members	of	a	professional	community—particularly	those	American	professionals	who	had	some	kind	of	ongoing	relationship	to	the	Soviet	Union—sought	to	more	directly	tie	individuals’	willingness	to	cooperate	in	economic,	technological,	scientific,	and	cultural	exchanges	with	the	Soviets’	observation	of	human	rights	protections	for	its	own	citizens.		The	Committee	saw	such	“moral	linkage”	as	an	effective	way	to	raise	awareness	among	American	scientists,	academics,	artists,	business	professionals	and	others	concerning	the	importance	of	human	rights	in	the	East-West	relationship.39		Encouraging	American	professionals	to	raise	human	rights	concerns	when	travelling	to	the	USSR	had	been	a	practice	of	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committees	since	its	very	inception.40		Now,	a	year	into	the	organization’s	existence,	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	began	taking	steps	to	formalize	those	efforts.	 		 By	the	beginning	of	1980,	in	the	midst	of	the	organization’s	ongoing	publicity	campaigns,	and	with	ever-widening	contact	across	transnational	activist	networks	providing	a	steady	stream	of	information	on	the	Soviet	infringement	of	citizens’	rights,	the																																																									39	See	handwritten	notes	from	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Planning	Meeting	concerning	the	Conference	on	Soviet-American	Exchange	and	Human	Rights,	n.d.,	HRWR,	Series	I:	Jeri	Laber	Files,	Box	46,	Folder	3.	40	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee,	‘‘The	First	Fifteen	Months,’’	15-16.	
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U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	took	steps	to	reinforce	their	strategy	of	“moral	linkage”	by	convening	a	conference	whose	goal	was	to	help	individuals	and	private	organizations	in	the	United	States	respond	constructively	to	the	broad	range	of	human	rights	violations	taking	place	within	the	USSR.		U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	argued	that	the	Soviets’	violation	of	the	humanitarian	provisions	agreed	to	at	Helsinki	had	a	real	and	lasting	impact	on	the	rest	of	the	cross-cultural	cooperation	stipulated	by	the	Final	Act,	and	worked	with	different	nongovernmental	actors	to	develop	and	communicate	ways	in	which	these	private	American	citizens	could	express	their	displeasure	through	the	course	of	their	various	international	exchanges.41		Importantly,	while	these	efforts	did,	to	some	extent,	seek	to	educate	American	citizens	about	the	restrictions	and	deprivations	experienced	by	Soviet	citizens,	the	primary	function	of	the	conference	was	to	stress	the	limitations	placed	on	
foreigners	in	the	context	of	these	international	exchanges,	and	to	emphasize	the	impediment	that	these	practices	posed	for	Western	interests.		This	strategy	of	framing	the	Soviet	violation	of	the	Helsinki	Final	Act	in	terms	of	it’s	impact	on	Western	actors	was	just	one	more	way	in	which	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	sought	to	persuade	American	audiences	to	more	directly	identify	with	the	consequences	of	Soviet	disregard	for	these	international	agreements	and,	by	extension,	human	rights.42				 The	conference,	which	was	held	in	April	1980	and	hosted	by	the	Ford	Foundation,	was	intended	to	be	a	forum	in	which	American	professionals	from	a	variety	of	different	fields	could	meet	to	discuss	the	problems	they	encountered	as	a	result	of	the	“closed	nature”	of	Soviet	society	in	the	course	of	their	international	exchanges.43		The	conference’s	discussion	centered	around	several	case	studies	commissioned	by	the	Committee,	which	highlighted	different	approaches	taken	by	Western	organizations	toward	various	recent	intercultural	events.		The	exchanges	under	examination	included	the	World	Psychiatric	Congress	held	in	Moscow	in	1973	and	Hawaii	in	1977;	the	International	Congress	of	Mathematicians	held	in	Vancouver	in	1975	and	Helsinki	in	1978;	American	Bar	Association’s	delegation	to	Moscow	in	1979;	and	the	Second	International	Moscow	Book	Fair	held	in	September	1979,	which	Jeri	Laber	had	attended.		In	addition	to	these	events,																																																									41	Ibid.	42	See	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee,	“Conference	to	Develop	Human	Rights	Guidelines	for	International	Meetings	and	Exchanges,”	n.d.,	unpublished	memorandum,	HRWR,	Series	I:	Jeri	Laber	Files,	Box	46,	Folder	3.	43	Ibid.	
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administrative	organizations	responsible	for	arranging	such	exchanges	were	also	invited	to	provide	details	of	their	experiences	for	use	as	the	basis	for	further	discussion.		These	organizations	included	the	National	Academy	of	Sciences;	the	Citizen	Exchange	Corps;	the	Dartmouth	Conference	for	Writers;	the	United	Nations	Association;	the	International	Research	and	Exchange	Board;	and	the	U.S.-USSR	Trade	and	Economic	Council.		It	was	also	from	these	same	organizations	that	many	of	the	participants	for	the	conference	were	selected.44			 To	ensure	that	the	case	studies	followed	a	standardized	format	that	would	be	useful	for	their	purposes,	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	had	prepared	a	questionnaire	that	was	meant	to	address	the	central	issues	that	were	to	be	addressed	at	the	conference.		This	questionnaire	asked	respondents	broadly	about	the	nature	and	duration	of	their	personal	or	organizational	contact	with	representatives	of	the	Soviet	state,	and	inquired	as	to	whether	any	attempts	had	been	made	to	establish	preconditions	for	American	participation	prior	to	their	visit	to	the	USSR.		If	so,	Committee	members	wished	to	know	whether	such	preconditions	had	been	effective.		The	questionnaire	focused	particularly	on	problems	that	arose	regarding	to	access	to	information,	access	to	the	press	or	citizens	of	the	Soviet	Union,	or	other	areas	related	to	the	free	movement	of	people	or	information—all	issues	that	pertained	specifically	to	the	Helsinki	Final	Act’s	agreements	on	cooperation	in	humanitarian	fields.		Finally,	the	questionnaire	sought	to	determine	whether	the	participant	had	any	knowledge	of	any	Soviet	citizen	who	was	denied	their	right	to	participate	in	the	exchange,	or	whether	any	other	issue	pertaining	to	human	rights	had	been	raised	in	the	course	of	their	visit.45	By	examining	these	recent	exchanges	in	this	way,	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	hoped	to	provide	American	citizens	with	alternative	negotiating	strategies	for	engaging	the	Soviets	on	matters	concerning	internationally	recognized	human	rights	protections.		Discussions	within	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Subcommittee	on	Liaisons	with	Professional	Organizations	reflected	the	belief	that	many	American	groups	were	completely	unprepared																																																									44	Ibid.;	"Memorandum	from	Andy	Sommer	to	Jeri	Laber	concerning	the	Results	of	the	Planning	Meeting	for	the	Conference	to	Develop	Human	Rights	Guidelines	for	International	Meetings	and	Exchanges,	January	13,	1980,”	15	January	1980,	HRWR,	Series	I:	Jeri	Laber	Files,	Box	46,	Folder	3;	Letter	to	Robert	McKay	from	Andy	Sommer,	12	February	1980,	HRWR,	Series	I:	Jeri	Laber	Files,	Box	46,	Folder	3.	45	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee,	“Questionnaire	for	Case	Studies	on	International	Meetings	and	Exchanges,”	n.d.,	HRWR,	Series	I:	Jeri	Laber	Files,	Box	46,	Folder	3.	
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to	constructively	confront	the	Soviets	on	such	issues,	and	would	benefit	from	a	forum	in	which	they	could	share	their	common	experiences	and	propose	ways	to	make	concern	for	human	rights	a	more	central	part	of	the	process	of	East-West	exchange.		Helsinki	Watch	members	also	hoped	that	this	conference	would	help	reinforce	procedures	for	those	individuals	who	wished	to	raise	the	issue	of	human	rights	in	their	exchanges,	but	who	lacked	the	institutional	support	of	their	professional	organization.46				By	the	time	the	Conference	on	Soviet-American	Exchanges	and	Human	Rights	was	held,	the	need	for	individual	citizens	to	be	effective	in	voicing	their	objections	to	Soviet	behavior	had	become	more	pressing	than	ever.		Only	a	few	months	earlier,	U.S.-Soviet	relations	began	rapidly	deteriorating	after	the	Soviet	Army	invaded	Afghanistan	in	December	1979	to	try	and	prop	up	the	rule	of	the	Soviet-allied	government	in	Kabul.		A	month	later,	security	forces	inside	the	USSR	moved	against	the	human	rights	leader	Andrei	Sakharov,	placing	him	under	arrest	and	promptly	banishing	him	without	trial	to	the	restricted	city	of	Gorky.		The	fallout	from	these	actions	on	the	part	of	the	United	States	had	been	swift	and	severe—particularly	in	areas	where	pressure	could	be	most	immediately	applied,	such	as	cultural,	scientific,	economic,	and	technological	fields.		In	their	letter	of	invitation	to	participants	of	the	conference,	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	spoke	of	the	urgent	need	to	establish	procedures	for	U.S.	private	citizens	when	dealing	with	the	Soviets,	“in	light	of	the	politicization	of	virtually	every	aspect	of	Soviet-American	relations”	as	a	result	of	these	recent	actions.47		These	efforts	by	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	to	stress	the	direct	link	between	economic,	scientific	and	cultural	cooperation	amongst	Eastern	and	Western	societies	and	continued	progress	in	the	humanitarian	fields	prefigured	a	return	to	the	heightened	ideological	tension	of	the	late	Cold	War,	when	this	type	of	linkage	became	more	widely	adopted	within	certain	specialized	American	professional	communities,	and	even	on	occasion,	was	implemented	as	a	tool	of	American	foreign	policy	with	respect	to	the	communist	bloc.48																																																									46		See	handwritten	notes	from	Helsinki	Watch	Planning	Meeting,	n.d;	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee,	“Conference	to	Develop	Human	Rights	Guidelines	for	International	Meetings	and	Exchanges,”	n.d.	47	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee,	“Draft	Letter	of	Invitation,”	n.d.,	HRWR,	Series	I:	Jeri	Laber	Files,	Box	46,	Folder	3.	48	Perhaps	the	most	high	profile	example	of	such	linkage	can	be	seen	in	President	Carter’s	decision	to	boycott	the	1980	Moscow	Olympics.		While	the	primary	motivation	behind	this	action	may	have	been	the	Soviet’s	actions	in	Afghanistan,	there	was	undeniably	a	human	rights	dimension	to	this	decision.		See	Nicholas	Evan	
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CONCLUSIONS		 Upon	its	formation,	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	had	gone	to	great	lengths	to	defend	its	legitimacy	as	an	organization	that	could	justifiably	pursue	the	monitoring	and	improvement	of	other	states’	Helsinki	records.		In	an	internal	Helsinki	Watch	memo	drafted	less	than	a	month	after	the	formal	creation	of	the	organization,	former	Moscow	correspondent	and	one-time	U.S.	Helsinki	Commission	staff	member	Alfred	Friendly	Jr.	summarized	the	challenges	that	faced	the	nascent	organization,	when	he	explained	to	his	subcommittee	chairman—the	former	Minnesota	congressman	Donald	Fraser—his	view	that	“the	enduring	problem	of	the	Watch	is	to	reconcile	its	identity	as	an	American	citizens’	pressure	group	with	its	goal	of	promoting	international	compliance	with	standards	Americans	honor	and	others	dispute.”49		In	order	to	overcome	this	contradiction,	the	group	adopted	an	advocacy	strategy	that	would	frame	for	their	audience—to	as	great	an	extent	as	possible—the	transnational	character	of	their	Helsinki	monitoring,	and	the	degree	to	which	such	violations	of	human	rights	by	the	Soviet	Union	impacted	not	just	those	citizens	whose	rights	were	denied,	but	all	people,	and	the	very	basis	of	international	cooperation.				In	its	Declaration	of	Principles	Guiding	Relations	between	Participating	States,	the	Helsinki	Final	Act	explicitly	sanctioned	a	private	individual	to	“know	and	act	upon	his	rights	and	duties”	with	respect	to	a	state’s	provision	of	human	rights	and	fundamental	freedoms.50		Similarly,	the	Declaration	of	Principles	confirmed	that	“institutions,	organizations,	and	persons	have	a	relevant	and	positive	role	to	play	in	contributing	to	the	achievement	of	.	.	.	good	neighborly	relations	among	[states],	international	peace,	security,	and	justice”	in	the	context	of	those	states’	ongoing	mutual	cooperation.51		The	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	took	seriously	this	obligation,	and	embraced	its	responsibility	to	monitor	Helsinki	compliance	in	a	manner	that	could	most	effectively	reconcile	their	organization’s																																																																																																																																																																																			Sarantakes,	Dropping	the	Torch:	Jimmy	Carter,	the	Olympic	Boycott,	and	the	Cold	War	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2011).			For	a	wider	analysis	of	the	influence	that	private	citizen’s	advocacy	had	on	the	course	of	U.S.-Soviet	relations	throughout	the	1980s,	see	Matthew	Evangelista,	Unarmed	Forces:	The	
Transnational	Movement	to	End	the	Cold	War	(Ithaca:	Cornell	University	Press,	1999).		49	Alfred	Friendly	Jr.,	“Proposed	Agenda	for	the	Committee	on	Human	Rights	and	Fundamental	Freedoms,”	March	14,	1979,	HRWR,	Series	VIII:	New	York	Office	Files,	1975-1996,	Box	1,	Folder	18,	8.	50	"Conference	on	Security	and	Cooperation	in	Europe	Final	Act.”	51	Ibid.		
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somewhat	contradictory	status	as	a	Western	NGO	concerned	with	the	behavior	of	Eastern	European	and	Soviet	governments.		The	strategies	of	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	that	resulted	from	such	an	approach	helped	to	shift	the	locus	of	social	and	political	pressure	in	American	society	for	Soviet	human	rights	reforms	beyond	the	instruments	of	official,	state-to-state	interactions,	and	instead	tied	those	protections	more	directly	to	the	process	of	nongovernmental	cooperation	between	societies	generally.		These	campaigns	directly	called	into	question	the	morality	of	continued	cultural	exchange	with	a	government	whose	disregard	for	its	own	international	commitments	violated	principles	central	to	American’s	system	of	values.		But	they	made	a	concerted	effort	to	do	so	in	a	practical	fashion,	quantifying	the	Soviet’s	repressive	practices	in	terms	of	the	adverse	impact	such	behavior	had	on	the	process	of	cross-cultural	exchange	in	question.		By	calling	upon	professional	elites	within	American	civil	society—scientists,	academics,	and	businessmen—to	express	their	displeasure	with	such	behaviors	by	withholding	further	participation	in	those	areas	of	exchange,	this	“moral	linkage”	reinforced	the	transnational	quality	of	this	moment	in	human	rights	history,	by	empowering	the	citizenry	of	a	state	to	have	a	more	direct	say	in	determining	the	conditions	under	which	future	cross-cultural	relationships	would	be	conducted,	and	allowing	Western	actors	existing	outside	the	traditional	international	normative	framework	to	more	effectively	appeal	for	the	cessation	of	specific	human	right	abuses.				
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CONCLUSIONS		 The	Moscow	Helsinki	Group	and	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	both	took	shape	as	nongovernmental	organizations	within	their	respective	countries	in	the	aftermath	of	the	signing	of	the	Helsinki	Final	Act.		Both	groups	considered	it	their	mission	to	see	the	humanitarian	articles	of	the	Helsinki	Final	Act	upheld	and	implemented,	but	despite	this	common	goal,	the	conditions	that	brought	both	these	organizations	into	existence	could	hardly	be	more	different.		The	founding	members	of	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	had	enjoyed	active	support	and	assistance	from	their	own	government,	and	occupied	positions	of	prominence	within	their	professional	and	social	communities.		The	founding	members	of	the	Moscow	Helsinki	Group,	on	the	other	hand,	were	social	outcasts	by	comparison	and	subject	to	near	constant	harassment	and	persecution	by	the	state.		Far	from	utilizing	their	occupational	opportunities	for	the	advancement	of	their	activism,	these	individuals	had,	in	many	cases,	been	dismissed	from	their	jobs	as	a	consequence	of	their	involvement	with	human	rights	work	and	targeted	by	the	KGB	through	surveillance,	intimidation	and	even	assault.	In	addition	to	the	distinct	social	and	political	environments	in	which	these	groups	were	created	and	operated,	there	also	existed	fundamental	differences	between	these	organizations’	methodological	approaches	to	their	Helsinki	advocacy.		While	the	Moscow	Helsinki	Group	sought	to	monitor	the	Helsinki	compliance	of	its	own	government	through	the	collection	and	dissemination	of	personal	testimonies	provided	by	Soviet	citizens,	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	made	the	publication	of	other	states’	Helsinki	records	its	primary	area	of	focus.		These	two	highly	divergent	sets	of	circumstances	have	led	some	scholars	to	conclude	that,	as	nongovernmental	organizations,	the	Moscow	Helsinki	Group	and	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	were	not	able	to	reconcile	their	contrasting	rhetoric	and	tactics	within	a	single	model	of	transnational	human	rights	advocacy.		Yet	despite	the	myriad	factors	that	differentiated	these	two	organizations,	the	fact	that	they	were	able	to	coordinate	their	activity	and	even	collaborate	to	the	degree	that	they	did	tells	us	something	important	about	this	moment	in	human	rights	history.		While	the	Helsinki	Final	Act	was	not	the	first	international	agreement	to	have	addressed	the	notion	of	
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individual	rights,	the	unique	structure	of	the	CSCE	follow	up	process	provided	participating	states	with	a	previously	unavailable	opportunity	to	make	concern	for	a	state’s	domestic	human	rights	record	a	legitimate	matter	of	international	relations.		Furthermore,	this	newly	articulated	area	of	international	accountability	was	set	forth	within	the	context	of	a	larger	comprehensive	economic,	technological	and	security	agreement	between	Eastern,	Western,	and	non-aligned	states.		It	was	this	implicit	linkage	between	the	humanitarian	provisions	of	the	Final	Act	and	these	other	areas	of	interstate	cooperation	that	helped	situate	the	Helsinki	process	as	a	potentially	profound	force	for	change	within	existing	Cold	War	relations.			However,	the	signing	of	the	Final	Act	merely	set	the	stage	for	such	change,	as	the	ultimate	impact	of	the	Helsinki	process	was	by	no	means	guaranteed	at	the	time	of	the	summit’s	conclusion.		Rather,	it	was	the	efforts	of	nongovernmental	organizations	in	the	years	that	followed	which	helped	to	pressure	states	to	respect	this	linkage	in	the	course	of	their	official	relations.		But	more	than	just	an	object	of	political	decorum	to	be	observed	by	governments,	these	groups	sought	to	stress	the	central	place	that	human	rights	had	in	the	lives	of	everyday	citizens.		This	too	comported	with	the	language	of	the	Final	Act,	which	asserted	the	responsibility	of	individuals	to	know	and	act	upon	their	rights	and	duties	with	respect	to	the	agreement’s	humanitarian	articles,	as	well	as	confirmed	the	positive	role	that	private	citizens	were	considered	capable	of	playing	when	contributing	to	overall	cooperation	and	improved	relations	between	societies.	The	text	of	the	Final	Act	provided	these	nongovernmental	organizations	with	a	common	transnational	normative	framework—to	be	equally	and	unreservedly	applied	among	participating	states—that	standardized	notions	of	human	rights,	and	specified	the	obligations	and	duties	of	both	state	and	non-state	actors	alike.		In	addition	to	their	lobbying	of	participating	governments,	these	organizations	worked	to	affirm	this	framework	by	engaging	with	the	broader	international	public	through	the	process	of	increased	cross-cultural	cooperation	called	for	in	Final	Act.		International	events	such	as	book	fairs,	professional	conferences,	scientific	forums,	and	even	the	CSCE	follow	up	meetings	themselves	provided	a	common	transnational	space	in	which	these	groups	could	make	their	voices	heard,	and	advance	their	calls	for	the	protection	of	human	rights.		Furthermore,	these	groups	utilized	a	common	transnational	discursive	field	to	transmit	
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this	message—newspapers,	reports,	and	studies—that	enabled	them	to	communicate	directly	with	private	individuals	for	the	purposes	of	furthering	greater	global	understanding	of	the	challenges	facing	this	new	transnational	mandate.			In	this	way,	nongovernmental	Helsinki	monitoring	organizations	were	able	to	free	themselves	from	a	reliance	on	the	state-centric	enforcement	paradigm,	in	which	a	government	or	international	organization	was	considered	the	ultimate	arbiter	of	reform	for	human	rights.		No	longer	would	these	organizations	have	to	content	themselves	with	simply	lobbying	for	the	inclusion	of	human	rights	protections	within	the	context	of	a	government’s	international	relations.		Instead,	under	the	new	normative	framework	established	by	the	Final	Act	and	embraced	by	Helsinki	monitoring	groups,	activists	could	now	work	to	directly	alter	a	state’s	behavior	through	the	application	of	their	own	endogenous	pressure—exerted	through	the	direct	empowerment	of	nongovernmental	actors	within	the	functioning	of	a	global	society.			With	the	benefit	of	hindsight,	transnational	Helsinki	advocacy	networks	of	the	late	1970s	and	early	80s	can	be	regarded	as	having	played	a	major	contributive	role	in	laying	the	seeds	of	the	post-Cold	War	efflorescence	in	nongovernmental	human	rights	activism	in	areas	around	the	globe.		Organizations	like	the	U.S.	Helsinki	Watch	Committee	helped	to	delineate	models	of	human	rights	advocacy	that	could	be	easily	adopted	by	individual	citizens	and	organizations,	irrespective	of	the	particular	target	government	or	the	nature	of	the	reform	in	question.		The	success	of	Helsinki	Watch	and	its	ultimate	incorporation	into	the	globally	influential	organization	Human	Rights	Watch	by	the	late	1980s	is	a	testament	to	this	model’s	efficacy	and	adaptability.		Yet	in	today’s	world,	as	populist	and	nationalist	sentiments	gain	increasing	popularity	within	long-standing	liberal	democratic	societies	such	as	the	United	States	and	Western	Europe,	we	must	question	the	long-term	viability	of	this	model	of	transnational	human	rights	activism.		New	challenges,	such	as	mass	migration,	global	climate	change,	and	continued	technological	disruption	exert	unfamiliar	pressures	on	the	ideological	foundations	central	to	the	advocacy	strategies	described	in	this	thesis,	and	perhaps	even	risk	undermining	the	individual’s	faith	in	the	power	and	propriety	of	transnational	human	rights	themselves.				
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